Pakistan's Nuclear Supermarket and the Arms Race in the Middle East

With the beginning of another round of negotiations between Iran and the United States in Switzerland, the convergence between the two countries regarding Tehran's nuclear program is approaching critical stages. Most observers analyzing these negotiations believe that both Iran and the U.S. have a clear desire to reach a final agreement, although their perspectives differ and may encounter issues in details that could halt the process. According to Wendy Sherman, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, one of the major issues hindering a complete agreement with the P5+1 is Iran's expectation for simultaneous removal of all sanctions against the U.S. argument that divides sanctions into at least two broad categories: - One group arising from Iran's nuclear activities, which would be suspended and ultimately removed if an agreement is reached. However: - Another group of sanctions imposed on Iran due to accusations of 'supporting terrorism and human rights violations' will remain in place. Another important issue is the distinction between 'suspension' and 'complete removal' of sanctions, which occupies a significant part of the negotiations and has not yet reached a final outcome. Beyond the implementation methods of the agreement, the regional and international implications of this matter encompass a wide range of issues and have drawn the attention of international observers. One of these issues is the impact of this agreement on disarmament and regional security. Few have overlooked John Kerry's immediate travels after the negotiations, where he visits the capitals of Arab countries to share the results of the talks with them. Almost all these trips are related to the outcomes of the agreement on regional security. To analyze this issue, we must take a look at the history of the region over the past couple of decades. The Pakistani Nuclear Supermarket Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan returned to Pakistan in 1976 after working for a time at enrichment facilities in the Netherlands to work on Pakistan's national nuclear program. At that time, he was 40 years old and quickly made his impact felt on Pakistan's nuclear program. Abdul Qadeer Khan played a direct role in the production and testing of Pakistan's first atomic bomb in the late 1980s. In addition, from the mid-1980s, he established his 'nuclear supermarket,' through which he transferred information and technical knowledge of enriched uranium production schemes to anyone willing to pay for it. Apparently, one branch of this nuclear supermarket was located in Pakistan's nuclear laboratories, where besides Abdul Qadeer Khan, four to six other specialists worked, seemingly unaware of the behind-the-scenes transactions between him and the outside world. The connection point was in the United Arab Emirates, and it is said that some European industry traders also collaborated with it. After the discovery and exposure of the network, the export of technology, technical knowledge, and some equipment was identified to two specific destinations: one to North Korea and the other to Iran. Apparently, North Korea received two types of centrifuges, 'P-1 and P-11,' the latter being the more advanced version of P-1, and progressed rapidly in this work to the extent that even during Bill Clinton's presidency, he was willing to provide two light-water reactor units and the necessary fuel to them if they halted their weapons program. On the other hand, there exists a Pakistani supermarket along with a network for the production and distribution of certain components used in the region. Additionally, the global black market offers some other primary equipment. Pervez Musharraf writes in his memoirs that he became suspicious of Abdul Qadeer Khan in the late 1990s and relieved him of his duties. He states that several North Korean missile engineers came to Pakistan, and Abdul Qadeer Khan trained them in military-level enrichment. In December 2002, it was revealed that North Korea had the capability to produce military-grade uranium, and a month later, it withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and shortly thereafter announced that it possessed an atomic bomb. Although North Korea's nuclear capabilities have largely been met with ridicule and scorn, it serves as a real example of arms proliferation through the spread of technical knowledge in nuclear technology, which remained hidden behind a wall of secrecy and ignorance from the West regarding the quantity and quality of North Korea's atomic bomb. It is said that part of the technical knowledge and centrifuge technology may have been transferred to other countries, including Iran, through North Korea. Nevertheless, until 2004, Abdul Qadeer Khan remained the mastermind of Pakistan's nuclear program and an advisor to Pervez Musharraf on science and technology. He was dismissed from his position in January 2004 but was pardoned by Pervez Musharraf a year later. Iran and the P5+1 on the Brink of Agreement Now we are on the verge of an agreement between Iran, the United States, and the member countries of the so-called P5+1. Beyond the technical issues and details of the agreement, assuming that understanding and practical agreement will be achieved, the short-term and long-term effects of this agreement in the region are being discussed and critiqued by various forums. In addition to the unwavering and always opposing stance of Israel, there have been direct objections from some Gulf Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, against the U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement, but overall, Arab countries have approached the matter in a somewhat ambiguous manner. On one hand, they tell the Americans that they support the agreement and the U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. On the other hand, they cannot tolerate the idea that Iran even has nuclear technology and demand similar nuclear capabilities. On one hand, there exists a Pakistani supermarket along with a network for the production and distribution of certain components used in the region. On the other hand, the global black market offers some other primary equipment. Additionally, the Russians have a strong interest in selling and installing nuclear power reactors in the region, and their initial conditions are very favorable, although a look at the fate of the Bushehr reactor shows