Operation Tikrit; Grounding of Militias, US Air Support

The Tikrit operation, the first attempt by the Baghdad government to retake an important city from the Islamic State (ISIS), began on March 1 with the participation of nearly 18,000 militias as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces and 3,000 Iraqi soldiers. The Popular Mobilization Forces, or Hashd al-Shaabi, were formed nine months ago by merging several volunteer brigades and militia groups in Iraq, and are commanded by Hadi al-Amiri, the head of the Badr Organization in Iraq. Hadi al-Amiri and Jamal Jafar Muhammad, known as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, senior commanders of this force, have longstanding and very close relations with the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Quds Force, including Qassem Soleimani, who has played an important role in the Tikrit operation. Recently, Hadi al-Amiri stated about Qassem Soleimani that he "provides very good advice... and comes to the field whenever we need him." Previously, Moein Kazemi, a leader of the Badr Organization, had said about Soleimani's role in this cooperation: "He participates in the command center of operations from the beginning of the attack until the end and visits the wounded in the hospital after the operation is completed." In addition to Qassem Soleimani, a large number of IRGC personnel are assisting Hashd al-Shaabi in the form of military advisors or fighters. Iraqi and Kurdish officials estimate the number of IRGC military advisors in Iraq to be "between 100 and several hundred." According to Haider al-Abadi, the Prime Minister of Iraq, Iran has provided weapons and equipment to the militias since the early days of the Tikrit operation. Hadi al-Amiri, in similar statements during an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai, confirmed the military assistance of the Islamic Republic to the militias, stating: "Iran has also given us technologies such as drones and anti-tank weapons." During the initial stages of the Tikrit operation, the militias, who were at the forefront of the attack on ISIS positions, along with Iraqi soldiers, fortified their positions in parts of the city and contained ISIS movements in the commercial and industrial areas of the city. Overall, that part of Tikrit located east of the Tigris River was completely under the control of military and militia forces, and ISIS's supply routes to northern Iraq were also cut off. Following this success, Iraqi political and military leaders repeatedly announced that ISIS's reach into the city of Tikrit had been curtailed. Haider al-Abadi, the Prime Minister of Iraq, promised an early victory over ISIS, stating: "This work has been achieved entirely through the efforts of Iraqis." Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the IRGC, also emphasized on March 10 in Tehran in response to a journalist's question about the imminent liberation of Tikrit, referring to the strategic position of this city: "If this group could resist, it would resist in Tikrit... but since it cannot resist in this city, it means that it will also be expelled from the remaining two cities, namely Fallujah and Mosul, which are under its control, and ISIS will be erased from Iraq." Despite this optimism, Iraqi forces failed to liberate Tikrit, and the central part of the city remained in ISIS's hands. In this regard, an Iraqi source told the media that operations would be halted until at least "1,000 elite and experienced forces" arrived. Following this halt, a group in the Iraqi army raised the issue of US air support in the battle to retake Tikrit, which ultimately led the Prime Minister of Iraq to convey this request to the United States. However, Hadi al-Amiri criticized this move on April 21, stating: "Some weak elements in the army... say we need the Americans, while we say we do not need the Americans." What factors have caused the liberation of Tikrit to drag on, contrary to the expectations and statements of Iraqi officials, and even to be temporarily halted? Contrary to reports from some Iranian media that link the temporary halt of operations to conspiracy and political factors, this is due to military reasons and the resistance of ISIS in Tikrit. According to Pentagon officials, 400 to 1,000 ISIS fighters are fighting in Tikrit. In this confrontation, ISIS has slowed the advance of the Popular Mobilization Forces in this street-to-street battle through tactics such as planting explosive traps, bombing houses and other buildings, roadside bombs, mining, blowing up bridges, digging tunnels, creating earthworks and obstacles, and similar actions. In one instance, ISIS fighters forced Iraqi forces to travel over 60 kilometers to use another bridge located north of Tikrit by blowing up the bridge over the Tigris River that connects two parts of the city. The tactics employed by ISIS have not only slowed down and ultimately grounded the Popular Mobilization Forces but have also increased the number of human and material casualties among