Politics and Power After Hashemi

Hashemi is gone. Although we, the nation, are at the 'final curtain,' history moves from beginning to end and is constructed. Hashemi was a politician who, along with Morteza Motahari, was one of the closest individuals to Mr. Khomeini. He transformed this trust into a driving force for the 'preservation of the regime' that was founded by his mentor. In this regard, he was very pragmatic and utilized every means to achieve his goals. This method, with all its consequences, is the 'essence' of the behavioral analysis of the established government in Iran. Accordingly, he was fully complicit in the outright despotism of the 1980s. Economic development or revolutionary ambition? However, in his 'practice' of politics and statesmanship at the upper levels of power, Hashemi gradually 'learned' that politics/statesmanship should be conducted on the ground and based on the balance of power after the end of the war (in which he played an important and positive role). This marked the beginning of a mental shift in him. The so-called 'revolutionary' discourse of his mentor gradually transformed into a 'development-oriented' discourse, reminiscent of the last government before the revolution. Now, unlike the past, he pursued a policy of de-escalation with the world and regional countries. At the same time, like the 'character' and 'spirit' governing the established power, he usually reached new results with delays and at high costs. Based on this, he had not yet recognized the necessity of accompanying political development with economic development. At this stage, he viewed external de-escalation as maximally accompanied by a kind of opening of the 'social' space (for example, for various lifestyles) and not with internal political participation and competition within the framework of the constitution. In the first two decades of the revolution, Hashemi had thrown many boomerangs around him that later targeted him with full force, including bringing Mr. Khamenei to leadership; changing the constitution and concentrating power in the leader of the regime; some adventurous political behaviors abroad and security agents inside the country; privatization and market economy accompanied by widespread corruption; loosening the grip of the IRGC in the economy and regional and sometimes domestic politics; and collaboration with pressure groups. With some historical delay at the end of his eight-year presidency, Hashemi became aware of the rise of a radical faction that intended to rig the elections. By preventing this advance, he entered a new phase that gradually intensified and ultimately culminated in his support for the Green Movement in 2009. During this period, he faced severe attacks from the regime's extremist military and security forces, led by his longtime friend, whom he had brought to leadership and bitterly reminded of this several times. Hashemi had thrown many boomerangs around him in the first two decades of the revolution that later targeted him with full force, including bringing Mr. Khamenei to leadership; changing the constitution and concentrating power in the leader of the regime; some adventurous political behaviors abroad and security agents inside the country; privatization and market economy accompanied by widespread corruption; loosening the grip of the IRGC in the economy and regional and sometimes domestic politics; and collaboration with pressure groups. How bitter it has been for Hashemi to review these events and reconsider them. Nevertheless, the strengthening of Hashemi's newer views gradually created a rift between him and his longtime friend. This gap gradually became the largest rift in the structure of power established in the country. The challenge of two discourses at the upper levels of power During the leadership of his longtime friend, we gradually witness the intensification of the rift and serious challenge between the two previous discourses at the upper levels of power in Iran: the 'security-centric' discourse that believes in the continuity of the initial approach and the so-called 'revolutionary' and conspiracy-oriented, enemy-centric approach that demands a constant struggle against the 'global arrogance'; the fight to destroy Israel and strengthen the 'resistance axis' in the region and prevent the activities of 'enemy agents' and their infiltration inside the country. The other discourse is based on economic development that seeks de-escalation in international relations and also regional relations of the country and a more open internal atmosphere and relative political competition within the framework of the system and constitution. Hashemi had been able to use all his political power, albeit reluctantly, under the trust of the founding leader to stabilize the regime, but he could not utilize this capacity for reform and continuity of the regime during the next leader's era. Hashemi's new discourse and mentality were, of course, not unique to him. This (late) change arose from the events of the times and the tumultuous fate of the system. However, Hashemi played an effective role in strengthening it within layers of the established power. This discourse did not dominate but gradually grew and strengthened to the extent that if it were not for the function of the supervisory council, one could say that in Iran, this minority governs the majority; due to the concentrated power and 'special right' of Mr. Khamenei; it can also be said that among the ruling minority, a minority governs the majority! However, a larger part of the ruling current now disagrees with the policy that Mr. Khamenei pursues against the national interests of the country