Potential Direction of Trump's Middle Eastern Policy

Just over a month remains until Donald Trump's official entry into the White House, and discussions about the reasons for his election victory and speculations about the future of his administration's relations with other countries, including those in the Middle East, continue. The phenomenon of 'Trumpism,' while some media outlets speak of its victory in American society, is viewed by the magazine 'Foreign Affairs' as the result of a thirty-year process that has occurred in the United States and some European countries. This article concludes from an economic perspective that to understand Trump's victory, one must listen to the voices rising from heavily indebted developed countries and the people who vote for them: 'This global outcry against elites is not only born from disgust, loss, and damage, but also stems from the global economy. The era of neoliberalism has ended, and the era of neomilitarism has just begun.' Foreign policy decision-makers and the parameters affecting how Trump's foreign policy will be shaped and who will be the decision-makers in this arena remain unclear. During his election campaign, he emphasized points regarding foreign and defense policy, including restoring respect for America worldwide; strengthening the country's defense capabilities; avoiding nation-building abroad and instead focusing on solving domestic problems; increased support for Israel; militarily defeating ISIS; tearing up the nuclear deal with Iran; resolving the Syrian issue; establishing close relations with Russia; conditioning U.S. aid to NATO; building a border wall between the U.S. and Mexico; and reviewing U.S. trade relations with China. However, Trump's lack of experience in political matters, foreign affairs, and government work complicates speculation about the direction of his foreign policy, especially since he has changed or moderated some of his positions after winning the election. He has appointed retired General Michael Flynn, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as his national security advisor, who has written in his book 'The Battlefield' about confronting radical Islam and how America can win in this confrontation. He considers Iran a 'formidable enemy' and describes the Islamic regime as a major part of radical Islam. Trump's other choice for the CIA, Mike Pompeo, is also a serious opponent of the nuclear deal with Iran. The president-elect has not yet announced his choice for Secretary of State, but he has appointed retired General James Mattis, former head of Central Command (CENTCOM), to the key position of Secretary of Defense, who views the Islamic Republic as a more serious threat than ISIS; considers Iran's nuclear program a potential threat despite the nuclear deal; believes in confronting the Islamic Republic's proxy groups in the region; and sees a serious response necessary against the threats posed by the IRGC's naval forces in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, Trump has also consulted with two other retired generals, David Petraeus (former CIA head) and John Kelly (former Southern Command chief), regarding the positions of Secretary of State and Director of National Intelligence (the president's advisor on intelligence matters and manager of 16 intelligence and espionage organizations). Donald Trump has not yet made his final decisions regarding some positions, but it is clear that foreign policy decision-making does not occur in a vacuum, and various factors and institutions are involved in shaping and implementing foreign policy. The President of the United States, his Secretary of State, and his national security advisor play significant roles in this regard, although the influential role of Congress, military leaders, and intelligence and espionage organizations cannot be overlooked. In addition, major decision-making parameters such as the personal characteristics of decision-makers, information, their perceptions and conclusions from information, values, and internal and external pressures play an indirect role in foreign policy-making. Therefore, as we have seen so far, it is expected that some of Donald Trump's promises made during his election campaign regarding foreign policy will be moderated, especially since implementing foreign policy requires different tactics compared to domestic policy, including providing convincing explanations to garner cooperation from other countries; negotiating to reach a common ground by encouraging the other party and, in some cases, threatening to accept conditions, economic pressures; and directly garnering support from the people of the country in question. Trump's Middle Eastern policy Overall, Donald Trump's election has created new confusion and concern in the Middle East and other parts of the world. He is unpredictable, and his behavior in politics is neither stereotypical nor predictable. As Noam Chomsky, the American philosopher and linguist, puts it, one of the predictable traits of Donald Trump is his unpredictability. Nevertheless, it seems that the Trump administration, considering the entangled internal conflicts and wars in the Middle East that have worsened even by the region's own standards in recent years, will not limit itself to crisis management like Barack Obama. The Middle East remains of significant strategic, security, and economic importance to the United States, and it is expected that U.S. policy towards Middle Eastern and North African countries will change significantly. This change will likely involve greater military utilization alongside enhanced diplomatic activities and economic interactions, and it is possible that, on a broader scale, U.S. foreign policy will shift towards a militaristic approach. Saudi Arabia The Saudi perception that the Obama administration cannot be considered a deterrent against Iran, coupled with Saudi Arabia's fruitless efforts to reach some form of reconciliation to end the war in Yemen, has pushed Riyadh towards greater cooperation with Turkey and Qatar. Despite serious concerns about Donald Trump's remarks against Muslims and the increasing Islamophobia in the U.S., Riyadh is pleased with the president-elect's sharp criticisms of Iran. As reported by several Arab media outlets, Riyadh is ready for all kinds of security cooperation with Washington against Iran and its proxy groups. This comes as Trump stated during his election campaign: 'We will stop buying oil from Saudi Arabia unless they put boots on the ground to fight ISIS... and that we have not been paid for the tremendous service we provide to protect other countries, and Saudi Arabia is one of those countries.' One of the immediate and significant challenges in U.S.