Perspective | The Ethical Legacy of Khomeini: The Spread of Hatred and Violence

(This article was written in 1999) To know that infidels and Zoroastrians and Jews in this box were nothing but curses. Usually, when a political leader passes away, media outlets and political and social organizations, as well as historians, evaluate the actions and deeds of the deceased leader and examine his so-called 'legacy.' This assessment is not easy, especially in countries like Iran, where many events remain shrouded in ambiguity and obscurity for long periods, sometimes indefinitely. For example, it took eighty years to understand that Reza Shah Pahlavi was not merely a servant of England and other foreign powers, but in fact, a man whose services, either directly or during his reign, contributed significantly to Iran's independent and unified existence in the last century; the very concept of modern Iran is also impossible without the foundations laid during Reza Shah's twenty-year rule. The discussion of Khomeini's legacy also goes through such complexities. Ten years have passed since Khomeini's death, but many events that led to his rise as the absolute ruler of the jurist remain unclear. For instance: • It is still not precisely known who and with what intention took American embassy staff (and in fact all the people of Iran) hostage and, by creating a suffocating atmosphere, illegally and un-Islamically ratified the constitution of the rule of the jurist; • It is still not clear what Khomeini's role was in inciting various political figures and factions against each other for the purpose of political exploitation and dominance in the country; • It is still unknown what the letters exchanged between Ayatollah Khomeini and some security officials (during his last year in Najaf) contained; • It is still not precisely known what transpired during two meetings (totaling four hours) between Khomeini and Mr. Richard Cottam in Paris (in the fall of 1978) and what agreements were made (although parts of it have been published in Sahifeh Noor); it may take forty years for Richard Cottam's report to the CIA to be declassified and published, as both parties involved in the conversation have passed away, and Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, who was his translator in that conversation, is unwilling to discuss the matters raised in that meeting because he believes he has not yet 'retired politically.' (Dr. Yazdi made this statement in the summer of 1998 at a gathering in Washington in response to a question raised.) • It is still not clear how Mr. Bazargan managed to secure the agreement of the embassies of England, America, and the Soviet Union in Tehran to announce the Islamic Republic; • The complete text of the minutes of the Revolutionary Council has not been published, and there is much speculation about the members of this council – and possibly a council formed in parallel with it under the same name. • And so on. Thus, we see that once again, for the examination of the so-called political legacy of one of the most prominent political figures in contemporary Iran – namely Mr. Khomeini – many unclear and unspoken points remain, making such an assessment incomplete and perhaps impossible. However, it can be said that Ayatollah Khomeini led a rebellion and revolution that resulted in the extinction of the monarchy in Iran, and thus his name will certainly remain in the history of Iran, just as the names of individuals such as Mohammad Ali Foroughi Zekaa al-Molk, Reza Shah Pahlavi, Dr. Mossadegh, and Qavam al-Saltaneh will remain due to their impact on the history of Iran. However, aside from the political and historical issues regarding Khomeini's legacy, which has not yet reached the time for a fair assessment, one can examine the ethical and behavioral legacy of Mr. Khomeini, the sources of which – namely his words and writings – are available; although the Islamic Republic is gradually collecting some of these sayings and writings and trying to erase them from the memory of the people. A defining characteristic of Khomeini's behavior was the hatred he had for the people of Iran. Perhaps the roots of this hatred should be sought in the behavior that the people and freedom-seekers of Iran exhibited towards clergymen like Sheikh Fazlollah during the Constitutional Revolution, including executing him as a 'corrupt on earth.' This hatred of Khomeini for the people increased during the reign of Reza Shah, who could not tolerate clerical interference in state affairs, and whose modernization program was despised by the clergy. The clergy opposed the establishment of courts, elementary schools, and high schools, as well as the replacement of traditional baths with modern showers, the entry of women into society, and the construction of roads, hospitals, railways, and universities, all of which they presented as contradictions to the Shia religion and faith. The reflection of Khomeini's hatred for the people of Iran can be seen in the preface of the book 'Kashf al-Asrar,' published in the early years after Reza Shah's ousting. There, he writes: 'He (Reza Shah) spent time with the late Modarres and had private contact with him and realized that nothing could satisfy him, neither bribery, nor threats, nor the power of logic. He gauged the state of other scholars and understood his duty to execute the plans of his masters. Despite all the pressures, tortures, and humiliations that particularly the clerics faced during those days of oppression in Iran, they rose and revolted several times to eliminate the corruptions they privately knew about from reliable sources, from Isfahan, Tabriz, and Mashhad, but the weakness of the people, who are the executing force of the scholars' clever plans, rendered their actions futile. The clerics recognized from the very first days of Reza Khan's rule that it was against the interests of the country, and as much as they could, publicly and when that was not possible, privately and secretly, they alerted the people to his ruinous corruptions, but the propaganda of that group through the newspapers of that day, which were the disgrace of Iran, and some of which still play a role today, discredited them [the religious scholars] in the eyes of the people to the extent that they were not even allowed to ride in cars, and any defect in the car was attributed to the presence of a cleric. I myself saw that when the gasoline ran out on the way, the driver said it was because of the curse of this cleric, and since I was a Sayyid, I was not objected to.' Khomeini is incorrect; according to documents recently published (in 1999), Modarres visited Reza Shah several times and