Nuclear Negotiations Require 'Artificial Respiration'

The presence of a large group of senior political and technical representatives from the Islamic Republic in Geneva indicates the ongoing difficulties in the nuclear negotiations and the urgent need to find a quick solution to move it out of the current situation. In the technical negotiations in Geneva, prior to the meeting of Foreign Minister Zarif with his American counterpart John Kerry, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, who has extensive experience in the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities and negotiations, led this important part of the discussions for the first time in front of Ernest Moniz, the U.S. Secretary of Energy. The significance of this part of the discussions in the potential success or failure of the negotiations is increasingly evident, considering the contents of the recent report from the Secretary-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding Iran's cooperation in implementing the 'Joint Action Plan' (the interim nuclear agreement), and the emphasis by both sides on not extending the current negotiations after the expiration of the agreement. Before the Sunday meeting with Javad Zarif, John Kerry also emphasized the remaining differences between the negotiating parties. Iran's negotiations with the 1+5 group have now effectively turned into bilateral negotiations between Iran and the U.S., with other group representatives seemingly agreeing to play a rubber stamp role to legitimize any agreement reached. Achieving a comprehensive nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic, in addition to addressing political issues, lacks substantive meaning without addressing the technical aspects of the negotiations and resolving ambiguities. The report from Thursday, February 19, alongside confirming the continuation of Iran's cooperation, indicates a lack of cooperation or shortcomings in other areas, although this time the Director-General of the Agency has used a milder tone in explaining the deficiencies. The report indicates that past ambiguities regarding Iran's nuclear activities suspected of having military dimensions (neutron firing and bomb trigger construction) remain. Specifically, Iran has refrained from any new cooperation proposals to complete the fourth phase of cooperation from 2014 and the last two parts of the third phase (bomb trigger construction). The issue of not allowing visits to Parchin and the continuation of suspicious activities there, including the construction of a new facility, is among the other points criticized in the Agency's recent report. According to the latest report, Iran has reduced the output of older P1 centrifuges while increasing the injection of uranium gas into more advanced centrifuges. In the ongoing negotiations, the number of centrifuges allowed to operate in Iran remains one of the major outstanding issues, and with this tactic, Iran may intend to convince the U.S. that the gap to the potential capacity for conducting a nuclear test (the breakout time to a bomb) will still be less than a year, thereby justifying a greater number of centrifuges (more quantity and less capacity to maintain face domestically). According to the report, Iran has not yet converted 3.5% enriched uranium gas into uranium oxide. So far, 2720 kilograms of Iran's uranium gas has entered the conversion phase, but the processing is incomplete (producing uranium oxide powder as nuclear fuel), and there is no reason provided for the failure to complete this phase in the report. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's recent statement regarding the need for a single, unambiguous, and interpretable text for the potential nuclear agreement has further complicated the negotiators' challenges. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to the U.S. and his speech to Congress, which has already sparked widespread political and media controversies, undoubtedly has made the atmosphere of the negotiations heavier and reduced the parties' ability to be flexible. Tehran's insistence on the complete removal of sanctions— which, due to the necessity of adhering to legal standards in the Security Council and the U.S. Congress, is an impractical expectation—remains strong; just as the U.S. emphasizes the necessity of conducting extensive inspections of Iran, implementing the Additional Protocol, and a verification period of over ten years. Opponents of the nuclear agreement between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic argue that previously Washington opposed uranium enrichment in Iran, whereas the potential nuclear agreement would effectively turn the Islamic Republic into a potential nuclear military power (on the verge of obtaining a bomb); a transformation that, according to opponents' arguments, could threaten the balance of power and peace in the region. The continued increasing pressures directed at the negotiators from both within and outside the Islamic Republic and the U.S. have made the space for breathing and continuing its existence difficult, such that only artificial respiration or undertaking a bold political surgery may allow it to survive or be saved from collapse before time runs out. The dispatch of two large teams from Iran and the U.S. to the negotiation site undoubtedly reflects an awareness of the current critical situation and the possibility of losing the opportunity to save it.