Nuclear Negotiations; Khamenei's Retreat from His Red Lines

On the first anniversary of the nuclear agreement, Abbas Araqchi, Iran's second senior nuclear negotiator, made significant remarks, knowingly or unknowingly, to let the world know that Ayatollah Khamenei's red lines are not as insurmountable as the term 'red line' implies. This is a major lesson to learn from Araqchi's words in understanding Khamenei's behavior as the leader of Iran's foreign policy, indicating that his red lines are not as 'red' as they should be. Araqchi clarified that some of the red lines 'could not be realized in the negotiation and practical scene.' He added that insisting on some red lines meant 'no agreement,' and thus, with Khamenei's approval 'in several cases,' the red lines set by him were shifted during the negotiations. Although Araqchi did not enumerate all the instances where the negotiating team deviated from the red lines with the leadership's green light, the only example he provided regarding Khamenei's concession to the U.S. raises the question of whether Khamenei can still claim that the U.S. cannot do anything. Araqchi stated: 'One of the red lines was the lifting of all sanctions against Iran, but U.S. officials announced that the government could not lift congressional sanctions, and if the Iranian negotiating team insisted, it would mean 'no agreement.' He clarified that [Khamenei's] order was that it was acceptable for EU sanctions, executive orders from the President, and UN Security Council resolutions to be lifted, but congressional sanctions should be halted, and the U.S. President should commit to continuing this halt.' In other words, Araqchi's explicit statement is that: First; Khamenei's main goal was 'to reach an agreement.' He based his strategy on reaching an agreement with the U.S. Second; in order to achieve this objective and prevent the negotiations from failing, Khamenei inevitably retreated from some of his red lines. This means that Khamenei's red lines were not as 'red' as they should have been. The concept of a red line in political literature and international relations is akin to a 'red light' in traffic rules. The color red signifies a warning. Therefore, a red line or red light refers to the concept of 'preventing the other party from committing an act that should not be transgressed.' Just as passing a red light is considered a crime and the offender is penalized, a red line in negotiations signifies a 'threshold of tolerance and patience.' Thus, delineating a red line means determining the boundary of tolerance, meaning that if this boundary is crossed, the offender should incur losses and damages. In the nuclear example, if Khamenei's red line was the simultaneous lifting of all sanctions with the nuclear agreement, then if this condition was not met, he should have ordered the negotiations to cease. Especially since he had stated in the middle of the negotiations that 'the Americans need these negotiations very much.' It should not be forgotten that the nuclear negotiations began when Khamenei introduced the tactic of 'heroic flexibility' in a public speech to the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. He himself explained this type of flexibility by saying: 'Heroic flexibility has a clear meaning, an example of which is evident in wrestling. In this match, where the goal is to defeat the opponent, if someone has power but does not apply the necessary flexibility at the right moment, they will certainly lose. However, if they use flexibility and power at the right time, they will pin the opponent down.' From Khamenei's explicit words, it is understood that there must be 'flexibility' in heroic flexibility. However, the question is whether there can also be flexibility in red lines? The answer can only be one of two possibilities: If one can deviate from the red line, then such a line should not be considered a red line anymore, as we understand that the purpose of delineating a red line is to prevent others from committing an act that exceeds the threshold of tolerance. And if one cannot deviate from the red line, then why, according to Araqchi, did Khamenei agree to deviate from his red lines? With Khamenei's retreat from his red lines, can he claim that the flexibility he showed in front of the Great Satan! was heroic? Did he not claim that the Americans needed these negotiations, so why was he willing to incur pure losses for himself and grant such a significant concession to the Americans? Furthermore, if he was forced to deviate from his red lines, can he still claim that his flexibility was heroic? Heroic flexibility or passive flexibility? We know that the Iran and 1+5 nuclear agreement began when Khamenei adopted a new approach to the nuclear issue. He explicitly stated that to 'ward off evil' from the enemy, he would negotiate with the 'Great Satan' and the 'wicked England' regarding what he considered the 'legitimate right' of the system. He named this new approach 'heroic flexibility' to instill the concept of 'powerful flexibility' against the U.S. in his followers. If Khamenei's flexibility was powerful flexibility, why do we not have even one commendatory word from him regarding the nuclear agreement? Not only have we never seen him praise the JCPOA, but we have also seen him consider the nuclear agreement a pure loss, and Araqchi has mentioned Khamenei's retreat from his red lines. More surprisingly, he accepted the retreat from red lines and incurred pure losses while previously stating during the nuclear negotiations: 'It is a mistake to think that the U.S. dispute with us is about the nuclear issue; no, the nuclear issue is an excuse... If one day the nuclear issue is resolved – suppose the Islamic Republic retreated; which is what they want – do not think the issue will be over; no, they will gradually bring up ten other excuses: Why do you have missiles? Why do you have drones? Why do you have bad relations with the Zionist regime? Why do you not recognize the Zionist regime? Why do you support resistance in the region... and why? and why? and why?' In these statements by Khamenei, three prominent points stand out: First; he described solving the nuclear issue with the West (specifically the U.S.) as 'retreat.' Second; he considered the nuclear retreat as the desire and wish of the U.S. Third; he clearly expressed his predictions and pessimism regarding the negative consequences of any agreement with the West and listed five potential negative outcomes (which could be more) for any nuclear flexibility against the West. These five negative outcomes he listed for entering into nuclear negotiations were: - Western excuses regarding the missile issue - Excuses regarding human rights - Excuses for not recognizing Israel - Excuses for supporting resistance forces against Israel (such as Hezbollah and Hamas) which the West interprets as support for terrorism. - Excuses regarding Iran's capabilities in building drones or missile capabilities. Conclusion: As we distance ourselves from the nuclear negotiations, more evidence of Khamenei's desperation emerges, as he has shown a willingness to engage in passive flexibility and retreat from his red lines even to ward off evil (read: crippling sanctions, as Hillary Clinton put it). With this weakness displayed by Khamenei, the story of the nuclear negotiations is not the end of the saga. It is just the beginning.