domestically, regionally, and internationally. This significant part, even if they do not explicitly express their views in all areas, shows through their votes and political behavior that they do not sympathize with the radical current. In the nuclear negotiations, we saw that even close advisors to the leader, such as Ali Akbar Velayati, were not aligned with the leader's approach. Accordingly, Hashemi was also one of those who played an important role in strengthening this discourse and forming a kind of 'moderate right.' Hashemi is gone, but the challenge between these two discourses will continue in its highest and most intense form. Politics and Power After Hashemi The last scenes in which Hashemi played a role were the 2013 and 2015 elections. Hashemi came to the reformists more boldly than before. If he was a companion in the Green Movement, in the new phase, he was in the position of one of the managers and leaders. He, along with Khatami, Hassan Khomeini, Nategh Nouri, and others, was at the forefront of a political spectrum and front that connected moderates and reformists. Hashemi's role was more as a political symbol with limited security and political boundaries and a connection he had with some influential clerics. This role is irreplaceable, but overall, it will not create serious and fundamental disruption in the existence and movement of the moderate and reformist bloc. A type of politics that was necessarily pragmatic and based on the objective political interests for all sides of this coalition. A coalition that was supported by some reformists for national interests. Now, Hashemi's absence will create weaknesses and deficiencies in this matter. Hashemi was the hinge and joint of connection between reformists and moderates and some veteran clerics and also parts of the technocrats within the system. Now, of course, the spectrum of technocrats and managers who were prominent during the reform era and part of whom were remnants of Hashemi's presidency may have even more trust and will towards Mohammad Khatami. Thus, Khatami's task will become harder. Khatami will become more isolated, but correspondingly, his acceptance will increase. Mousavi and Karroubi, even under house arrest, have more empathy with this approach, and their potential statements will be helpful. In the last years, Hashemi no longer had a special and unique relationship with the leader of the regime, so one could no longer count on this lobby and its effective role. If we do not say that sometimes Hashemi's interference fueled some suspicions and had a reverse effect! Hashemi's occasional statements, of course, had their own unique impact that now must be continued by others, including his family. The veteran clerics with whom he had connections, which was another advantage of Hashemi, are also leaving the political scene one by one. Thus, although there is no one with Hashemi's weight in the power structure, Hashemi's late influence no longer had much sway in the appointed power structure. Hashemi's role was more as a political symbol with limited security and political boundaries and a connection he had with some influential clerics. This role is irreplaceable, but overall, it will not create serious and fundamental disruption in the existence and movement of the moderate and reformist bloc. His individual role will now be distributed among more individuals, of course, if they wish. Thus, the momentary concern and despair among some political and civil activists is a transient matter because the scene of efforts and challenges in Hashemi's absence will not fundamentally change. If we look at the scene realistically and unemotionally. The radical current now does not hide its happiness over Hashemi's death. However, Hashemi's absence disrupts the internal 'discourse' mobilizing them based on opposition to Hashemi as a symbol of compromise (against revolutionary fervor) and a symbol of elitism (against populism). Now, in Hashemi's absence, what new dichotomy will they create? The same narrative exists for the upcoming elections next year. Now, Hassan Rouhani is the main candidate of moderates/reformists. 'If' other candidates enter the field, managing the multiplicity of candidates will probably be easier for figures like Mohammad Khatami than even in a situation where Hashemi was alive. In the council elections, due to the lack of social and organizational expansion of moderates, it is again the reformists who will have a broader field in this bloc. Thus, it can be said that politics at the highest levels of power will continue to be challenged between the two blocs. Although Hashemi's absence reminds us of a credible individual with relative and sometimes explicit boundaries in this bloc. Perhaps the concern over the death of Hashemi, a figure who has oscillated between public hatred and love, will even lead the peaceful civil society in the coming year to make a greater effort to continue strengthening the civil and developmental approach against the authoritarian and radical approach. The radical current now does not hide its happiness over Hashemi's death. However, Hashemi's absence disrupts the internal 'discourse' mobilizing them based on opposition to Hashemi as a symbol of compromise (against revolutionary fervor) and a symbol of elitism (against populism). Now, in Hashemi's absence, what new dichotomy will they create? It should not be forgotten that in recent years, when the word 'corruption' comes to people's minds, more than the name of the Hashemi family, it is the name 'IRGC' that flows in people's minds and tongues. This means that peaceful and gradual political-civil activism continues along its past path...