Nuclear Agreement and Internal Struggles between Iran and the U.S.

The foreign ministers of Iran and the 1+5 countries gathered at the Munich Security Conference to find a diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear issue. Iran, the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia set a deadline of March 24, equivalent to Farvardin 4, to agree on a framework that would pave the way for a final and comprehensive agreement by June 30 (mid-Tir). Meanwhile, Israel warns that reaching an agreement (as described by this country) leaves Iran's hand open to produce nuclear weapons, causing concern in Israel. Representatives of the U.S. Republican Party, who gained a majority in the Senate and House of Representatives following the recent congressional elections, invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to speak in Congress in Esfand. This invitation has drawn criticism from U.S. President Barack Obama and his supporters in the Democratic Party. Tehran rejects the accusations from Western powers and their allies that it is seeking the capability to produce nuclear weapons. However, neither Iran's uranium enrichment program nor its sensitive nuclear activities have been halted, nor have the sanctions from the U.S., the European Union, and the UN Security Council against Iran, which aim to weaken Iran's economy. According to international news agencies, although the disagreement over the number of centrifuges Iran can keep operational under a long-term agreement has decreased, disagreements over the lifting or timeline of sanctions remain. Three guests on this week's program, coinciding with the Munich Security Conference, are examining the status of Iran's nuclear file: Reza Taghizadeh, a professor of political science and international relations in Glasgow; Mansour Farhang, a senior professor of international relations in New York; and Rasoul Nafisi, an analyst of Iran-U.S. relations in Washington. Mr. Nafisi, let's start with you and your expressions of support and doubts about the Obama administration's approach to the nuclear negotiations with Iran and the 1+5. The atmosphere before the President's annual speech was heavy, which I believe changed suddenly with this speech, and we saw that even Hillary Clinton, who is likely to be a candidate in the next election and usually distances herself from the President's foreign policy, fully supported this policy for negotiations. Rasoul Nafisi: The atmosphere before the U.S. President's annual speech was heavy, which I believe changed suddenly with this speech, and we saw that even Hillary Clinton, who is likely to be a candidate in the next election and usually distances herself from the President's foreign policy, fully supported this policy for negotiations. Even some members of Congress who were previously opposed to Obama's policies and were more hawkish, such as Kirsten Gillibrand and Cory Booker, came out in support; I cannot say the atmosphere has become peaceful, but the intensity has diminished, and they even said they would postpone sanctions. We have also seen that support for negotiations with Iran has increased in many influential newspapers. I believe that the duality that the President mentioned in his speech, that is, either negotiations or war, and then added that we can no longer consider war as an option, was very effective. I believe that the four Democratic senators necessary to (collaborate with them) pass this bill will definitely no longer be available to Republicans, and the future of these negotiations is much clearer than a few months ago. Mr. Farhang, what is your opinion? Does the support for the Obama administration's approach to negotiations carry more weight or do the challenges that this administration faces within U.S. domestic politics? I generally agree with Mr. Nafisi's optimism. The reason is that I know the interests of the U.S. government and even I want to say the interests of the ruling system or regime of the U.S. and the interests of the Iranian regime have created the necessity to find a solution to this problem that is bearable for both sides. Iran's motivations are more economic. Iran's oil sales have dropped to one-fifth of what they were in 2011, and economically Iran is in a deadlock, and there is a consensus in Iran that solving the country's economic issues is contingent upon finding a solution to the nuclear issue. In the U.S., particularly with the influence of Israel, Iran's nuclear program can have two paths that can alleviate the concerns of the Western world. One is that this program remains at a level of uranium enrichment and uranium stockpiling that is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so that even if Iran decides to change its position and move towards acquiring the capability to build nuclear weapons, it would need time; at least a year. If this path, the diplomatic one, cannot alleviate concerns, meaning if it cannot at least contain Iran's nuclear program for a specified period of five or ten years as stipulated in the agreement, then the other option in the U.S. could be the option of war. When we come to the option of war, over 73% of the American public supports the option of diplomacy and currently opposes the military option. When we reach foreign policy analysts in the U.S., only a few influenced by Israel accept the option of war; they want to destroy the foundation of Iran's nuclear program and leave no potential for Iran to pursue uranium enrichment or build nuclear weapons even in the future. Therefore, I think U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and generally even in Libya and Yemen have put those who always want to solve issues using military options on the defensive, and public opinion does not support them at all. Thus, the realities on both sides have led the parties to seek a solution, and I believe that both Obama's speech and the statements made in Iran and the continuation of these negotiations give hope that this issue can be resolved peacefully and diplomatically without resorting to violence. I, like Mr. Nafisi, am relatively optimistic. Mr. Taghizadeh, how do you see the outlook? Unfortunately, I cannot share the optimism of Mr. Nafisi and