Nuclear Agreement; Continuation of Arms Sanctions, Acceptance of Military Site Inspections

One of the last obstacles to finalizing the nuclear talks in Vienna was the issue of arms sanctions. Iranian nuclear negotiators insisted that these sanctions should be lifted all at once, while their American counterparts emphasized that arms sanctions against Iran should continue, assuming the Lausanne document as an unchangeable framework. Meanwhile, China and Russia, unlike other members of the P5+1 group, supported the lifting of arms sanctions. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov justified Moscow's request by stating that Iran participates in the fight against ISIS, and lifting these sanctions would enhance Iran's ability to combat terrorism. Ultimately, negotiators opted for a middle ground, choosing a gradual lifting of arms sanctions. Accordingly, arms and missile sanctions will continue for five and eight years, respectively. The scope of sanctions in UN Security Council resolutions first imposed arms sanctions on Iran nine years ago in 2006 based on Resolution 1737, which included nuclear and missile materials. However, in March 2007, with the issuance of Resolution 1747, the sanctions were extended to conventional weapons, covering items such as tanks, armored vehicles, high-caliber artillery systems, fighter jets, attack helicopters, warships, missiles, and missile systems. This resolution also called on UN member states to refrain from providing any technical training, financial assistance, and investment in conventional weapons in Iran. The arms sanctions against Iran were first imposed nine years ago in 2006 based on Resolution 1737 of the Security Council, which included nuclear and missile materials. However, in March 2007, with the issuance of Resolution 1747, the sanctions were extended to conventional weapons. With the issuance of Resolution 1929 in 2010, five years ago, the scope of sanctions was further expanded, prohibiting Iran from any activities related to ballistic missiles capable of carrying and launching nuclear weapons. This resolution also prohibited the sale of weapons to Iran and banned the transfer and export of weapons to third countries. A brief overview of the wide range of sanctions mentioned in the three Security Council resolutions shows that their continuation could significantly reduce Iran's deterrent capability in regional security equations and prevent it from qualitatively developing its missile capabilities, which, in the absence of a modern and efficient air force, is the most important deterrent factor for Iran and currently holds a significant position in the military doctrine of this country, which is defensive in nature. Iran's argument in the final days of the nuclear talks for lifting arms sanctions was that the current security requirements in the region necessitate lifting arms restrictions against Iran to confront extremism and the expansion of ISIS's influence. Furthermore, the continuation of arms sanctions, alongside Iran's acceptance of enrichment limitations and its cooperation regarding potential military dimensions of the nuclear program (PMD), and consequently alleviating the security concerns of Western countries, is unjustifiable. In contrast, the American argument was that until Iran meets the explicit demands of the Security Council, sanctions should continue, and that lifting sanctions is conditional and closely related to Iran's future behavior. However, regardless of this argument, the U.S., considering its concerns and worries in the region, does not generally have a positive view on lifting arms restrictions and is aware of its impact on its allies in the region, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia. With the lifting of restrictions and the release of Iran's frozen assets, this country could provide more effective assistance to Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the Assad regime, disrupting the balance of power in the region. Additionally, a major concern for the U.S. is that lifting arms sanctions would enable Iran to effectively challenge the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf. A week before the comprehensive nuclear agreement, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, in remarks to Congress, opposed the lifting of arms sanctions and emphasized the need to prevent the advancement of Iran's ballistic missile program, stating, "This country should not acquire intercontinental missiles and have the capability to launch missiles from Iran to the U.S." As mentioned above, the arms sanctions, which include a wide range of conventional and unconventional weapons, will continue for five years, although this period can be reduced if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is fully assured of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, or in other words, if the PMD issue is resolved. Concurrently, Iran will be deprived of importing ballistic missile technology for eight years. Conflicting interpretations regarding the fate of the S-300 system Despite this, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, in a televised interview on Tuesday, July 22, downplayed these sanctions, stating, "The missile and arms sanctions as outlined in the resolutions will be lifted... and regarding arms sanctions, a kind of limitation has been created for five years." American officials, looking beyond Iran's nuclear program, deem the continuation of