The visit of the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to facilities in Anarak, east of Isfahan, prior to his trip to Moscow and the signing of a document referred to as the 'contract for the construction of two new nuclear reactors,' indicates the emergence of a new dimension in the controversial nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic. The Anarak facility, which Ali Akbar Salehi visited, is said to be nearing completion after 'eight years of effort and site selection' and is intended to become the 'permanent storage and stabilization site for Iran's nuclear waste.' The new nuclear center will apparently not only serve as a 'dumping site for nuclear waste' but is also expected to become a center for 'stabilizing fuel waste,' a highly controversial and sensitive action that could be seen as a third path to obtaining explosive material for a nuclear bomb. The other two paths to obtaining a bomb are uranium enrichment at Natanz or Fordow or any other undisclosed location, and obtaining plutonium-238 after igniting the heavy water reactor under construction in Arak. Currently, the volume of radioactive waste in Iran is very small and limited to the remnants of radiotherapy in hospitals and the small amount of fuel waste from the decommissioned Tehran research reactor, which is mostly off for most of the year. Until the end of the useful life of the first fuel rods of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, the volume of Iran's radioactive waste will remain at its current level. The average lifespan of nuclear fuel rods is about four years, during which their yield gradually decreases. Regarding the management of the fuel waste from the Bushehr reactor, Iran has a contract with Russia for the delivery of fuel waste to that country. Due to the sensitivity and importance of nuclear waste management and the possibility of processing waste for military uses, the United States was opposed to sending the necessary fuel for the Bushehr reactor to Iran until the nuclear waste delivery contract with Russia was signed. Only after the signing of that contract at the end of 2004 and securing U.S. approval did Russia proceed with the delivery of fuel to Iran. Currently, the Bushehr reactor is under the supervision of inspectors from the Agency, and its fuel waste will be temporarily stored in warehouses next to the reactor's fuel storage. In the next phase, under the Agency's supervision, the fuel waste from the Bushehr reactor is expected to be sent to Russia for 'stabilization and burial' immediately, and not to Anarak in Isfahan. The cost of receiving, stabilizing, and burying nuclear waste from nearly one hundred tons of fuel transported to Iran is close to eighty million dollars. If the fuel waste from the Bushehr reactor is not delivered to Russia, that country could, based on the signed contract, refuse to deliver the necessary fuel to the Bushehr reactor. One of the side questions regarding the newly signed document in Moscow for the construction of two nuclear reactors is the issue of fuel supply and then the management of waste. Currently, Iran is legally prohibited from receiving nuclear materials from abroad for enrichment or natural fuel based on Security Council resolutions (the Bushehr reactor is an exception). Reprocessing waste; why? Nuclear fuel after use in the reactor core still contains over 90% of recyclable materials for reuse as fuel or for military purposes. It is noteworthy that the cost of recycling nuclear fuel is higher than purchasing fresh fuel. Nevertheless, some reactor holders prefer to resort to recycling nuclear waste for two reasons: one is to reduce the volume of nuclear waste and adhere to environmental considerations, and the other is to avoid paying for waste burial. Russia has reprocessing equipment for nuclear fuel waste. One of the most advanced reprocessing facilities for light water or pressurized reactors, called Sellafield, is located in the UK, and another called COGEMA is in France. Japan, which currently sends its waste for reprocessing to the UK, is expected to establish its own facilities in that country. Regarding the Islamic Republic's decision to establish a center for 'stabilizing and burying nuclear waste,' it is doubtful that environmental considerations or financial savings for recycling waste that has not yet been produced are being taken into account. In recent months, it has been reported that the Islamic Republic buries radioactive waste in border areas of Sistan and Baluchestan. The choice of Anarak in Isfahan, given its urban status on one hand and the sensitivity of burying nuclear waste on the other, is of greater importance. Recycling fuel waste is a chemical process in which usable materials remaining in the waste are separated from actual waste and reused. As a result of recycling nuclear fuel, 96% uranium recovery, 1% plutonium, and 3% actual waste will occur. Currently, there are 34 reprocessing and stabilization plants for nuclear waste in the world. If the Anarak unit in Isfahan is launched, this number will increase to 35. The sensitivity of completing the Anarak unit will increase when Iran refuses to return its nuclear waste from Bushehr. One hundred tons of waste from the Bushehr reactor would be sufficient to produce dozens of nuclear bombs.
Nuclear Fuel and Waste Issues: Iran's Third Path to a Bomb?
Iran's recent developments in nuclear waste management and the establishment of a facility in Anarak raise concerns about the potential for a third path to nuclear weapons. The facility is intended for the stabilization and permanent storage of nuclear waste, which could have military implications. This situation is critical as it highlights Iran's ongoing nuclear ambitions amidst international scrutiny.
👥 Key Players
⚡ Actions
📰 What Happened
Iran's Atomic Energy Organization expands nuclear capabilities with new reactor construction and waste management plans.
- Atomic Energy Organization of Iran announce new nuclear reactors, nuclear waste management
- Ali Akbar Salehi visit Anarak facility
- Iran manage nuclear waste
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
Iran's nuclear activities are expanding, potentially leading to further tensions.
📝 Key Evidence
🏷️ Entities Mentioned
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