stayed with him for long periods, consulting him on various state matters. However, what is interesting in Khomeini's quote regarding Modarres' thinking is that he boasts that Modarres, being a cleric, did not even submit to 'the power of logic!' This is also an incorrect claim. Although Modarres clashed with Reza Shah over power – and also supported Sheikh Khaz'al, a British puppet, and advocated for his separation from Iran – he was the one who, through various arrangements, prevented the republicanism of Iran from being established by Reza Khan, the commander-in-chief. In fact, what caused Khomeini's hatred for the people of Iran at that time was summarized in the phrase 'the weakness of the people, who are the executing force of the scholars' clever plans,' the same weakness that rendered the clergy's plans to gain power through 'the brilliant record of the clergy' in anti-Iranian and anti-people actions ineffective. Khomeini at that time was also unable to understand the sentiments of the people of Iran, why they attributed every negative outcome to 'the cleric's foot' and 'the cleric's curse,' and why – as he himself put it – even the coachmen would not allow 'clerics' and 'prostitutes' to ride together: Was it not the case that the greatest wars between Iran and Russia, which led to the humiliating treaties of Gulistan and Turkmenchay, occurred at the behest of the clergy? Was it not the case that the people rightly attributed the disintegration of Iran, the defeat in the war with Russia, and the corruption of the Qajar dynasty to the clergy? Was it not the case that many clerics – including Sheikh Ali Kani in Tehran and the Friday prayer leader of Tabriz – hoarded grain during the famine while people were dying of hunger? Was it not the case that the clergy, who controlled the judiciary, would marry off women to others at their whim and create documents for the properties of the people in the name of others? Was it not the case that some clerics were large landowners and the oppression they inflicted on the peasants led to a negative reaction from the people towards them, just as Mr. Khomeini's father, who was a ruthless landowner, was killed by his peasants, and Khomeini grew up without the supervision and affection of a father or mother in the home of his relatives? (Refer to the memoirs of Ayatollah Pasandideh, Khomeini's brother) This is a mere sample of the 'clever plans' of the clergy in Iran over the past two hundred years. Khomeini knew these and worse, and for these reasons, he gradually developed a hatred for the people of Iran and only used them as cannon fodder and 'the executing force of his plans,' to the extent that in his view, religion, faith, Islam, Shia, honesty, integrity, and truthfulness were only relevant when they could serve his fantasies and distant dreams. Khomeini had no fear of the death of the people and, in fact, welcomed it, and wherever he could, he incited people and youth to become 'martyrs' so that he could politically exploit the 'blood of martyrs.' Most clerics believed – and some still do – that if possible, bloodshed and killings should be prevented by any means, and 'the blood of the people' is worth more than to be spent on uncertain paths, while Khomeini promoted in his speeches and writings that 'be killed and kill...' to the extent that Mr. Seyyed Hamid Rouhani, Khomeini's official historian, addresses this issue in a book titled 'An Analytical Study of Imam Khomeini's Movement' and clearly – and indeed proudly – shows how 'Imam Khomeini' was not afraid of the 'blood and souls' issue: 'I pursued the issue of 'blood and souls' even though it is outside the scope of this writing because I wanted to respond to those lazy charlatans [referring to clerics who oppose bloodshed] who justify their shameful silence in the face of the dangers threatening Islam and the Islamic community (to prevent bloodshed) and (to preserve blood and souls) and criticize the great leader for engaging in a movement that led to the killing of Muslims by the Shah...'. Khomeini's historian does not forget to attribute this 'determined resolve and iron will' to the Shia Imams as well, to silence anyone who considers 'bloodshed' to be against religion and spirituality and to strip opponents of the courage to breathe: '[Khomeini] heroically and fearlessly advanced, following the great leaders – Imam Ali, Imam Hussein, and other saints of God and prominent figures in Islamic history...' (same book, pp. 310-314). Thus, we see that Khomeini's following of the Shia Imams in bloodshed, alongside his hatred for the people of Iran – and also his insatiable thirst for power and rule – reached a point where, to achieve his goals and kiss the forehead of power, he welcomed the slaughter of the people of Iran and made their blood the collateral for his power acquisition. Khomeini's hatred for the people of Iran had expanded to the extent that he – despite all religious teachings – expressed and instilled the following view about the officers of the Imperial Guard to his supporters: 'These executioners are often the offspring of the illicit unions of deceived, lustful, and corrupt men and women who, after being abandoned in alleys and at the doors of mosques, are taken to municipal orphanages and raised there, receiving lessons in idol worship from foreign mercenaries, and then enter the army and are placed in the Imperial Guard, and since they know nothing of God, religion, etc., and are without real parents, they are the only group in the army loyal to the Shah and love him to the point of worship.' (Quoted from the book 'An Analytical Study of Imam Khomeini's Movement,' p. 340) Truly, Khomeini's knowledge, humanity, awareness, and religious integrity were unique! (It may be interesting and necessary for esteemed readers to note that: the late General Syed Shirazi, who was assassinated by the Mojahedin Khalq with the cooperation of a faction of the security apparatus of the Islamic Republic in Tehran about ten years ago, was one of the officers of this very Imperial Guard and, contrary to what Khomeini propagated about such individuals and accused their mothers and fathers of prostitution – was a very devout man and reached the highest military positions in this Islamic Republic. This itself is an example of how Khomeini instilled hatred towards the people of Iran without having the slightest understanding of them. It is also a glaring example of the indecency of a man who considered himself a 'clergyman.') Khomeini's method – contrary to the norms of spirituality and humanity – for destroying his opponents was to first strip them of their 'humanity' and then order their execution.