Peaceful Regime Change in Iran; What Supporters and Opponents Are Saying

These days, there is talk that one of the options for the United States government during Donald Trump's presidency is a political regime change in Iran. Following last month's statements by Rex Tillerson, the U.S. Secretary of State, in support of a peaceful regime change from within the Islamic Republic, various circles and think tanks have sought to discuss and debate this theory. The scope of these discussions has also extended to the media and continues. Support and practical action regarding regime change by the U.S. and some other countries in areas with irreconcilable conflicts with the existing situation is not unprecedented. The regime change in Libya led to an uncontrollable situation that remains unresolved. Regime change in Iraq resulted in a costly war that, after nearly fifteen years, has only reached a stage where some researchers consider the scenario of dividing Iraq into three countries as the ultimate solution. Additionally, this action led to the emergence of a dangerous ideology in the region known as the 'Islamic State' (ISIS), which has caused widespread violence and created a perilous world. However, the situation in Iran is somewhat different. The attempt to change the regime in Iran has at least one successful precedent; the head of the CIA confirms that the U.S. played a role in designing and executing the plan to overthrow Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh's government. We know that this plan was executed, and afterward, the Shah, who had left Iran, returned under new conditions and remained in power until 1979. But is regime change from within, with the support of one or more foreign powers, feasible under today's conditions? David Kualaloo, a global affairs lecturer, argues in an article published on June 28 in the Huffington Post that even if the U.S. has the capacity to overthrow and change the regime in Iran, the result would be the spread of 'anti-Western sentiment.' He believes that Washington's theory regarding regime change in Iran with external support overlooks a dangerous reality: Iran's reaction with the support of Russia and China. Kualaloo argues that President Trump would be making a mistake if he thinks he can control or even influence events in the Middle East. In his view, a weak assessment of this region could lead to geopolitical mistakes. However, Ray Takeyh, a senior researcher at the Council on Foreign Relations, looks at the issue from a different angle in his latest article published on July 5 in the Washington Post. He describes Tillerson's comments about supporting elements within Iran that seek to peacefully transfer power as 'horrific,' but at the same time states that given the age of Iran's leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, 'the United States must be prepared for a power transition in Iran that could even lead to the collapse of the entire system.' From Takeyh's perspective, 'there are no shortage of failing regimes in the Middle East, and Iran is often mistakenly described as a bastion of stability. The history of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a tumultuous one, marked by a struggle between an authoritarian regime and a rebellious populace demanding democratic empowerment. When they first came to power, the religious oligarchs suppressed other members of the revolutionary coalition who did not align with their vision of a religion-based dictatorship through street bloodshed.' Takeyh further describes two phases of recent Iranian history: the 1990s reformist movement, which remains the most prominent attempt to create harmony between religion and pluralism. He summarizes the reformists' demands as the necessity of 'revising Khamenei's absolutist goals' and the need for 'developing civil society and critical media.' He also refers to the regime's repressive reaction through 'creating terror and fear to drain the reformist movement's strength' during this period and writes that afterward, the Green Movement emerged in the summer of 2009, which 'forever called into question the legitimacy of the regime and severed the relationship between governance and society.' Takeyh predicts that 'another protest movement will undoubtedly occur and lead to regime change.' According to the Washington Post article's author, today, the Islamic Republic of Iran bears a striking resemblance to the Soviet Union in its final years: 'It teaches an ideology that convinces no one. It operates under a security system that proved unreliable during the 2009 uprisings, as the regime had to bring militia forces into the streets, and many Revolutionary Guard commanders refused to shoot at the people.' The article notes that 'mosques are empty,' the inclination to join religious schools is declining, and even 'women are reluctant to marry clerics'; 'the system is mired in corruption, which poses a problem for a system that claims to derive its power from divine sources.' The article's author argues that the recent election winner, Hassan Rouhani, has promised freedoms that he has no intention of delivering. Takeyh believes the Islamic Republic will not be able to resolve the leadership succession issue because 'the factions are fragmented and society is dissatisfied.' The author argues that the only advantage that works in the regime's favor is the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which can somewhat prevent sanctions against Iran. He believes that while concerns will be expressed regarding Iran's human rights and terrorism allegations, this 'arms control agreement prevents crippling sanctions, and those who prioritize maintaining this arms control agreement will not question the regime's legitimacy and survival.' However, in his view, 'the moral standing of the arms control agreement cannot prevent a consensus and create a common cause for freedom within Iran.' The author further notes that the United States is monitoring conditions that could suddenly but likely lead to another protest movement within Iran or that due to the sudden death of the Islamic Republic's leader, 'the system could become unstable to the brink of collapse from within.' He suggests that planning should begin now to exploit such conditions so that the U.S. can take advantage of internal divisions and further weaken the already unstable security system. According to the Washington Post article's author, 'all these actions should start today; when the crisis begins, it will be too late for the U.S. to enter as a player.' Takeyh uses a historical event to further explain the necessity of this examination and preparedness: In March 1954, when Joseph Stalin died, President Dwight Eisenhower inquired about what studies his administration had conducted to exploit the succession crisis in the Soviet Union. It turned out that no studies had been conducted. Eisenhower, frustrated, declared, 'I know that everyone has been worried about this since 1956... well, now he is dead, but we have no plan.' The author concludes that Rex Tillerson has turned on the green light. Now it is the government's responsibility to exploit the ongoing crisis in Iran and act for the displacement of one of America's established enemies. In response to this article, which explicitly calls for pre-crisis study and policymaking, Daniel Larison, in two articles on July 4 and 6 on the 'American Conservative' website, accuses Iran's opponents, including Ray Takeyh, of being unaware of the internal and international conditions of Iran. He states that following the suppression of the Green Movement, Iran's opponents known as the Hawks repeatedly claimed that the U.S. missed the opportunity for regime change in Iran, but in reality, 'they have misunderstood the political realities within Iran. Such an opportunity never existed during the Green Movement, and the possibility of it arising under current conditions is also unlikely.' He then criticizes the Hawks and American neoconservatives, accusing them of believing in 1980 that the Soviet Union was too strong to be comprehended. Now their ideological successors are convinced that the Iranian regime is fragile and hope to soon steer the current U.S. government towards pursuing a regime change policy in Iran and present it as a simple matter. It should be noted that Rex Tillerson's remarks and Ray Takeyh's article should not be seen solely as manifestations of a desire for regime change in Iran. In recent days and weeks, we have witnessed increased activity among formerly armed Iranian opposition groups and similar statements from the leaders of several Middle Eastern countries. When we combine all these factors with the hostile methods that hardliners have resorted to on the brink of the formalization of Iran's twelfth government, we realize that many of the arguments of those advocating for regime change from within Iran may not be entirely unfounded.