arms sanctions necessary considering the regional situation and Iran's role, while Russia, given its political and economic interests, seeks to modify or eliminate the sanctions as soon as possible. On the same day, Barack Obama emphasized the five and eight-year arms and missile sanctions mentioned in the comprehensive nuclear agreement in a televised speech. However, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, referring to Russia's support for a kind of agreement between Iranian officials and their Western counterparts regarding arms sanctions, stated, "The sanctions will last five years [but during this five years, the delivery of weapons to Iran will be possible with the knowledge and through the verification process of the Security Council [of the UN]." Simultaneously, one of the Iranian nuclear negotiators, who wished to remain anonymous, told the Russian news agency RIA Novosti, "Based on this agreement, Iran can provide defensive weapons to its regional allies to combat terrorism and extremism." In this context, Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan, following the comprehensive nuclear agreement, implicitly referring to arms sanctions, told the managers and staff of his ministry, "The defense industries of the Ministry of Defense are fundamentally based on self-reliance and breaking dependency, and as long as sanctions or limitations continue, our defense industries will be able to meet the country's defense needs in response to potential threats." The inconsistent interpretations and statements, and in some cases contradictory remarks from Iranian, Russian, and American officials regarding arms sanctions could pose serious challenges to the implementation of this part of the comprehensive nuclear agreement. American officials, looking beyond Iran's nuclear program, deem the continuation of arms sanctions necessary considering the regional situation and Iran's role, while Russia, given its political and economic interests, seeks to modify or eliminate the sanctions as soon as possible. Vladimir Putin, by refusing previous agreements between Russia and the U.S. regarding Iran, and also with a new interpretation of Security Council Resolution 1929 - the same resolution under which Dmitry Medvedev, the then President of Russia, canceled the sale of the S-300 system to Iran - is willing to deliver this system to Iran. In this regard, a Russian official stated on July 22 to the Interfax news agency that the continuation of arms sanctions for five years has no effect on the delivery of the S-300 system to Iran. "The S-300 is a purely defensive system, and not only does the 2010 resolution [Resolution 1929] not cover it, but the comprehensive nuclear agreement between Iran and the six mediating countries [the P5+1] also does not include it." However, if we consider Sergey Lavrov's statements as a basis for the delivery of weapons to Iran, the delivery of the S-300 system requires the approval of the Security Council and consequently the U.S., France, and the UK, which hold veto power, and it is uncertain whether they would agree to deliver this system to Iran. Inspections of Military Sites Based on the Additional Protocol, the International Atomic Energy Agency is allowed to inspect sites, including military sites, of the countries implementing the protocol, provided they present reasons and manage the inspections. However, those countries can legally challenge the reasons for inspections, which will result in lengthy discussions to reach some kind of agreement. In the case of Iran, which has accepted the Additional Protocol, the time frame for resolving the issue of inspections of military sites, if Iran challenges the Agency's request, has been reduced to a total of 24 days. This means that initially, Iran and the Agency have 14 days to resolve the disputed issue. Otherwise, the matter will be referred to an eight-member commission consisting of representatives from Iran, the European Union, and the P5+1 countries. In the case of Iran, which has accepted the Additional Protocol, the time frame for resolving the issue of inspections of military sites, if Iran challenges the Agency's request, has been reduced to a total of 24 days. This commission will have one week to examine the issue of whether or not to implement the inspections and will officially inform Iran of its decision within three days. The commission's decision requires a majority vote, and since the U.S. and its allies, namely the European Union, Germany, the UK, and France, hold the majority and can veto any action by Iran, China, and Russia, the outcome is predetermined. With these details, despite Ayatollah Khamenei's statements that allowing inspections of Iran's military bases and sites is a "red line" for the Islamic Republic, and the repeated warnings from the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards on this matter, IAEA inspectors can inspect Iran's military sites if necessary, following the established process for this purpose. In other words, if the Islamic Republic wants to implement the provisions of the comprehensive nuclear agreement unconditionally, the Agency's inspections of Iran's military sites will be inevitable. While red lines have been broken or faded one after another, the country's Friday prayer leaders emphasized three days after the comprehensive nuclear agreement in their sermons on July 26 that Ayatollah Khamenei's red lines in the nuclear agreement must be respected.