Parliament's Yellow Card and Rouhani's Empty Hands

Hassan Rouhani visited the Parliament for the first time during his presidency to answer five questions from the representatives regarding "the continuation of banking sanctions," "unprecedented economic recession," "failure to reduce unemployment," "smuggling of goods," and "increase in currency rates." Rouhani and his parliamentary assistant initially attempted to persuade the representatives to withdraw their questions, which backfired and affected his relations with Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament. In response to the aforementioned questions, Rouhani presented a 47-page written document to the representatives and tried to calmly navigate the tense atmosphere of the parliamentary session. His reference to a meeting with the Supreme Leader before entering the Parliament and his emphasis on the necessity of avoiding tensions between the Parliament and the government indicated a caution advised from above, serving as a signal for why Rouhani was cautious in his responses and also sending a message to the representatives, especially the hardline conservatives, to consider his position and act within the framework of increasing unity between the Parliament and the government. However, what transpired during Rouhani's speech in the Parliament, which was predictable, remained within the framework of therapeutic discourse, slogan-based interactions, denial of widespread problems, and presentation of dubious statistics, ultimately harmed the moderate government at both the societal and power bloc levels, further destabilizing its position. Almost all of Rouhani's supporters among reformists and moderates expressed their dissatisfaction with his responses. Only Hesamoddin Ashna, his advisor, made an unsuccessful attempt to justify Rouhani's conservatism as a form of dignity and a contrast to Ahmadinejad's confrontational approach in the Parliament, which did not resonate with public opinion given his history of making false claims and launching weak propaganda. According to reports, Ali Motahari mentioned that the reformists' criticism was anticipated by Rouhani, who apparently did not care about it. Based on some reports, before the session began, Motahari informed Rouhani of the conditions for support from the Hope faction, to which Rouhani reportedly responded, "It doesn't matter if they support me!" In the session where the representatives exercised their supervisory role over the executive branch, Rouhani revealed more than ever his empty hands, indicating that his term is nearly over. The twelfth government has no plans or programs to pull the country out of its dire economic situation and has completely assimilated into the current political and cultural landscape, showing no difference from the moderate and traditional conservatives. In this context, the gap between most voters and Rouhani has widened and is approaching irreparability. The erosion of Rouhani's social base has accelerated, and the number of those who feel deceived or regretful about voting for him in the 2017 elections is increasing. In fact, the main source of protest against Rouhani's performance is the people. If he were to run again, it is unlikely he would win against rivals like Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and Ebrahim Raisi. His position within the power bloc is also precarious. The negative perception of hardline conservatives towards him remains strong, and they are even more determined than before to delegitimize and undermine him. Moderate and traditional conservatives are also concerned about Rouhani's poor performance in the economic sphere. The announcement of dissatisfaction with Rouhani's responses to 80% of the questions has increased his vulnerability in Parliament. The Sheikh of Moderation is no longer the president who had a seemingly strong position in society and the power bloc with 24 million votes last year. This severe fall indicates both the temporary nature of that vote and its lack of strategic and constructive aspects, as well as the instability of politics in Iran. Monitoring the inclinations of representatives from various factions shows that the atmosphere in the Parliament is conducive to impeaching Rouhani and removing him from office. The request for questioning the president was initiated by hardline conservatives, but due to the negative perception of Rouhani's responses and dissatisfaction with the twelfth government's performance, other factions have joined them. At least one-third of the members of the Hope faction and most of the Independent faction (close to Ali Larijani) participated in issuing a yellow card to Rouhani. Ali Larijani, who is inclined to run for the 2021 presidential election, is inevitably distancing himself from Rouhani, and this consideration was evident in the finalization of the questioning of Rouhani and the negative evaluation from the Parliament. The only opposing view from the Supreme Leader has prevented the impeachment of Rouhani in Parliament due to political expediency. Mr. Khamenei expressed his satisfaction with Rouhani's responses during a meeting with cabinet members in the week commemorating the government and emphasized that the gap between the expectations of the Parliament and the existing realities must be bridged. This statement implicitly indicates greater alignment of the leadership with the views of the critical representatives in the Parliament. However, the dominant power bloc still prefers that Rouhani retreats further, aligns with the status quo, and distances himself from his electoral slogans and promises, allowing for a quiet descent from power. In this context, regardless of whether the representatives' questions had a criminal nature or contained violations of laws and duties, it