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Nuclear Agreement and Political Opening

Feb 1, 2026 February 1, 2026 12 min read 📰 Radio Farda
📋 Key Takeaway

The article discusses the implications of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the 1+5 countries on the political landscape in Iran, focusing on the challenges and opportunities for political opening under President Hassan Rouhani. Key political figures express skepticism about the government's ability to fulfill its electoral promises amidst systemic resistance and highlight the importance of strengthening civil society and the middle class for meaningful reform.

🔍 Quick Context Guide
💡 Bottom Line: The nuclear agreement has sparked debate on political reform in Iran, but systemic resistance poses significant challenges.

👥 Key Players

Hassan Rouhani MENTIONED
President of Iran
"Rouhani's administration negotiated the nuclear agreement and promised political reforms."
Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari MENTIONED
Member of the Central Council of the National Trust Party
"He provides insight into the internal political dynamics and challenges within Iran."
Hassan Shariati MENTIONED
Political Activist
"Offers a critical perspective on Rouhani's priorities and the systemic challenges to political reform."
Taghi Rahmani MENTIONED
Political Activist from the National-Religious faction
"Discusses the broader challenges facing democratic forces in Iran."

📰 What Happened

Following the nuclear agreement with the 1+5 countries, discussions have emerged about the potential for political reform in Iran under President Rouhani. Key political figures express skepticism about the government's ability to fulfill its electoral promises due to systemic resistance.

  • The nuclear agreement has raised questions about political reform in Iran.
  • There is skepticism about the government's ability to implement promised reforms due to internal resistance.

💡 Why It Matters

🇮🇷 For Iran: The potential for political reform could impact Iran's internal governance and civil society development.
🌍 Regional: Iran's political stability is significant for regional security and relations with neighboring countries.
🌐 International: The success or failure of reforms could influence Iran's relations with Western countries and the implementation of the nuclear agreement.

📚 Background

The nuclear agreement between Iran and the 1+5 countries aimed to limit Iran's nuclear capabilities in exchange for lifting economic sanctions. President Rouhani's election promises included political reforms, which are now under scrutiny.

Iran nuclear deal Iranian political reform
📡 Source: NEUTRAL
📊 Confidence: 70%
The article presents views from various political figures, providing a balanced perspective on the challenges of political reform in Iran.

