Obama's Doctrine of 'Caution and Prudence' and Putin's Show of Power

On Sunday, October 19, Barack Obama, during an interview with CBS's '60 Minutes', answered questions regarding the Syrian crisis, ISIS, and Moscow-Washington relations. The U.S. President criticized critics of the White House's position on Syria and Russia, emphasizing points that relied on soft diplomacy and avoidance of military intervention and war, which are essentially the core of his foreign policy doctrine. Caution, foresight, and realism characterize Obama's doctrine, which Roger Cohen, a prominent Anglo-American journalist, has termed the doctrine of caution and prudence. On one hand, it emphasizes engagement and coexistence with opposing and discordant countries, while on the other hand, it maintains U.S. military capabilities, exercising maximum restraint against indirect foreign threats by refraining from deploying military forces to confront these threats. In response to a question from the '60 Minutes' host about Russia's military operations in Syria following Ukraine, challenging U.S. leadership, Obama stated: 'When my presidency began, the corrupt ruler of Ukraine was a puppet of Putin, and Syria was merely Russia's ally in the region [Middle East]. But today, instead of relying on their support and maintaining its old base in Syria, Putin is trying to keep his only lifeless ally on its feet by sending soldiers and units of the Russian army to this country.' In the continuation of the interview, Obama addressed his critics, particularly Republicans, who view his policy towards the Middle East as a sign of weakness. He emphasized that their insistence on military intervention in Syria shows they have not learned the necessary lessons from the Iraq war. '[Some Republicans] believe... that sending hundreds of thousands of American soldiers to the Middle East is the only sign of strength and that we must impose peace and be the police of the region. These critics have no problem with the reality that thousands of our soldiers could be killed, thousands more wounded, and another trillion dollars spent. Some want America to do this, and until it happens, they believe America is retreating.' Sixteen months ago, on Wednesday, May 28, 2014, in a similar speech at the West Point Military Academy, he emphasized that unilateralism would not be America's option and that resorting to military force is not the only way for America to lead in the world. In that speech, he addressed his foreign policy critics, stating: 'Some believe that the solution to every problem is military intervention without considering the consequences and legitimacy of it, as well as the price that the American people must pay for it... We have the best hammer in hand, but that does not mean we should treat everything as a nail.' Obama's foreign policy doctrine, based on what he has expressed in his speeches and interviews, is self-centered, showing no signs of idealism or endless goals. He avoids hasty decisions regarding crises that do not directly threaten U.S. interests and recommends diplomacy, sanctions, litigation through international law, and finally, multilateral military operations in cooperation with America's allies. Obama seeks to highlight the difference between the realities of international relations and the understanding of global events, in other words, to crystallize his foreign policy doctrine rooted in the theory of realism in international politics. In his view, the U.S. is the most important international player by any military, economic, cultural influence, political, and diplomatic measure. However, it has become clear to the Kremlin that Obama is skeptical about the effectiveness of military operations and refrains from sending American forces to foreign wars that may drag on. Since American public opposition to extensive military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan put Obama in power in 2008, it is no surprise that he views the effectiveness of such interventions with skepticism. In this context, he stated in his '60 Minutes' interview: 'The notion that the only option for America is to send 100 or 200 thousand troops to Syria or Iraq and perhaps to Libya or Yemen, and that America should not only be the police but also the ruler of this region, is a flawed strategy... It would be shameful if we repeat these mistakes.' Timing and Putin's show of power Vladimir Putin believes that the era of American-imposed solutions through military force has ended, and that the U.S., given its declining power, is retreating. Aware of the changes in U.S. foreign policy, he first demonstrated power in Ukraine and then in Syria. Nevertheless, Obama views Putin's actions, whether regarding the annexation of Crimea and support for rebels in eastern Ukraine or military operations in Syria and bombing positions of U.S.-backed militant groups, as desperate attempts to change the existing trend in the region and divert Russian public opinion from the country's economic difficulties, ultimately harming Russia. The reality is that Putin has seized the opportunity created by the U.S. vacuum, entering the field at a time when the U.S. government is in a poor position regarding its policy in Syria, both among internal and external opponents and among its allies. Obama's approach regarding Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria has revealed his indecision. By setting a date for the complete withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan (although he retained 5,500 soldiers after reassessing the situation in that country) and directing military operations from behind the scenes in Libya against Gaddafi without any plan for post-Gaddafi Libya, establishing a red line for Assad in the event of chemical weapon use and then ignoring it, he sent an unintended message to Russia that the White House does not have a coherent strategy and that America is no longer the most important and prominent player on the international stage. Regarding Syria, the U.S. plan to organize, train, and arm so-called moderate Islamic groups opposing Assad has not borne fruit, with many American weapons allocated to these groups falling into the hands of Al-Qaeda elements and other extremist groups. Obama does not have an active and effective policy for resolving the Syrian crisis, and the country is on a downward spiral, a point he himself acknowledges in his '60 Minutes' interview: 'Undoubtedly, countries like Syria are less secure compared to the years before my presidency... but in terms of keeping America safe from terrorist actions and strengthening relations with our allies and global credibility and standing, our situation is undoubtedly better.' Given Obama's inclination towards adopting and implementing a risk-free foreign policy and his doctrine of caution and prudence, and considering the threats to his sphere of influence, Putin resorted to force and military power. In Ukraine, widespread public protests aimed to permanently remove Kyiv from Russia's sphere of influence, and in Syria, U.S. support and arming of Assad's groups brought Russia into the field. In response to these actions, Putin annexed Crimea and is now determined to keep Assad's regime in place. Anthony Cordesman, a prominent analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the U.S., considers Russia's military intervention in Syria as part of Putin's strategy in response to the color revolutions organized by the U.S. in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, including the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003. It is clear that the Kremlin has taken the initiative in Syria, and with this decisive action, it has placed the U.S. and other coalition countries in a passive position after the end of the war. Russia and the 'Syria Quagmire'? On October 24, Obama stated regarding Russia's military intervention in Syria: 'Russia is getting stuck in the quagmire of Syria.' Many American officials have also spoken about the significant risks Putin has taken. Others have commented on the backbreaking challenges Russian forces will face in Syria, likening this intervention to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, which ultimately faced increasing resistance from angry Sunni factions. However, the feasibility of these scenarios depends on two factors. One is the intensity of the opposition groups fighting the Assad regime, which itself depends on the level of support from coalition countries, including the U.S., and how well these groups can rally these countries to their side. Currently, the level of this support is unclear due to the incoherent strategy of coalition countries. Regarding the second factor, based on his performance in Georgia and Ukraine, Putin is very likely to continue military operations in Syria, at least until the threat of the Assad regime's collapse is removed, despite the challenges he will face. Putin has established an effective force in Syria and has achieved progress in combating Assad's opposition groups with close air and ground support for Syrian government forces, alongside assistance from Iranian forces and Hezbollah. Existing evidence indicates that the Kremlin is preparing for ongoing military operations in Syria and solidifying its presence in the country. Currently, military operations in Syria overshadow political avenues for resolving the crisis, but the Kremlin knows that fundamental and long-term solutions to overcome this crisis are possible through dialogue, which Putin has emphasized on several occasions. The Obama administration has also repeatedly recommended this solution and has even moderated its position on Assad, linking Assad's immediate departure from power to political dialogues and related decisions. Until then, and without achieving fruitful political dialogues, the disintegration of society, displacement, and killings in Syria will continue, with the main victims of the Syrian civil war being the people of that country whose homeland has been devastated.