35 years ago, on a fall Sunday, on the 13th of Aban 1358 (November 4, 1979), a group of revolutionary students who called themselves followers of Imam's line climbed over the wall of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took dozens of its employees hostage. An event that, according to the students themselves, was not supposed to last more than two or three days, but as the hostage crisis extended beyond what the students had anticipated, its political, social, and economic impacts on Iran have remained even to this day. The hostage crisis, which occurred a few months after the Islamic Revolution, marked the end of diplomatic relations between Iran and the U.S. According to the U.S. public radio and television service, PBS, the hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was the only event that garnered the most attention in global media and press from World War II until that time. On the 35th anniversary of the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis, Radio Farda examines the causes and roots of this event, what happened during the 444 days of captivity, and its international and domestic impacts on Iran and the region. In the section before the freedom of the hostages, we addressed the October Surprise theory. The occupation of the U.S. Embassy was the beginning of the deterioration of Iran-U.S. relations. Following this incident, the U.S. imposed sanctions against Iran and changed its policy towards Tehran. The students believed that the occupation of the U.S. Embassy would not last more than 24 to 72 hours, but this action turned into a crisis whose effects have lasted until today. One of the students who was very active in the U.S. Embassy occupation and wished to remain anonymous told Radio Farda that the students did not want to sever ties between the two countries forever. One of the students stated: 'I clearly say that the students' action did not mean that we intended to place the U.S. in the position of a permanent enemy and then cut off this relationship forever.' This student told Radio Farda: 'It was clear in our initial statements and early interviews that our intention was to protest against the U.S., and if the U.S. had acted to expel the Shah, certainly these heavy consequences that affected both Iran and the U.S. would not have occurred.' John Limbert, a former hostage, stated: 'I was very mistaken. At first, I thought that after 5 or 7 years, Iran and the U.S. would establish relations and the situation would be such that both sides could talk to each other.' Limbert said that after the occupation of the U.S. Embassy and the release of the hostages, he believed that diplomatic relations between the two countries would be established. He told Radio Farda: 'I was very mistaken. At first, I thought that after 5 or 7 years, Iran and the U.S. would establish relations and the situation would be such that both sides could talk to each other. Not that they would be friends. Many countries in the world have relations and may not be friends. For 34 years, the two countries could not talk to each other. They were essentially estranged and insulted each other. They threatened each other.' Pride in the past or regret? Masoumeh Ebtekar, one of the students who played an active role in the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis, said in May 2013: 'The students at that time did not feel any regret about the action they took in the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis.' Ms. Ebtekar also stated: 'In the view of the followers of Imam's line, this decision was the best thing that prevented harm to the Islamic Revolution.' However, some former students who climbed over the wall of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran believe that the occupation of the embassy was not the right action. One former hostage-taker stated: 'The students' action belonged to a specific time and was a form of protest. After that, under no circumstances is this action acceptable. After that, the followers of Imam's line themselves became the driving force of a movement that helped normalize and interact with the outside world.' One of these students, who wished to remain anonymous, said that the occupation of the U.S. Embassy should be assessed within its specific time and context. This former student told Radio Farda: 'We cannot say that a fixed action is a correct method forever and can be modeled. The students' action belonged to a specific time and was a form of protest. After that, under no circumstances is this action acceptable. After that, the followers of Imam's line themselves became the driving force of a movement that helped normalize and interact with the outside world and in 1997 assisted and managed Khatami's campaign and later initiated the reformist movement in Iran and contributed to Khatami's dialogue among civilizations theory. In any case, the reformist engine inside Iran is the same students who, at that time, occupied the U.S. Embassy as a protest against America. In fact, the student movement opposing these students, who at that time said we should protest against the Soviet Union instead of the U.S., had a traditional and conservative view of issues, and during Ahmadinejad's presidency, we saw how their aggressive view of the outside world was and how they used international platforms to impose this radical view on the world.' As this follower of Imam's line told Radio Farda, many of the students who played an active role in the U.S. Embassy occupation are now among the reformists. Hojjatoleslam Mousavi Khoeiniha, who was considered the spiritual leader of the students, also played a significant role years later in the victory of Mohammad Khatami in the 1997 elections. He was even accused by his opponents of being the mastermind behind the protests following the 2009 presidential election and conspiring against Ayatollah Khamenei. Most of the followers of Imam's line who joined the reformist group held positions in Khatami's government. Mohammad Reza Khatami, the brother of the former president, Masoumeh Ebtekar, the head of the Environmental Protection Organization, Ebrahim Asgarzadeh, a former parliament member and a member of the first city council of Tehran, Abbas Abdi, a journalist and political activist, Habibollah Bi-Taraf, Khatami's Minister of Power, and Rahman Dadman, Khatami's Minister of Roads and Transportation, who died in a plane crash, are among them. Abbas Abdi and Ebrahim Asgarzadeh also have a history of imprisonment in the Islamic Republic's prisons. Mohammad Reza Khatami was also banned from leaving the country in September 2014. One of the followers of Imam's line who is now among the reformists told Radio Farda that he and other reformist followers of Imam's line accept the Islamic Revolution. This former follower of Imam's line stated: 'In the end, we were at a stage where the regime