Mr. Farhang and do not believe that the atmosphere governing the negotiations, especially after the President's annual speech, has changed. A glance at the media associated with the Islamic Republic's government, especially in the past two weeks, shows that this atmosphere has become much heavier than before, and I believe that the longer these negotiations last, the less likely it is for an agreement to be reached between the parties. The negotiations are now limited to discussions that Iran is having with the U.S., and even the walking of Zarif, the Iranian Foreign Minister, with the U.S. Secretary of State is criticized by those who oppose reaching a nuclear agreement in Iran. There has been minimal change on the ground in recent weeks, especially after the new Congress took power in the U.S., and there is such support for introducing two bills that propose potential sanctions if the negotiations do not reach an agreement and set a timeline for them, that even if, for example, they are passed, Iranian oil products will be sanctioned in August, and in November, sanctions will include Iranian government officials, and in the following month, Iran's financial resources and foreign relations will be sanctioned, etc. Another bill that is still being discussed and may reach the Senate for a vote concerns the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Bob Corker, who wants any agreement with Iran to be approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives. I do not know what change has occurred on the scene that observers should be more optimistic about the future of the negotiations. What seems to be happening is that the atmosphere of the negotiations is becoming heavier while we do not see any specific will to politically overcome the obstacles. If there was such a will on both sides, it could have even laid the groundwork for reaching a comprehensive agreement at the time of the interim agreement. This situation has not changed compared to the past, and if it has changed, it has been in a negative direction. Mr. Nafisi, Mr. Taghizadeh sees the issues differently. However, in addition to other arguments you may have, I also have this question for you: Do the struggles of the anti-Western faction of the conservative camp with the Rouhani government have an impact on the negotiations or not? If you assume that Mr. Khamenei was opposed to these negotiations, they would never have taken place. Mr. Farhang pointed out the very broad economic problems. The situation is such that there can no longer be hardliners and moderates in Iran. The situation ultimately compels both sides to find a way to come to terms and later cheat and disrupt things. Rasoul Nafisi: Allow me to say regarding Mr. Taghizadeh's remarks that the situation he described is indeed correct; this is the prevailing situation. Mr. Farhang and I do not think we have a disagreement about the fact that the prevailing situation after the midterm elections, where Republicans took both houses, was very dark. I mentioned this. However, it seems that after Obama's speech, the transformations I mentioned, especially, for example, Hillary Clinton's support or that the sanctions plan was postponed, have completely changed the tone of newspapers like the Wall Street Journal and others. In the part concerning Iran, you mentioned that the atmosphere has become heavier; you proposed a very important hypothesis, which is that the longer it takes, the worse it is for the agreement. This hypothesis should be examined. I do not quite agree with this very important hypothesis, Mr. Taghizadeh. Because in Iran, this issue needs to settle in. The longer it takes, the more the hardliners get used to seeing Iranians and Americans together. There should be discussions of reconciliation, discussions of peace. They should see that foreign ministers are walking together. All of these will have a significant psychological impact on the prevailing atmosphere in Iran. Ultimately, the one who speaks first is not Mr. Khamenei. But he always has the last word. Sometimes he does speak first, of course. But generally, he waits and has the last word. With the moderation he has shown this time, even though he mocked in his speech two weeks ago that yes, let them negotiate, Mr. Khamenei has taken this approach in front of the Revolutionary Guards and hardliners who oppose any agreement... to gradually settle an issue. If you assume that Mr. Khamenei was opposed to these negotiations, they would never have taken place. Mr. Farhang mentioned the very broad economic problems. The situation is such that there can no longer be hardliners and moderates in Iran. The situation ultimately compels both sides to find a way to come to terms and later cheat and disrupt things. For this reason, I believe the most important part of the 1+5 agreement with Iran should be on the additional protocol. This allows IAEA inspectors and those sent to inspect Iranian facilities directly and without prior notice. This will be the most difficult part of the agreement because Iranian officials believe they are spies and want to find Iran's military sites and so on. If the parties can reach an agreement at this key point, I believe the agreement will be made. The other four or five points are not important. The most important part is that Iran cannot cheat in the future and reassure other countries that it is not seeking a nuclear bomb. Otherwise, regarding the struggle that exists in Iran between the reformist and conservative factions, I believe the conservative faction has lost this game. And now the President and the Foreign Minister are in the dominant position. Of course, this is my opinion, and my friends may certainly have different views. Mr. Farhang, if Benjamin Netanyahu's presence in the U.S. Congress occurs, could it act as an obstacle to forming an agreement between Iran and the 1+5? Or is it not that influential? There are some who, because they do not want reformist groups like Rouhani, Rafsanjani, or Khatami to gain credibility from resolving this issue, criticize this, but when they reach that middle ground that is acceptable to both sides, they will also remain silent, just as they did regarding the Iran-Iraq war.