Following the nuclear agreement between Iran and the 1+5 countries, whispers have emerged in political circles, media, and social networks in Iran regarding the fate of the political promises made by Hassan Rouhani's government during the June 2013 elections. This week's guests on the program "Views" address this key question: Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari, a member of the Central Council of the National Trust Party in Mashhad, Hassan Shariati, a political activist in Hamburg, and Taghi Rahmani, a political activist from the National-Religious faction in Paris. Political development and opening in the post-agreement era from the perspective of Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari, Hassan Shariati, and Taghi Rahmani. Mr. Javadi Hesari, does the Rouhani government have the desire and ability to take actions towards political opening in Iran after the nuclear agreement? At least to the extent of the electoral promises made in 2013? Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari: There is no doubt about the desire and will, which is clearly visible within the government. However, I believe that the ability to fulfill these promises becomes harder as we get closer to the elections. The structure of the government at the top has changed, but there has been no serious change in the body. Especially since there are two or three internal areas like the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, where external manifestations face heavy and stubborn resistance. In the Ministry of Intelligence, as one of my friends puts it, the ministers' influence in these areas extends only to their office. They can only instruct their office manager to follow up on a task, and even that is very difficult to achieve. In the Ministry of Interior, especially, there is resistance in the body, and if they want to create an opening, it starts from the executive committees. The government must directly issue a directive to the Ministry of Interior, to governors and district governors, to reconstruct the previous executive committees. As soon as those thirty people are elected to choose the eleven-member executive committee, two of whom are the governor and the registrar, the other nine must genuinely represent public opinion. If this does not happen, with the direct and indirect interventions of the Guardian Council and the resistance of the previously established executive committees, which are generally aligned with Ahmadinejad, we should not have much hope of making progress in the elections. Unless a fortunate event occurs in the voting and participation is so high that they cannot do anything significant. Mr. Shariati, what obstacles does Rouhani's government face in advancing political opening and reducing restrictions on political activities of marginalized or suppressed tendencies? Hassan Shariati: Mr. Rouhani may not personally prioritize the reopening of the political space. He has focused more on repairing the economic situation and has taken steps in this direction. The reason is that, in general, this system may reach a consensus on security threats that threaten its existence, which we may call a last-minute rationality. For example, like the nuclear agreement or the fact that the threat of ISIS in the region reaches a very critical level, a consensus arises that the nationalistic component must be separated from the religious component among Iranian ethnic groups to reduce ISIS's potential for infiltration. Mr. Rouhani can easily go to Kurdistan and promise to establish a Kurdish language department at the University of Kurdistan. This passive or reactive rationality, under a security measure that maintaining the system is a top priority, always arises in addressing something that we know as civil society, which has not been a primary threat to the existence of this system until now. Therefore, even if Mr. Rouhani has such a desire, which I doubt, reaching a consensus on such an opening across all blocks of the system is very difficult because there is no serious threat to the existence of the system. However, if Mr. Rouhani had such a desire, like Mr. Obama, who made referring to the people part of his agenda during the nuclear agreement, Mr. Rouhani must also refer to the people. In the following sections, I will explain how civil society can help Mr. Rouhani democratize society so that he can turn this consensus into a realization that civil society can also be a threat to a system that has dissatisfied the society. Mr. Rahmani, to what extent is the desire and ability for political opening visible in the government and among supporters of the so-called moderate and reformist factions? Taghi Rahmani: Generally, there is a difference that we think democratic forces in Iran are the determining force. In the entire history after the National Movement of Constitutionalism, we have made this mistake, and it ended with the Green Movement. For democratic forces in Iran to become the determining force, they must be at the forefront, but their governance faces serious obstacles. This means that we want to condition or limit the government, and we need law, civil institutions, parties, and media. We do not have these properly at our disposal. For this, we need an open space. If our paradigm is not revolution, it automatically becomes reform. When we say reform, our main theme is reaching an open space. If democratic forces pay attention to this, then both the past can be criticized and the future can be seen. To achieve an open space under current conditions, I believe the nuclear issue and Rouhani's coming to power have opened a space for bureaucrats to maneuver. In the reform process, when bureaucrats gain power, the democratic forces, who are not determining, can help with the opening of the space. The open space is also a gradual matter and is shaped by the correct performance of political forces in Iran. A major obstacle to democracy-seeking, not the main obstacle, is the obstacle of despotism. There is no discussion about that. But a major strategic obstacle is that change-seeking forces in Iran become deluded about power, and their actions are incorrect. Like in 1360 and even this reformist movement and the Participation Front in the sixth parliament. They do not consider the calculations and relationships. This mistake may happen again because we create a duality that the system must go, and we must take its place. Can we take its place? This is an important discussion. At one point, you say you are looking to open the space. In the process of gradually opening the space, many events may occur, whether the system exists or not. In my opinion, this is also a point. For democratic forces, reconsidering the balance of power is very important. For example, after 1388, the issue has changed. The regional atmosphere has changed. The right-wing forces have rebuilt themselves. They have brought many new generations into universities. They have a ten percent force. They have a repressive military force. All of these are serious obstacles that a democratic force can take positions that help open the space without considering Mr. Rouhani as their savior or even Mr. Khatami as their savior in the balance of power. In the next discussion, I will explain. Mr. Javadi Hesari, in the post-nuclear agreement conditions that Mr. Rahmani referred to, outside the limits of the government and in the arena where political activists can play a role, what path do you see as more practical and effective for advancing political opening? Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari: There are several types. In my opinion, one of the most important is strengthening the middle economy of society. If they are strengthened, this middle or bureaucratic class can help institutionalize economic openings. They can strengthen newspapers. They can strengthen parties. They can provide the essentials for life towards development in society. During Ahmadinejad's era, unfortunately, the focus was on the lower classes of society in their perception. Of course, they did not do this. But they wanted to direct their attention to the lower classes of society. The middle and upper management class of Iranian society, if strengthened, can help significantly in economic, political, and cultural development to strengthen civil institutions. Mr. Javadi Hesari, in this case, votes often go to the electoral basket of people like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose slogan was bringing oil to the people's table. Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari: That was a deception. It was a lie. But if we want to look at the issue realistically, whenever this middle class of Iranian society has been strengthened, cultural and political development has been considered, and following that, the essentials and institutions of political opening have also been considered, such as the development of knowledge, the development of newspapers, the development of parties. Now, to achieve sustainable development, we need to transform the government from a purely powerful, one-sided institution to an interactive institution with the body of society, to powerful parties, and to change the government's approach from a state-centered view to an interactive and party-based government. If Mr. Rouhani's government can provide mechanisms in the new space, with backing to the needs of international interactions and international attention to this area, the government must come out of this concentration and create a civil government. A political government based on parties can help us move towards institutionalizing civil society. Strengthening the middle class of Iran, the industrial and scientific section of Iran can also help provide the essentials for that work, which includes the development of parties, NGOs, trade unions, and civil liberties. Our main solution is to change this government-centered approach towards a government elected by parties, NGOs, and the bureaucratic section of society, meaning that middle and managerial section of society. Mr. Shariati, do you see any issues in Mr. Javadi Hesari's statements? Among the paths that transformation-seeking tendencies propose for political opening these days, which do you think is less costly and more profitable? Hassan Shariati: Logically, what Mr. Javadi Hesari says is correct. But what is logical does not usually coincide with what occurs. In this regard, it is logical that the structure of this system has been based on hostility towards the West and the security threat to its existence since the beginning of the revolution. Such a structure has turned into a new authoritarian state based on a religious ideological discourse that seeks to impose authority on society. For this reason, lower classes of society are seen as agents that can be easily bought... and you know that in Iran, about 60 percent of society directly or indirectly depends on the government and the system for their livelihood, according to statistics provided by Iranian economic researchers today. Therefore, such a society and such a structure, after this peace agreement with the US and the West, must gradually become an orderly society, and the middle class must gradually come to power, and one of the important ways to achieve that is economic reforms. However, this is not simultaneous, and it is not the case that just because it is logical, it will necessarily happen. Civil society must play an important role, and what Mr. Rahmani says about political institutions exaggerating their power or civil society exaggerating its power may not differentiate between potential power and actual power. The reality is that the stability of any system is owed to the social base that, as a result of this social base, is at least qualitatively dependent on solidarity with civil society. What causes such a base to exist in new authoritarian societies and for civil society to lack vitality is that authoritarian regimes appropriate civil society institutions. They plant government agents in these institutions to work in their favor. Among the ways to democratize society, in addition to the economic reforms that Mr. Javadi Hesari correctly mentioned and are very important, political and civil forces should strive to democratize and liberalize civil society institutions. This means that civil society institutions must be cleansed of government agents in their statutes and must elect representatives of civil society in their elections. I believe this is even more important for civil society than parliamentary elections and presidential elections. That is, alongside the occurrence of relatively freer elections and the people's votes shaping laws and altering the balance of power, one of the most important tasks is that we must help liberalize civil society, and this liberalization of civil society is what, if a middle section emerges, will reflect the demands of the people, and not a united and offshoot of the system that the system has appropriated for its benefit. Mr. Rahmani, what do you think about Mr. Shariati's remarks regarding the distinction between potential and actual power of independent and dissenting forces, as well as how much strength and capacity do marginalized tendencies from the power circle and transformation-seekers inside and outside Iran have to influence the decisions of the rulers or mobilize critical and dissenting sections that Mr. Shariati mentioned? Taghi Rahmani: Mr. Shariati pointed out a very good point. We must see how much the performance of political groups inside and outside has strengthened civil society and how much they have lacked the full capacity to gain power, which peaked, in my opinion, from 1977 to 1981. Then the mistake made during the reform period... the government-centered view essentially wants to hasten civil society to a place where it does not have the capacity. We currently have 9 to 10 civil institutions that the government is fighting fiercely against.

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Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →

Translation confidence: 85%

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