Pejmanian and 'National Accord'; With Whom, For Whom, and With What Policy?

Pejmanian and his associates use the term 'National Accord' for the current government and its political strategy. The use of grand and comprehensive terms in politics is common, just as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad chose 'Mehr' and Hassan Rouhani chose 'Hope and Prudence' for their governments. However, the events and policies during their presidencies had little connection to such attributes. Therefore, the meaning of words in society and the political world must be analyzed primarily in the context of history, society, and the understanding and interpretation that exists around them. Words have history and meaning, and the deep gap between political reality and the common meaning of words makes their usage more akin to misuse. On what basis can a policy be considered national? The term national for a government can relate to both its political-social composition and its policies. Being national in common political discourse means paying attention to the public interest or considering the interests of broad groups of people against factional policies that reduce it to a part of the political forces. The proposed cabinet of Pejmanian; from low efficiency to gerontocracy. In Iran, the use of terms like nation and national has a history dating back to the 19th century. However, political power has been exclusively in the hands of Islamist forces since 1979 and has never acquired a 'national' character. The term national and nationalism, as a secular and non-religious tendency, has had a negative connotation in the literature of the Iranian government for years, and for some, it still does. Islamist forces in Iran (both reformists and conservatives) do not consider themselves 'national' in the common sense of the word; because beyond slogans (Iran for Iranians...), the belief in a Shia religious government and dividing society based on religion means excluding part of society and denying the national aspect. The application of this term and the prevalence of concepts like 'national reconciliation', 'national accord', 'national agreement' is a new phenomenon among Islamist groups and individuals like Pejmanian and Zarif, and it remains to be seen what understanding they have of the 'national' aspect in politics and whether their interpretation of these words is trans-religious and encompasses a large part of social forces or is more intra-governmental and reduced to Islamist groups that believe in the Islamic Republic and the Guardianship of the Jurist. The arrangement of Mr. Pejmanian's cabinet was the first practical test for giving meaning to this term. The formation of a strategic council to prepare a list of 'qualified' individuals and propose government members was the first step towards 'national accord' as understood by Mr. Pejmanian. News that leaked from within the council showed that working groups had to have a very minimal interpretation of the 'national' nature of the government formation process, the capabilities of candidates, or positive discrimination from the very beginning. In other words, contrary to the President's promises, expertise, competence, and representation of part of society did not take precedence, and the proposed individuals had to first align with the ideological-religious-political criteria of the government. This was the first and biggest obstacle to the national inclusivity of the new government members or the actual implementation of positive discrimination policies in favor of women and religious and ethnic minorities and other social groups victimized by religious and political discrimination. The practical result of this noisy approach was a government that, at best, can be called a single-identity, single-religion, and male (with one female minister) 'accord among insiders' where each took a share for themselves; a government that does not reflect the current diversity of Iranian society (women, minorities, specialized and political elites, secular groups...) and does not encompass forces beyond the Islamists who have been in power until now. Mr. Pejmanian stated that he had to consider the views of security and intelligence institutions, the IRGC, leadership, and parliamentary factions in arranging the government. He mentioned something in parliament about the opaque compromise over the government and its passage through the filter of the 'system', non-elected and security institutions that everyone knew but few openly articulated. For Mr. Pejmanian and his supporters, compromising with the main power institutions is considered a success, but few question the price that has been paid for this compromise or what must be paid in the future. Let us not forget that the main power institutions have not yet engaged in any critical or evaluative approach to past policies and speak about the current limited shift with hesitation and ifs and buts. Mr. Pejmanian says he coordinated his ministers with Khamenei; the parliament voted confidence to all ministers. Now, if despite failing in the first step, we still look with great optimism at the President's promises, we must wait for the policy that the coalition government among insiders with a national accord approach is supposed to implement. However, such a claim simultaneously raises two fundamental questions. How will the main power institutions, which did not allow the government desired by Mr. Pejmanian (according to him) to take shape, submit to a policy that is supposed to go in a very different direction from the past? How will those in the government who until yesterday were players in the field of purifying politics and suppressing society adapt themselves to the 'national accord' policy today? How does a minority that holds a large part of power accept to respect citizens' rights, the demands and requests of society, and the requirements of desirable and transparent governance in the name of 'national accord'? The second question relates to the essence of the policy that intends to symbolize a kind of 'national accord' in society or to take steps in that direction. This question is very fundamental because the disillusioned, hopeless, and distrustful society of today's Iran, in terms of the level of demands and collective psychology, does not resemble the year 1997 and cannot be compared to 2013. What has been achieved today is not the result of the retreat and 'new rationality' of the government, but the direct result of years of resistance from society; a society that seeks a new relationship with the government, transparency in politics and structures, efficiency, respect for citizens' rights, and the elimination of various forms of discrimination imposed on the Iranian people by the religious government. For this reason, the fundamental question is how a policy that concerns 'national accord' can place public interest and national interest at the center of its strategies instead of the interests of the 'system', non-elected institutions, and the minority of society? How can one respond to the demands of the people and society without reforming autocratic and opaque structures? The coming weeks and months will show whether national policy in areas such as choosing lifestyle and dress, freedom of expression and media, ending political repression and freeing political prisoners and civil activists, lifting filtering, intergenerational dialogue, respecting academic freedom and university independence, ending ideological and repressive policies in education, defending the fundamental rights of the people, combating structural corruption, ending widespread environmental destruction, eliminating gender, religious, ethnic discrimination, de-escalating foreign policy, transparency in policymaking, and preventing military interference in politics and economics will make progress or whether the national accord project, like the arrangement of the government, will turn into a hollow term.