One Hundred Days with the Government of Beheshtian; A Bitter Experience in Foreign Policy

In the first hundred days of Masoud Beheshtian's government, foreign policy, which was supposed to be centered on 'engagement with the world and lifting sanctions,' has taken a contradictory path due to the Middle Eastern disputes and arms exchanges with Russia. Beheshtian's alignment with the 'illusion of looking to the East' has not brought any breakthroughs. The rise of Trump has not necessarily made the situation easier. Masoud Beheshtian's government began its work on August 7 with the swearing-in ceremony, and now a hundred days have passed since its rule. Although the presence of some women and political figures affiliated with the Sunni minority in the government structure and some non-strategic actions are visible in the positive record of this government, it is still unclear how effective these selections and actions will be in the government's performance, including in securing the rights of women and minorities and fulfilling other electoral promises made by Beheshtian. Overall, the government's record is far from the minimal program based on 'consensus' with other upper sectors of the government that was proposed during Beheshtian's election campaign. Domestically, there is still no news or sign of lifting the filtering of social media networks as the 'most urgent social and economic action,' and various officials are urging the people to 'be patient' with the hope that 'it will eventually be lifted.' The halt of the so-called 'Noor Plan' and violence against women and youth has not yet been formalized or recognized, and the government is somewhat challenged by the enforcement of the 'Hijab and Chastity Law,' at least showing a positive attitude towards its implementation in public offices and institutions. The approval of the 'FATF' (Financial Action Task Force), which could somewhat alleviate the blockage and paralysis of Iran's banking communications with the outside world, is also in limbo, and the Expediency Discernment Council has not paid attention to the government's discussions regarding this approval, as it seems that Ali Khamenei does not have a favorable view on this matter either. Overall, Beheshtian's government has not taken any meaningful action regarding the country's major problems, namely the poor economic and living conditions, high inflation, industrial recession, and resolving energy imbalances, and it seems to lack a specific compass and program. Alongside combating widespread corruption and rent-seeking and limiting the semi-private economy, a large part of solving economic problems is contingent upon resolving issues with the outside world, where no significant developments have occurred either. The first day of Beheshtian's government coincided with the attack on the residence of Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of the extremist group Hamas, in Tehran, symbolically reminding that the dispute with Israel is a central problem in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic, which, without resolving it, other issues in this area may also remain unsolvable. In these hundred days, the Islamic Republic has experienced a direct attack and counterattack with Israel, which, if reports are correct, the Israeli counterattack has effectively struck a blow to Iran's military and defensive capabilities. In other words, the Islamic Republic has tried to confront Israel, 'besiege this country,' and deny its existence mainly through its proxy groups or allies without engaging in direct conflict with Israel. However, in the context of the October 7 attack on Israel and the Gaza war over the past year, not only have Tehran's allied forces suffered significant blows and lost a large part of their leadership and offensive capabilities, but the Islamic Republic itself has also come under direct and indirect attacks that will not necessarily allow it to continue the recent ping-pong attacks and counterattacks. Of course, Israel has not yet achieved a strategic advantage from the blows it has inflicted on the Islamic Republic and its allies, and without yielding to a fair and just solution to the historical Palestinian issue, achieving a strategic victory, 'creating a new Middle East,' and attaining sustainable security will remain an illusion and out of reach for it. However, the aforementioned blows and the emphasis they place on the imbalance in power equations between Tehran and its allies on one side and Israel and its allies on the other have been more fundamental for Tehran than it can continue to adhere to its slogans and regional discourse in practice and even in the medium term. The widespread massacre and disastrous situation in Gaza and Lebanon resulting from Israel's military approach have not provided legitimacy for Tehran's positions and have not rendered the necessity of changing these positions moot. Still, the same old slogans regarding Israel and its destruction are heard from Tehran and the hard power core, and news related to military and asymmetric confrontations of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis (with or without coordination with Tehran) are widely reflected in the Islamic Republic's media, without these operations necessarily bringing about fundamental changes in the actual power equations or bringing Tehran closer to its goal of destroying Israel. Beheshtian's government does not represent a different narrative in this regard. Voices among reformists calling for compliance with international law and UN resolutions regarding the Middle Eastern dispute are increasingly met with threats, intimidation, and repression. Nevertheless, it seems that the trends in the region and the Islamic Republic's policy have reached a point where they cannot continue without a noticeable shift. Another round of back-and-forth attacks between Iran and Israel does not negate this option but may accelerate its occurrence. The important event, however, is what has happened in the political scene of the United States, disrupting Tehran's calculations, which may have counted on Kamala Harris's rise. The analysis has been that at most, with the same 'neither war nor negotiation' policy and extensive circumvention of sanctions like the Biden administration, it could continue relations with the outside world while threatening to build a nuclear bomb. However, the experience of Trump's first term has been harder than that which could be erased from the memories of the leaders of the Islamic Republic, and it will not be possible to continue with the same previous policies during his second term, perhaps with a cautious approach. Trump's government can be both a threat and an opportunity for the Islamic Republic and Beheshtian's government. An opportunity in the sense that, like his first government, he does not want war in one corner of the world or another. His remarks about the harms of US sanctions on the dollar's power in the world also provide a window that shows his dissatisfaction with the continuation of these sanctions. His emphasis on relieving other crises in the world to focus