Nuclear Memories of Hashemi Rafsanjani: From the Eight-Year War to the Approval of the JCPOA

The website 'Hope of Iranian Nuclear' published an interview on Tuesday, November 4, with Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the head of the Expediency Discernment Council, discussing Iran's nuclear program from the time of the eight-year war with Iraq to the Vienna nuclear agreement. He noted that Hassan Rouhani was not concerned about the approval of the JCPOA in the Islamic Consultative Assembly because the Speaker of the Assembly had previously assured him. According to him, Rouhani believed that the Assembly had no right to comment on the nuclear agreement, which is why he did not present a bill regarding this agreement to the Assembly, but 'since Mr. Larijani had previously told Mr. Rouhani that it would not be rejected in the Assembly, there was no cause for concern because they have a large faction of about 170-180 members.' The Islamic Consultative Assembly ultimately approved the JCPOA on October 21 with 161 votes in favor and 59 against. This event prompted reactions from opposing representatives like Mehdi Koochakzadeh and Hamid Rasai, who stated in the same Assembly session that Ali Larijani, along with Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Asghar Hajazi from the office of the Supreme Leader, had concluded in a meeting that the proposals from Assembly representatives regarding the JCPOA would not be raised, and that Ayatollah Khamenei was fundamentally opposed to the nuclear agreement. However, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani rejected the claim of Khamenei's opposition to the JCPOA. He mentioned that the Iranian nuclear file was 'starting to yield results' when Ali Larijani was pursuing negotiations. Larijani was responsible for nuclear negotiations during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency but was eventually replaced by Saeed Jalili, leading to a new phase of negotiations under Hassan Rouhani, with Mohammad Javad Zarif as the foreign minister. In another part of the interview, Rafsanjani discussed the Islamic Republic's approach to the nuclear program during the eight-year war with Iraq, stating that Iran had considered the possibility of acquiring a nuclear bomb at that time, although it was never pursued seriously: 'At the beginning, when we started, we were at war and were looking for such a possibility for the day when our enemy might use nuclear weapons against us. Such thinking existed. But it never became serious. However, we took civilian uses seriously and invested in many areas. We worked in various types and provided extensive training. We sent students and invited scientists. We did many of these things. The basis of our doctrine was peaceful nuclear use. Although it never left our minds that if one day we faced a threat and necessity arose, we would have the possibility to go the other way.' The accusation that the U.S. and its allies have leveled against the Islamic Republic in recent years has been the pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, Ayatollah Khamenei declared in a fatwa that acquiring nuclear weapons is forbidden and that the Islamic Republic is not seeking them. Rafsanjani also emphasized that Iran did not want to build a nuclear bomb and 'there is no need to go towards military nuclear issues,' but he simultaneously warned that if necessary, 'Iran's power' in this area 'is preserved': 'It is true that we are not allowed to go towards nuclear weapons, but if conditions arise and necessity is created, or if we encounter an enemy that wants to use this weapon, our power is preserved.' He also referred to the history of Iran's nuclear programs and the efforts to establish them, mentioning cooperation with Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani scientist and the father of nuclear weapons in that country. Rafsanjani stated: 'We reached stages where we became disappointed with the Germans and thought of other ideas. There were discussions with the Pakistanis. There was a nuclear scientist named Abdul Qadeer Khan in Pakistan. During a trip I made to Pakistan, I wanted to see him. But they did not show him to me. Ayatollah Khamenei also did not see him... Apparently, Mr. Abdul Qadeer Khan believed that the Islamic world should have a nuclear bomb and he was the one who built Pakistan's nuclear bomb. Although it took a long time to build the bomb.' He noted that Abdul Qadeer Khan eventually agreed to help 'to the extent that, for example, he provided second-hand first-generation centrifuges that enrich uranium, with plans' to Iran so that Iran could build them later. Abdul Qadeer Khan was arrested in 2004 after admitting to providing confidential information about nuclear programs to Iran, North Korea, and Libya and remained in prison for five years. Rafsanjani also discussed the resumption of activities at the Isfahan nuclear facility in the last days of Mohammad Khatami's presidency, stating that Khatami was initially opposed to this issue and did not accept it, but eventually was 'convinced': 'When Ahmadinejad came, with the Leader's decision, they decided to break the suspension. Before Ahmadinejad's work had even started, the reformist president was proposed to break the suspension. During that period, there were sometimes meetings with the Leader that a large number of people attended. In that group were the foreign minister, the president, the heads of the branches, myself, military figures like Shamkhani, and others, and consultations were made for step-by-step actions. The Leader's decisions were accepted based on consultations from that meeting. When Ahmadinejad came and said to break the suspension, the reformist president said that he would not break it because a heavy file of threats would remain for the next government and he did not want the next government to inherit this problem. Later, I do not know how they convinced the sitting president to break the suspension. From then on, the disputes intensified and the other issues have continued until now.' Khatami announced a few days before Ahmadinejad's presidency began that the suspension of activities at the Isfahan complex had caused 'significant financial and moral losses' for Iran and that since Iran had 'voluntarily' suspended the activities of this complex, it would resume its program, which was later followed by the unsealing of the Natanz site and thus intensified global pressure on Iran. Lastly, Rafsanjani addressed the Saadabad Agreement, another significant point in Iran's nuclear controversy, which was drafted during negotiations led by Hassan Rouhani, then head of Iran's National Security Council, with the foreign ministers of three European countries in 2003, wherein Tehran accepted the suspension of centrifuge activities at the Natanz facility. Rafsanjani stated that this agreement had the support of Ayatollah Khamenei: 'Before the reformist government ended, there were negotiations, and since Mr. Rouhani was the Secretary of the Security Council, he played the role of negotiator. At that time, threats and dangers had begun and had reached a point where we voluntarily decided to suspend our activities and only perform limited tasks that were specified. But we would suspend enrichment and these activities and continue research, which is a lengthy story. The Leader also approved. That is, the Leader approved the last document that was signed in Saadabad. Even when there was a commotion against it, he defended it and said it was a good thing that was done.' However, the Saadabad Agreement faced strong opposition from groups of principlists, with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad describing it as 'shameful.'