changed. If they had said the regime should change, we would have accepted it, but if they had said the Shah should change his behavior, we would not have accepted it. We were not reformists during the Shah's time. I belong to a generation that concluded in the late 40s and early 50s that the Shah's regime could not be reformed through reformism. It simply had no listening ear. I do not shy away from saying that we, the revolutionaries of the first decade of the revolution, underwent a transformation in the second decade of the revolution and moved towards reform. I do not hide my behavior during the revolution. I defend the revolution.' Abbas Abdi, one of the followers of Imam's line, met with Barry Rosen, one of the diplomats taken hostage, in Paris in 1997. Barry Rosen, the press attaché of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran during the hostage crisis, said after this meeting that Mr. Abdi apologized to him. However, Abbas Abdi denied this and stated in a note he wrote for the Iranian History website that he is not in a position to consider the matter as a personal issue, whether right or wrong, to apologize based on that. Abbas Abdi, a reformist journalist and political activist, declined to participate in this program when contacted by Radio Farda. John Limbert, the second secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran during the hostage crisis, stated that if the former followers of Imam apologize, it would be good, but an apology does not advance the matter. He said: 'They should come to terms with the truth. They should not fool themselves and say they did a good job. They should see the reality and say their actions were wrong, ugly, and detrimental to Iran and contrary to Iranian culture. What I had never seen in my life until that time was an Iranian mistreating a guest who was responsible for his security. In our culture, this act is ugly.' One of the former students who played a significant role in the U.S. Embassy occupation stated that an apology is a psychological matter to alleviate the psychological blows that public opinion has suffered, but someone should apologize who considers themselves guilty. One former hostage-taker stated: 'Both sides should accept that their rapprochement should be based on recognizing each other and acknowledging that they had excesses in the past. If this process is to take shape, I will help.' This former student further told Radio Farda: 'If countries and nations are to come closer, there must naturally be a win-win game. The Americans, except for Ms. Madeleine Albright, (the former U.S. Secretary of State) who implicitly stated at an informal ceremony that the U.S. played a role in the coup of August 19, 1953, did not announce anything from the U.S. government. Naturally, if conditions arise for the two governments to want to come closer, it has its own specific protocol. I am not a government official and have no administrative responsibility in the country. I am one of the students who are refugees in the mountains and deserts, and none of us have any administrative responsibility in the country. But if public opinion in both countries wants to come closer, it is natural that intellectuals, academic institutions, civil society organizations, and universities should analyze the past in a way that does not humiliate either side. That is, we cannot say let’s go to the negotiating table and be friends while each of us has a dagger behind our backs and wants to consider the other side as 100% the devil and ourselves as the children of God. Both sides should accept that their rapprochement should be based on recognizing each other and acknowledging that they had excesses in the past. If this process is to take shape, I will help.' One of the followers of Imam's line stated: 'Most students consider the U.S. Embassy incident as a consequence and an event that occurred due to the Shah's entry into the U.S. and could have been reconciled. Its continuation unnecessarily dragged on and there was no need for it, and it could have been resolved much sooner with the wisdom of the governments.' He continued in response to the question of whether all former students agree with him about apologizing to the U.S.: 'I know that most of the students who played a role in the U.S. Embassy occupation believe that the students' action in occupying the U.S. Embassy was a defensive, temporary, and protest action. Now a minority of students believe that ideologically it was their divine duty to occupy the U.S. Embassy and then cut off this relationship forever. But the majority of students belong to the reformist community, and they consider the U.S. Embassy incident as a consequence and an event that occurred due to the Shah's entry into the U.S. and could have been reconciled. Its continuation unnecessarily dragged on and there was no need for it, and it could have been resolved much sooner with the wisdom of the governments.' Stephen Kinzer, a journalist, stated: 'Many former hostage-takers are now advocates for reconciliation and relations with the U.S. Of course, it would have been better if they had reached this conclusion sooner, but thinking about the present is better than not thinking about it at all.' Stephen Kinzer, a New York Times journalist and political analyst, believes that the hostage-taking was a mistake and adds: 'I always like it when people reflect on their past behavior and recognize that they made a mistake. I think it is interesting that many former hostage-takers are now advocates for reconciliation and relations with the U.S. Of course, it would have been better if they had reached this conclusion sooner, but thinking about the present is better than not thinking about it at all.' In the next section, we will address Iran-U.S. relations 35 years after the hostage crisis. The program '444 Days' airs every day at 10:30 PM, 10:30 AM, 2:30 PM, and 5:30 PM Tehran time on Radio Farda.
Occupation of the U.S. Embassy: Regret or Pride?
The article reflects on the 35th anniversary of the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis in Iran, exploring the perspectives of former student revolutionaries involved in the event, some of whom express regret while others maintain pride in their actions. The crisis marked a significant turning point in Iran-U.S. relations, leading to lasting political and social ramifications.
👥 Key Players
⚡ Actions
📰 What Happened
Revolutionary students occupied the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, taking hostages and impacting Iran-U.S. relations.
- revolutionary students protest U.S. Embassy
- United States sanction Iran
- U.S. Government indict Iran
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
The hostage crisis remains a pivotal moment in Iran-U.S. relations.
📝 Key Evidence
🏷️ Entities Mentioned
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%