Potential Consequences of Rafsanjani's Disqualification

An examination of signs and evidence indicates an increasing likelihood of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani not being approved for candidacy in the Assembly of Experts elections. However, this event is not yet certain, and considerations may lead to his acceptance in the Assembly at the last minute. Nonetheless, preventing his role is a serious and noteworthy scenario. Ahmad Jannati's attack on him and indirectly calling him a devil, gatherings in Qom chanting 'All seditions are under Hashemi's control,' and comments from General Jafari, a senior commander of the IRGC, stating that 'the revolutionary past of individuals does not grant immunity against the regime's actions,' all indicate the difficulties Rafsanjani faces in passing the Guardian Council's scrutiny. The Society of Teachers of Qom Seminary, which previously included Rafsanjani in its electoral list, has decided not to support him this time. His inclusion in the list of the Combatant Clergy Association of Tehran has also become challenging, and the outcome remains uncertain. Assuming Rafsanjani does not receive permission to participate in the Assembly elections and is disqualified by the Guardian Council, the potential consequences of this event will be examined. The consequences can be categorized into several axes: * Closer to the finish line: Disqualifying Rafsanjani is another step towards pushing him out of the regime's boundaries and portraying him as problematic, as the dominant power believes he has deviated from the path of the revolution and the regime. The main reason for his being disliked is his divergence from the leadership's positions and his limited resistance against his overarching policies. Although Rafsanjani ostensibly positions himself against the radical conservatives and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad while respecting Khamenei's status, the results of his stances conflict with the leadership's outlined lines for the government's overall policies. His attempts to increase influence in the Assembly of Experts and the atmosphere created in the post-JCPOA period have raised the costs of Rafsanjani's different political maneuvering for the regime and justified tightening the restrictions around him. It seems that the potential removal of Rafsanjani from the Assembly of Experts is part of a broader strategy to completely neutralize the moderate government in the post-nuclear agreement period, packaged under the code name of a larger and more dangerous sedition of 1394. At the same time, disqualification serves as an escape route for the regime from the repercussions of Rafsanjani's high vote in the Assembly elections. It can be predicted that Rafsanjani's potential disqualification may precede his non-reappointment to the membership and presidency of the Expediency Discernment Council, whose current term ends in Esfand 1395. It seems unlikely that Rafsanjani will find himself in a situation similar to Ayatollah Montazeri. His conservative spirit prevents him from taking a critical and protest stance. However, there is a considerable possibility that he may find himself in a situation somewhat akin to Mohammad Khatami, lacking effective political maneuvering space within the official system. * Disempowerment in the future leadership selection process: Preventing Rafsanjani's presence in the future Assembly of Experts means completely cutting off his influence on the process of selecting Khamenei's successor. Even in a minority position in the Assembly, Rafsanjani could have been influential in this process. However, in Rafsanjani's absence, the current majority in the Assembly can more comfortably advance their agenda, significantly increasing the likelihood that the future Supreme Leader will be determined within the framework of maintaining the status quo. In this case, the possibility of a council-based leadership in the future also weakens. * Increased pressure on Rafsanjani's circle: Rafsanjani's disqualification will lead to increased pressure on his close circle. It also aims to isolate him by raising the costs of connection and support. Since the motivations of Rafsanjani's surrounding forces are self-serving and opportunistic, believing they can access the benefits of power, this plan has a high chance of success. Additionally, those who view him as a refuge for reducing costs for reformists and reform-seekers will also become disillusioned and realize that the regime's resistance to positive change is serious enough to not hesitate to sacrifice its oldest and most significant operatives. Rafsanjani's close circle may face more attacks and increased security and judicial cases against them. * Increasing constraints on moderates: It can be predicted that Rafsanjani's disqualification in the elections will coincide with further constraining policies against Rouhani's government. The natural outcome of Rafsanjani's disqualification will be the revelation of Rouhani's government's weaknesses in implementing reforms in domestic policy. However, the nature of Rouhani's response to this potential event will play a role in the final impacts. Yet, this reality once again highlights that the notion of change without cost in Iranian politics is a fantasy and a myth. * Contradictory effects on the democracy movement: Rafsanjani's potential disqualification by the Guardian Council has contradictory short-term and long-term effects on the democracy movement. In the short term, it has negative consequences and contributes to the puzzle of increasing pressure and preventing the complete breakdown of the police state atmosphere. Rafsanjani's presence in the Assembly of Experts and the empowerment of the moderate faction of the government could have been effective in creating a breathing space and low-cost critical political maneuvering within the country. However, in the absence of this event, hardliners are strengthened, and the determination of future leadership aligned with authoritarian currents makes the transition to democracy more costly and difficult. In the long term, it strengthens structural and community-centered transformative approaches and once again reveals the deadlock of state-centered approaches in minimal political and social reforms. The result of this event is a decrease in the risk of conservative reformism gaining power and the emergence of opportunistic and self-serving forces indifferent to a powerful civil society, human rights standards, and ideals in the realm of protest politics. Explaining the outcomes of short-term and long-term impacts is challenging, and this difficulty becomes more complex when Rafsanjani's increasing role in the power bloc is gray and not black and white. Therefore, it is not incorrect to say that his presence in the Assembly of Experts and the capacity for influence on the democracy movement is beneficial due to creating a rift in the absolute power structure. However, the prerequisite for this positive influence is a verbal and political confrontation with the messianic portrayal of Rafsanjani and a gray approach towards him. The coming weeks will clarify whether the slogans 'All seditions are under Hashemi's control' and 'The great sedition of 94' are code names for Rafsanjani's disqualification or if the leadership finds it expedient for this pillar of the regime to have a weakened presence in the fifth Assembly.