these forces. Iraqi officials have not yet released statistics on the number of casualties, but based on unofficial statistics, an average of 60 Iraqi forces lose their lives daily. In this regard, Hadi al-Amiri, in response to a question from a journalist from the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai about the reasons for the prolonged battle for Tikrit, stated: "We do not want to suffer casualties, and at the same time, inflicting heavy losses on ISIS is better than rushing and finishing the battle quickly." However, evidence suggests that apart from the effectiveness of ISIS tactics and the unexpected resistance of this group, the Popular Mobilization Forces are acting independently, and there is a lack of necessary coordination between these forces and the military units participating in the Tikrit operation. In such circumstances, the US entered the field at Abadi's request for air support in the Tikrit operation, and ultimately Hadi al-Amiri also accepted it, stating: "We respect the Prime Minister's decision regarding the coalition's participation in airstrikes." US Airstrikes The US airstrikes against ISIS positions, which began on April 25, come at a time when by this date (April 28), nearly half of Tikrit is under the control of Iraqi forces, and currently, the balance of power is in favor of ISIS, although its continuation will be impossible. The US accepted the airstrikes on the condition that there would be no need for coordination with the militia forces and that this force would withdraw from the operational area in Tikrit. The US, aside from its concerns about the victory of Iranian-backed militias, politically does not want direct contact with the Popular Mobilization Forces and therefore coordinates its operations only with the Iraqi army and the Ministry of Defense of that country. Recently, General Lloyd Austin, commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM), told the US Senate Armed Services Committee: "I will not coordinate or cooperate with Shiite militias, and I hope such a situation never arises." According to this general, the militias have moved away from the front lines against ISIS in Tikrit and have given way to the Iraqi army. Reaction of the Militias In response to US airstrikes, militia groups such as Kata'ib Hezbollah and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, which are supported by the Islamic Republic and whose training, weapons, and equipment are provided by the Quds Force, suspended their cooperation for the liberation of Tikrit. It is unlikely that these groups would have taken such action without the approval of the Islamic Republic. The actions of these groups and Amiri's statements regarding the unnecessary participation of the US in the Tikrit operation indicate that the approach of the Baghdad government differs from that of the Islamic Republic, which Amiri represents. Haider al-Abadi wants government forces to liberate Tikrit quickly, while Amiri advocates for the continuation of the siege of Tikrit, artillery attacks on ISIS positions, and gradual advancement, believing that this approach will result in less damage to the city and civilian casualties compared to airstrikes. Urban Warfare Challenges Amiri and his supporters in the Islamic Republic are trying to maintain the image of the Popular Mobilization Forces as a powerful and independent force capable of defeating ISIS in Tikrit. The US participation in the Tikrit operation is a blow to this force, which does not see US airstrikes as necessary. Additionally, the Tikrit operation has highlighted the serious challenges faced by Iraqi forces in pushing back ISIS in Iraq. As demonstrated in this operation, military and militia forces can make significant advances in reclaiming areas around the city that are open and lack deep defense, while also being vulnerable to airstrikes. In such cases, militia forces can use their numerical and human superiority and resort to swarm attacks to push back the opponent by besieging targeted areas and cutting off their supply lines. However, after this stage and the siege of the city, the serious challenges of urban warfare posed by the enemy, especially by fighters like ISIS who are willing to fight to the death, severely slow down the progress of militia forces. In such circumstances, human casualties, both military and civilian, increase, and significant damage is inflicted on the city. The Baghdad government is in a difficult position to push back ISIS from Iraq. On one hand, the country's army has fundamental weaknesses that were revealed by the collapse of four Iraqi divisions and the surrender of Mosul to ISIS, and is now being reorganized and equipped under US oversight. On the other hand, its most effective military force, the Popular Mobilization Forces, is under the control of the Islamic Republic. US airstrikes could be a breakthrough, but they will not turn the tide, and the liberation of Tikrit, given ISIS's preparations in this city, requires the comprehensive sacrifices of Iraqi forces.