-Saudi relations will be the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), which Congress has provided the opportunity for families and survivors of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to sue Saudi Arabia in U.S. courts against Barack Obama's veto. Saudi Arabia expects Donald Trump to encourage Congress to amend JASTA so that the president can exempt important U.S. partners in the fight against terrorism from this law. Failure to resolve this issue will overshadow the improvement of relations between Saudi Arabia and Washington and the intelligence and security cooperation between the two countries. Saudi Arabia has threatened that if JASTA is implemented, it will withdraw its assets in the U.S., which amount to over $750 billion, although this action seems unlikely. If Riyadh were to take such action, it would not be surprising if the U.S. intensified its human rights sanctions against Saudi Arabia. This could increase the risk of instability in Saudi Arabia and provide the Islamic Republic with an opportunity to intensify its activities using its proxy groups in the Shia-populated areas of Saudi Arabia. One of the consequences of the deterioration of U.S.-Saudi relations could be the cessation of logistical support and political backing from Washington for Saudi operations and those of other Arab coalition countries in Yemen. The cessation of U.S. support for these operations should be regarded as a sign of a complete deterioration of relations between Washington and Riyadh. Iran Several American politicians and officials, including John Brennan, the head of the CIA, have warned the president-elect that tearing up the nuclear agreement with Iran will strengthen hardliners in Iran. Meanwhile, Mike Pompeo, the future head of the CIA, has described this agreement as 'catastrophic.' In this context, Ayatollah Khamenei has warned the U.S. that Iran will respond to new sanctions, and simultaneously, 264 members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly have signed a statement declaring the extension of the 'Iran Sanctions Act' by the U.S. Congress for another ten years as 'contradictory to the text and spirit of the JCPOA' and have called on the government to take reciprocal action. Undoubtedly, Trump will adopt a different policy towards Iran, and it is highly likely to be a confrontational one. It is expected that during Trump's presidency, oversight of Iran's nuclear program will be meticulous, and the International Atomic Energy Agency will be pressured for the slightest potential error by Iran or doubts about the implementation of the JCPOA. Instead of the comprehensive financial sanctions previously imposed on Iran before the JCPOA, the U.S. is likely to settle for sanctions on individuals and some institutions. The imposition of comprehensive financial sanctions or sanctions on non-American companies aimed at preventing them from establishing trade relations with entities affiliated with the IRGC will increase the risk of the JCPOA's collapse. If this occurs, the U.S. will find itself at odds with the other members of the 1+5 group, and the activities of companies that entered the Iranian market after the JCPOA or signed trade contracts with Iran will be called into question. Another option for Trump could be to impose new sanctions under the pretext of countering the Islamic Republic's terrorist activities, thereby forcing Tehran to violate the JCPOA itself. In the military sphere, given the statements of his national security advisor and defense secretary regarding serious resistance to the threats posed by the IRGC, the Persian Gulf will be one of the testing grounds – a place where U.S. naval vessels and the IRGC Navy operate in proximity to each other. If the IRGC boats continue their provocative and troublesome activities against U.S. vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and are ordered to respond practically, military tensions in the Persian Gulf will increase during Trump's presidency. Under such conditions, a war against Iran in the Persian Gulf and its surrounding waters led by the U.S. will not be unexpected. Overall, the risk of military confrontation between the U.S. and the IRGC in the Persian Gulf, which may stem from miscalculations by the Islamic Republic, is significantly higher than the cancellation or failure of the JCPOA. Given Donald Trump's positive stance and that of his national security advisor, General Michael Flynn, towards Russia, there is a possibility that the U.S. and Russia may cooperate regarding Iraq and Syria and even Yemen, deterring the IRGC's proxy groups or Quds Force from undermining the sovereignty of these countries. This cooperation could even lead to collaboration between Moscow and Washington in the National Security Council against Iran. Although currently, Iran and Russia have shared geopolitical and strategic interests in Iraq and Syria, and their disagreements with the U.S. are serious, as we have seen in the past, Russia's political dealings with Iran are contingent upon the U.S. and other Western countries' positions towards Moscow, and improving relations and strategic cooperation with a player like the U.S. is far more important for Russia than Iran. Turkey, Iraq, Syria Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was one of the first leaders to congratulate Donald Trump's victory and even suggested that he would like to engage in dialogue with him at the earliest opportunity. Erdoğan described Trump's victory as 'the beginning of a new era and a positive sign.' Turkey seeks the extradition of Fethullah Gülen from the U.S., and this could be facilitated by the appointment of Michael Flynn as Trump's national security advisor, who seeks fundamental changes in U.S. Middle Eastern policy and prioritizes some of Turkey's needs. According to Flynn, from the perspective of U.S. intelligence agencies, the statements of 'Mullah Gülen' lean towards terrorist actions. The Erdoğan government is under pressure, especially from the Obama administration, to acknowledge the increasing power of the Kurds across its southern border in Syria and Iraq. Continuing this pressure from the Trump administration and its ongoing support for the Kurdish position could lead to a significant escalation of unilateral Turkish actions in northern Syria and Iraq in the near future. If the U.S. and Russia cooperate in Syria and allow the Popular Mobilization Forces or other Shia groups supported by Iran to send fighters to Syria to combat ISIS, Turkey's military actions in Syria and Iraq will undoubtedly intensify. Overall, Iraq and Syria have a very complex situation as the groups and actors present in each of these countries, especially those supported by Iran, have the capability to undermine any potential agreements with regional or global powers like the U.S. Iran's role in these countries, especially in Iraq and Syria, cannot be overlooked, and undoubtedly, the Islamic Republic will strive to ensure that the positions of the governments of these countries align with Tehran's stance. Russia will continue its efforts to limit the influence of Iran's proxy groups in Syria, including Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia groups supporting Assad, to pave the way for cooperation between Moscow and Ankara as well as Washington. Nevertheless, cooperation between Moscow and Washington alone cannot end the Syrian crisis, as Iran and Turkey, regardless of this cooperation, will continue to pursue their own interests.