on America's main problem (the rise of China) can also be a positive point for Tehran, just as his approach to the Ukraine war and his emphasis on ending it quickly serve this strategy. However, as seen in Trump's first term, this does not mean that he will underestimate the problems Washington has with the Islamic Republic or be ready for flexibility without quid pro quo. He seeks a tougher and more robust agreement than the JCPOA regarding the nuclear program, and given his closer ties with Israel compared to the Democrats, he will also demand specific concessions (albeit not suddenly and dramatically) from Tehran regarding the Islamic Republic's policy towards the Middle East and Israel. Tehran's refusal to be flexible in these areas and its insistence on the 'neither war nor negotiation' position could increasingly tighten the noose of sanctions and pressure against Iran, confronting Beheshtian's government with more problems and failures. Beheshtian, like other senior officials of the Islamic Republic, has stated that 'it will not matter to us who wins the elections in America,' but in practice and within the framework of his electoral slogans, which prioritize solving the sanctions issue and daily mentioning the problems that sanctions create for his government, it indeed makes a difference who occupies the White House. If he wants his government to achieve a minimal level of success, he must think of devising and applying pressure within the government to transition from Khamenei's strategy of 'neither war nor negotiation' towards appropriately adapting to the new conditions to lift sanctions, even if he fails and ultimately finds the courage to transparently explain to the people the reasons for this failure. It is unlikely that Trump will act in his approach to Israel's demands and objectives, including how to confront the Islamic Republic, as he did in the first term, fully complying with these demands. On the other hand, it is also unlikely that regional developments after October 7 will maintain his government's relationship with Israel in the same manner, and that Israel's security can be ensured solely through advancing the project of normalizing relations between Israel and Arab countries (Abraham Accords) without proposing a solution to the Palestinian issue or definitively pushing the Islamic Republic to accept agreements somewhat favorable to Tehran. On the other hand, achieving a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon and the resumption of normalization of relations between Israel and Arab countries in the region, along with the emphasis and clarification of regional Arab countries in tighter dialogues and contacts with Tehran, will likely place the Islamic Republic in a position where it cannot avoid revising its regional policies; a revision that will also pose greater challenges for Israel in sidelining the Palestinian issue and denying their rights, and a revision that will not necessarily be feasible and credible with a figure like Khamenei, who has symbolized the 'disastrous policy' of the current situation, and will need to present and represent more acceptable figures. The experience of Trump's first term and the recent direct confrontation with Israel has strengthened Tehran's understanding that 'allies' like China and Russia will not necessarily stand alongside the Islamic Republic with loud voices against the Trump administration or condemn Israel, and will mainly express a cautious position calling for de-escalation. Interestingly, Israel's recent attack on Iran's defense and military facilities has apparently reduced the country's capacity to supply missiles and drones to Russia in the war against Ukraine. Iran has been the target of increased pressures and sanctions from the West due to this role in recent years. Beheshtian has attempted to convince the West that no arms have been exported to Russia during his term, an effort that has been unsuccessful, and his government has witnessed further sanctions, including the prohibition of Iran Air flights to Europe. The Beheshtian government, having lost hope for breakthroughs in lifting sanctions and resolving the 'FATF' issue, has tried to somewhat align with the hard power core by presenting the 'look to the East' as a solution to problems. He recently expressed hope that 'Iran's presence in BRICS will reduce the impact of unfair sanctions.' However, participation in BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and agreements with the Eurasian region, which are considered facets of the Islamic Republic's 'look to the East,' have not yet had a significant impact on reducing the effects of sanctions or alleviating the people's economic burdens, similar to 'resilient economy.' Almost all BRICS member countries, except for Iran and Russia, view this group not as an alternative to the West but as an opportunity to diversify tools, partners, and increase their maneuverability in a world leaning towards multipolarity. Therefore, most of them, while being members of BRICS, maintain close relations with the US and Europe and are not afflicted by the illusions prevalent in Tehran regarding the capabilities and role of BRICS. In summary, in the first hundred days of Beheshtian's government in the realm of foreign policy, if we disregard some positive developments, which are not necessarily sustainable in relations between Tehran and Arab countries, there has not only been no breakthrough in engagement with the world and solving numerous economic problems to lift Iran from isolation, but in most areas, there has been a retreat and worsening of the situation. The root of this situation, of course, lies not in the approach and intentions of the fourteenth government but in the strategies and policies of the hard power core and the leader of the Islamic Republic. The situation of these hundred days should have increasingly demonstrated to Beheshtian and his government that without changing the main structures of the Islamic Republic's foreign and regional policies, especially considering the power shift in the White House, his efforts for 'engagement with the world and solving the economic and living problems of the people' will remain barren and may even worsen the situation compared to the past. However, with the understanding and narrative that Beheshtian has propagated regarding 'consensus' and cooperation with the hard power core in implementing his programs, there is still no basis for hope that the experience of a hundred days of unsuccessful governance will lead him and his government to create a divergence from the approaches of the hard power core and engage in dialogue with the people, clarifying these approaches, alongside the new regional and international conditions, will intensify pressure to abandon these disastrous internal and external policies and transition to policies aligned with national interests and the wishes and aspirations of the majority of society. To embark on such a path requires a fundamental shift in defining 'consensus' and establishing it based on prioritizing the interests and aspirations of the majority of society.