Obstacles Threatening the Final Nuclear Agreement

As the excitement surrounding the Lausanne nuclear agreement between Iran and the six powerful countries of the world subsided at the end of this year's Nowruz, the positions of both sides revealed the challenges ahead in reaching a final agreement. The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated last week that he is not optimistic about negotiations with the Americans. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also insisted on the immediate lifting of sanctions coinciding with the announcement of the final agreement. However, on Saturday, Jeff Rathke, the spokesperson for the U.S. State Department, emphasized the phased lifting of sanctions based on the Lausanne understanding, repeating similar positions from the negotiating countries with Iran. On the other hand, following remarks by Ashton Carter, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, about the necessity of monitoring Iran's military facilities, Abbas Araqchi, Iran's nuclear negotiator, stated that Iran will not accept any monitoring or access in this regard. This aligns with statements made a day earlier by Ahmad Khatami, the Friday prayer leader of Tehran, and Hassan Firouzabadi, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran. What is the impact of these positions on the negotiation process to reach a comprehensive nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 countries? This is the main question of this week's program featuring three guests: Mohammad Sadegh Javadihesar, a journalist and political analyst supporting President Hassan Rouhani in Mashhad; Mansour Farhang, a senior professor of international relations and former representative of Iran at the United Nations in New York; and Alireza Namvar Haghighi, a Middle Eastern studies instructor in Toronto. In a discussion with Mosaddegh Katouzian, they talk about the potential obstacles to the agreement. Mr. Javadihesar, how do you interpret the Supreme Leader's latest statements within the framework of the official discourse and the prevailing rhetoric of the regime? Mohammad Sadegh Javadihesar: In my opinion, the response was a necessity that was communicated through the media. Over the past week, both domestic and foreign media have constantly fueled the demand for the Supreme Leader to express his opinion, as he had remained silent and it was unclear whether what had happened was also his concern. This demand compelled him to announce his official and public stance on the issue, despite implicitly supporting the negotiations. It is natural that when they want the leadership to say something, that statement should have a clearer distinction from previous remarks made by others; at least there should be a decisiveness or meaningful clarity that creates a difference from what has been said so far. What did the Supreme Leader's statement mean? Mohammad Sadegh Javadihesar: His statement meant that he both approved the negotiations and indicated that we only discussed the nuclear dispute and nothing else, and that no significant event has occurred yet, and we must wait three more months. When the understanding becomes an international agreement, then we can take a position on whether it can be defended or whether we can be happy about it or not. Mr. Farhang, one day after the Supreme Leader's statements, the White House National Security Advisor described his remarks as indicative of pressure from hardliners within Iran but added that such statements from the Supreme Leader or the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot be interpreted as making the nuclear agreement unattainable. What is your understanding of this American official's reaction? Mansour Farhang: Mr. Khamenei's remarks had two aspects and, in my opinion, there was no contradiction in terms of the historical positions taken by Khamenei or other clerical leaders in Iran. On one hand, Khamenei is generally interested in resolving the nuclear issue, but since he knows that resolving the nuclear issue means showing flexibility towards the West and the U.S., he currently wants to implicitly support it because it is beneficial for the regime and society; sanctions and political isolation have created fundamental problems for the regime. However, he also wants to indicate that if a deadlock occurs, which is still possible but seems very unlikely, he can say that he has always had doubts and distrust towards the U.S. and the West, and it does not surprise me that they have broken their promises and deviated. This position, I believe, will be maintained until they reach an agreement. But this speech continues the positions of the Islamic Republic from the beginning to now, except for the period when Rafsanjani was in power. The Islamic Republic is a revolutionary regime and, like other revolutionary regimes such as the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, they want to break the ceiling of the world and propose a new plan. Even in Iran's constitution, it is stated that this Islamic revolution is not limited to the borders of Iran and seeks to change the entire Islamic world and the world. It aims to eliminate imperialism. Every ideological system, whether religious or non-religious (the difference is only in language), over time realizes that the idea of breaking the ceiling of the world and proposing a new plan is somewhat meaningless and leads nowhere. However, the protests they raise against the West or imperialism or colonialism can be valid. Iran's national interests dictate that they take a stance against many positions. However, opposition to a strong foreign policy and defense of national interests has nothing to do with breaking the ceiling of the world and proposing a new plan; that leads you into illusions. Therefore, Mr. Khamenei is still on that line, but within this regime (regarding society or outsiders), there are figures like Khatami, even Rafsanjani and Rouhani, who immediately after the Iran-Iraq war began to clarify positions, and from the Iran-Iraq war until September 11, Iran was not much pursuing the export of revolution. But after the Bush administration came and changed all the power dynamics there, the export of revolution and breaking the ceiling of the world and proposing a new plan was revived. Khamenei sees the necessity of resolving the nuclear issue but is still within the framework of wanting to change the world. Therefore, I do not expect that as long as Khamenei and his associates are at the top of power and control all the security, intelligence, and media institutions of the country, they will proceed in a direction that suggests a change in approach, meaning the approach that Rouhani is proposing today. Unfortunately, I do not have that hope. But sooner or later, this regime will realize that the changes we saw in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba will also occur in Iran. Mr. Haghighi, given these circumstances, what are the characteristics of Iran's policymaking and that of the P5+1 in the period following the recent understanding? Alireza Namvar Haghighi: Its characteristics will be that the Iranians will try to create a consensus within the power bloc. That is, they will try to create a unified stance within the power bloc to facilitate negotiations. Secondly, the remarks made by Ayatollah Khamenei differed from his earlier statements in that he accepted that nuclear negotiations could serve as a trust test for broader relations with the West on other issues. This is something that Mr. Rouhani has mentioned from the beginning and reaffirmed that this is a beginning for constructive engagement with the world. Indirectly, it was suggested that Iran could have regional cooperation in areas such as security, drugs, etc., with the West, which would be a logical outcome of this. The third point is that it seems there is a shift in Iranian media from an anti-American atmosphere to an anti-Saudi one. This changes the propaganda landscape significantly. The fourth point, which I believe is decisive, is that strategically, the Iranians are definitely preparing to justify the agreement socially. The next point is how they can increase their regional partners to influence the advancement of the agreement. This means that regional issues should not negatively impact the Iran-P5+1 agreement. Issues related to Iraq, commitments in Yemen, and all these matters are, in my opinion, what Iran is trying to manage to minimize friction and not negatively affect the agreement in July. Mr. Javadihesar, considering that the economic sanctions related to nuclear activities are separate from those related to human rights violations, what is referred to as support for terrorism, and ballistic missiles, how can Mr. Khamenei's request for the immediate lifting of sanctions coincide with the potential agreement he mentioned on Friday? Mohammad Sadegh Javadihesar: Well, as you heard, he clarified that this part of the discussions pertains solely to the nuclear issue and nothing else, and no other disputes are on our agenda with the Americans and the West. Therefore, other issues such as regional matters, concerns about ballistic missiles, and similar issues, I believe he indicated that if we can reach a meaningful understanding with the U.S. on this issue and set aside the usual ambiguities between Iran and the U.S. that have been imposed by the Americans and treat us clearly, perhaps there will be grounds for discussing subsequent issues. However, what is certain is that he and the Iranian negotiating team have stated that we are currently discussing the nuclear issue and nothing else is on our agenda, nor is it intended to bring anything new to our discussions in the future. Only the nuclear issue is at hand, and the solution is that the relevant resolutions regarding sanctions related to nuclear concerns or disputes should all be annulled through a new resolution from the UN Security Council, and on the day of their acceptance, the resolution will be issued that they have lifted them. It is obvious that as soon as they are lifted, the process of lifting sanctions will begin immediately, and it is part of the contract, not part of the results of the contract. Mr. Farhang, do you agree with Mr. Javadihesar's interpretation? Do you think this could be a solution for the immediate lifting of sanctions that Mr. Khamenei desires, which aligns with Mr. Obama and other leaders of the P5+1's emphasis on the phased lifting of sanctions? Mansour Farhang: Yes, it can be reconciled. In fact, the language of this agreement takes into account the internal concerns of both parties. If this current understanding reaches a conclusion and in this manner Iran fulfills its commitments, just as Iran has fulfilled its commitments over the past year and a half since signing the interim agreement in November 2013. Therefore, Iran needs time to implement its commitments and for the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to confirm them; it is in this process that sanctions can either be suspended or completely lifted, but it requires time. The Iranian negotiators know this well and understand that even Obama has legal limitations. Because the sanctions imposed by the U.S. Congress require a renewed vote from Congress for a complete lifting. In my opinion, this is solvable; if both parties remain committed to the principles underlying this understanding, this issue can be resolved. The language they use to address the internal needs and conflicts that inevitably arise for both parties is part of the creativity of diplomacy, which I believe Iran has so far shown a logical position. Interestingly, when Zarif speaks abroad, he is very logical and principled, but when he speaks in Iran, all his audiences are anxious. Obama and Kerry are the same. Therefore, this was a success that could lead to a positive outcome that benefits Iran's national interests. Mr. Haghighi, a contentious point reflected in the positions of American and Iranian officials last week was the issue of monitoring Iran's military facilities. While Ashton Carter, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, called for such monitoring on Friday, Ahmad Khatami, the Friday prayer leader of Tehran, Hassan Firouzabadi, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and on Saturday, Abbas Araqchi, Iran's nuclear negotiator, successively opposed such monitoring. What impact could the disagreement over military oversight have on the negotiation process? Alireza Namvar Haghighi: The disagreement regarding the interpretation of the type of inspections is a serious obstacle and could even pose a significant problem for the negotiations. This goes back to the history of this issue; if you pay attention to the books written about Iraq, one of the methods the U.S. has tried to use with regimes it has problems with or has serious issues regarding their political order is the use of UN inspections to gather information, and when it wanted to take military action or confront them, it was used extensively. These instances have been noted in the books of American officials themselves. Therefore, politically, Iran is sensitive about this issue, and in Mr. Zarif's discussions, it became clear that there is a serious disagreement between the U.S. and Iran regarding the inspection system, and this is one of the issues that internal critics believe is key because if this happens, it increases the disagreement between military groups and political groups, which is dangerous for Iran's stability. Additionally, some of them even believe that to prevent Iran from complying with inspections, it is better to suspend enrichment. Because the Americans have done this in the past as well.