is unlikely that Rouhani's case will be referred to the judiciary by the Parliament, and even if it is, it is unlikely that the judiciary will conduct a serious investigation. The representatives' protests against Rouhani can be understood against the backdrop of dissatisfaction from both main factions of the government regarding his performance. As mentioned in the session, Rouhani denied the critical state of affairs, claiming that the existing problems are merely damaging and not commensurate with managing an abnormal situation. Overall, conservatives expect Rouhani's government to respond swiftly to what they assess as America's economic war and to expand its activities quantitatively and qualitatively through the establishment of operational frameworks. They object to reactive approaches, incoherent policies, the presentation of false and propagandistic statistics, blackening the performance of the ninth and tenth governments, and erroneous and corruption-inducing decisions by the government. Reformists, while having higher expectations of Rouhani, mainly criticize him for avoiding transparency regarding problems, conservatism, evading clarification about the shadow government's sabotage, failing to change weak managers, lacking a strong economic team, adopting wrong policies, and most importantly, ignoring the promises Rouhani made in political and cultural spheres. In practice, the failure to distribute power seats according to expectations is the main reason for the opposition of some conservative reformists and those seeking shares. From the perspective of society, Rouhani's discursive shift, broken promises, inability to improve political, cultural, and economic conditions, passivity, lack of a correct economic paradigm, populism, patronage, and factionalism, complete surrender to the authority of the Supreme Leader, failure to implement structural reforms in the economy and fight corruption, and in a word, the neutral and ineffective approach of the government in solving problems have created a bleak outlook for society. Rouhani's approach is such that a significant portion of society feels he does not live in Iran, and his statements do not correspond to the realities of the country. Therefore, the most significant criticism of Rouhani's statements in the Parliament is the incorrect framing and misunderstanding of the problems. He attempted to present a romanticized image, providing unrealistic and manipulated statistics, and portraying the government's performance before December 2017 as very successful, while attributing the problems to the protests that erupted in December 2017. In reality, the country did not emerge from crisis during his entire presidency; it merely slowed down the country's downward trajectory with his and his ministers' promises, and the country did not even get on the right path. His first term was spent on achieving the JCPOA and advising patience until its benefits materialized. Investment in the country was effectively suspended, and everyone was waiting for a bright future that Rouhani promised in words, but even then, the government's actions left little room for optimism. It was natural that this situation could not continue. The protests in December 2017 marked the beginning of the bursting of Rouhani's bubble, as people, frustrated by the problems and the unlikelihood of the promises being fulfilled, took to the streets, demanding extensive political changes due to the wide gap between Rouhani's words and actions, and their disappointment in him and the reformists' political strategy. The protests that emerged in the public sphere after December 2017 were neither a break from past events nor a conspiracy by foreign elements or rival factions, but rather a natural reaction to the overflowing patience of society that continues. In fact, these protests are a result of problems, not their cause. Of course, the government's poor performance is part of the problems, not the entirety of it, but Rouhani's dual behavior, especially raising expectations during the 2017 elections and acting in a contrary direction by increasing alignment with the authority of the Supreme Leader, has led him to bear a significant share of the protests and criticisms. Shifting the blame for the main problems onto Trump and the aggressive policies of the U.S. government is also a form of deflection. Most economic experts unanimously agree that the primary source of internal problems lies within. Major mistakes by the government in inappropriate interventions, particularly in determining the value of the 4200 Toman dollar, delaying deep engagement in solving problems with a populist and superficial outlook, and repeating previous failed practices have not only deepened the economic crisis but have also raised serious doubts about the hope of controlling and reducing these issues. The result of this inadequacy is the high vulnerability of the country's economy to observable psychological factors. In this context, the currency and gold markets reacted negatively to Rouhani's statements, leading to a continuation of uncertainty and confusion, causing the price of the dollar and gold coins to return to previous increasing levels. It seems that Rouhani no longer has a defensive shield, and his therapeutic rhetoric is not only ineffective but has become his Achilles' heel. Rouhani has become so vulnerable that a significant portion of his ministers are facing impeachment, and as was evident during the vote of no confidence against the ministers of labor and economy, he lacks the ability to defend himself. If conditions continue in this manner and no significant change in government performance is observed, Rouhani will practically have no relevance in the political arena, and only his name will remain in the executive branch.