that reliable technology has not been employed there. Alongside all this, the West also wishes to sell its light-water nuclear reactors and power generation equipment to its regional allies. Moreover, oil-rich countries in the region have good relations with Western countries and are not under sanctions like Iran, possessing high financial and economic capabilities to purchase such technology, while also being under the security umbrella of major powers that ensure the safety of such equipment. All these factors create positive incentives for nuclear enthusiasm. However, is equipping with nuclear reactors the right choice when the Japanese are shutting down all 50 of their nuclear units? What will be the environmental impacts of these units around the Persian Gulf? Scott Sagan, a Stanford University professor and another thinker in the field of international security, and the author of the book 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,' believes that the presence of rational characters at the head of governments can prevent the use of nuclear bombs, and it is uncertain whether every nuclear-armed country has a rational political leader. Therefore, the more limited nuclear powers are, the more global peace and security are ensured. What does international relations science say? Once, Kenneth Waltz (1924-2013), a globally respected scholar in international relations who taught at the prestigious universities of Berkeley and Columbia, believed that the abundance of countries with military nuclear capabilities could serve as a significant deterrent to the use of nuclear bombs and, in fact, guarantee peace. According to him, nuclear bombs create more balance and prevent their use, thus being a better choice for ensuring global security. In fact, the fear of global destruction ensures peace. In contrast to Waltz, Scott Sagan, a Stanford University professor and another thinker in the field of international security, and the author of the book 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,' holds an opposing view and believes that the presence of rational characters at the head of governments can prevent the use of nuclear bombs, and it is uncertain whether every nuclear-armed country has a rational political leader. Therefore, the more limited nuclear powers are, the more global peace and security are ensured. Among the irrational and dangerous figures for international security, Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein can be named, neither of whom managed to access nuclear weapons during their lifetimes. The proliferation of nuclear equipment and terrorism During the height of the Cold War, the main parties in the arms race were the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the theories of the two aforementioned thinkers were largely shaped based on the political behavior of those two countries. However, today, two years after Kenneth Waltz's death, the world faces a multitude of terrorist groups eager for power and destructive weapons. Groups like the Islamic State (ISIS), Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and many other large and small groups have made the world less secure and increased the need for comprehensive calculations to prevent their access to nuclear and dangerous materials. Here, the need to balance between the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the military application of nuclear technology becomes increasingly urgent. Overall, conditions are forming in the region that are not very predictable. For example, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries in the region show great interest in nuclear technology and competition with Iran. Alongside the interest of regional governments, the shadow of terrorism and the traces of organizations like Al-Qaeda can be seen in the black market for nuclear materials. The growing concern about active terrorism in the region creates a very dark image of the future of nuclear technology in the Middle East. It does not matter whether the source of delivery and sales in the black market is the Pakistani supermarket or the Russian and Western markets. What matters is the changing political situation in the region and the possibility of terrorists accessing dangerous nuclear materials. If even one more small country in the region develops nuclear capacity (even for peaceful purposes), it is likely to create a situation where Turkey and Egypt, which have previously taken steps in this area, will also consider upgrading their technology to nuclear technology and even military use. Netanyahu's Argument The White House's argument that everything will be controlled during the ten years set for the agreement's implementation is not accepted by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who ultimately believes that Iran will emerge from this process as a nuclear giant. The fear of an arms race has existed in various decades since World War II and has manifested itself at two levels: conventional and nuclear weapons in various parts of the world. However, regarding nuclear weapons, this fear has often remained theoretical. Today, among the approximately 30 countries that were eager for nuclear bombs in the 1960s, almost none have succeeded or have backed down. For example, in Latin America or South Africa, where one or two countries took steps towards nuclear weapons, short-term fears and tensions arose, but ultimately no country became a nuclear power, and even South Africa, which had advanced to the point of bomb construction, completely withdrew. Although this country is still listed in the black market for materials and tools. Two countries, Pakistan and India, after several decades of rivalry, ultimately achieved nuclear bombs and immediately threatened each other, but ultimately the dispute over the disputed region (Kashmir) has remained dormant and suspended. Whether the actions of Iran and Israel (assuming Iran becomes a military nuclear power) will lead to an arms race or whether reaching an agreement with Iran will cause other countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or smaller Arab countries to turn to nuclear weapons only makes sense within the framework of the theory of arms race, but we know well that the political and economic costs of this are not cheap, and thus there is a long way between theory and practice. However, the risk of regional terrorists accessing these rules is an exception and may not follow any specific rules.