Power Balance Through the Caspian Sea Agreement

How should Iran's signature on the Aktau Agreement regarding the Caspian Sea be understood? To accurately comprehend the Aktau Agreement, one must first grasp its context. The primary reason for this agreement is to create a legal framework for the transfer of gas and oil through the Caspian Sea to Europe. This project requires significant investment, and attracting such investment necessitates a clear legal order that has not yet been established. However, as we will demonstrate below, the only country that will suffer from the recent agreement is Iran, because this agreement: 1. Deprives Iran of national sovereignty over territorial waters in the Caspian Sea. 2. Completely alters the balance of power against Iran in the geopolitical landscape of the region. 3. Reduces Iran's share of oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea to zero percent. 4. What remains is the clarification of Iran's share (between 11 to 13 percent or slightly more) from fishing in the Caspian Sea. Meanwhile, Iran, considering its history of exploitation and unilateral actions by the other four countries based on bilateral or trilateral agreements conducted outside the framework of Caspian negotiations, which has now led to the presence of extraction activities by over 30 companies from dozens of countries in this lake, had no obligation to sign any contract at this juncture. On the contrary, from the perspective of securing a fair share of oil and gas resources, Iran has, for the first time, found itself in a position to gain necessary concessions and rights in these negotiations due to the other four countries' need for an agreed legal regime among all five countries. Actualizing such a potential opportunity requires Iran to file a complaint with the Hague Court and possibly revise the Caspian Agreement in the context of such action. The Islamic Republic's action in endorsing and signing the provisions of this agreement is entirely contrary to this policy. Because the 'free passage' clause of this agreement, both in terms of legal logic and practically concerning Iran, is uniquely irrelevant. In this agreement tailored by Russia, the water level is considered for the passage of Russian warships as common, but the seabed and subsoil are deemed at the cost of completely excluding Iran from oil and gas resources, with the Caspian referred to as having a Special Status that neither includes international maritime law nor the logic and customs of international lakes. Iran does not have any two legitimate commercial destinations in the passage route that would obligate the free passage of commercial and military vessels of the interested countries (for security provision) from its territorial waters. The 'free passage' of Russian warships in Iran's territorial waters, accompanied by clauses of 'immunity' and 'compensation' from Iran, alongside the right to ensure security, means a complete relinquishment of Iran's sovereignty over its territorial waters. Such a matter is not true in principle and fundamentals for countries that are genuinely on commercial passage routes, just as this principle of Iran's sovereignty over its territorial waters in the Persian Gulf is not violated. But this is not the case for the Caspian. According to this clause, along with the clause for ensuring the security of the Caspian Sea, Iranian fishing vessels even within territorial waters (15 nautical miles from the shore) and exclusive fishing (25 nautical miles from the shore) are under the sovereignty and authority of Russian warships, and legally, Russia can inspect them. This situation is far worse than the harassment of Chinese warships against Iranian fishermen these days. The balance of power in the logic of this agreement strategically alters the balance of power in the geopolitical landscape of the Caspian, turning Iran into the rear and strategic depth of Russia. One of the bitter ironies of this agreement is the claim of the Islamic Republic and Mr. Zarif and Rouhani regarding the clause prohibiting the presence of foreign 'opposing' forces in the 'territorial domain' of each of them. The claim that this was at Iran's insistence and initiative! The mind is unable to comprehend the motivation behind such a poisonous and dangerous action for Iran, and the tongue is at a loss to respond to this claim. Creating and managing a balance of power to avoid falling into the trap of raw and naked Power politics, which inevitably leads to the humiliating and forceful dominance of the stronger party over the weaker neighbor (a contemporary example being Russia and Ukraine), is the primary concern of the leaders (national) of any country in geopolitical political relations. A concern that national leaders and governments are compelled to pursue due to two principles of geography (neighborhood) and the principle of 'trustworthiness' in pursuing the country's interests and maximizing concessions for their country. The Islamic Republic, in complete weakness against Russia, has forgotten these two. The issue of the Caspian and more than that, the strategic geopolitical issue of Iran is creating a balance of power with Russia. Just as the strategic geopolitical issue of Saudi Arabia is to create the same balance with Iran. Just as the geopolitical issues of Pakistan are to create a balance with India, India with China, contemporary Vietnam with China, Russia with Europe and America, Japan and East Asian countries with China, and Mao's China at that time with the Soviet Union. China's reason for establishing a relationship with America during Mao's time was not to create a balance of power against the ideological Soviet Union; it was geopolitical. The reason why the American fleet is currently docked in Vietnam is not that the Vietnamese have become Americanized. It is to create a balance against China, maintain political independence, and avoid falling into inevitable colonial relations with it. Inevitable for both China and Vietnam. Because Chinese leaders are obligated to pursue maximum economic and political concessions for China, and this trustworthiness and responsibility have no internal brakes. The principle of trustworthiness (contrary to the Islamic Republic's claim of 'occupying ownership' over Iran) does not allow them to squander the interests and resources of China or to refrain from pursuing maximum achievable concessions! The responsibility for maintaining Vietnam's political position and independence rests with the political leaders of Vietnam itself. This mechanism is known as triangulation. The leaders of the Islamic Republic have uniquely replaced the interests and concerns of maintaining their position and power with the strategic interests of Iran. In Afghanistan, we witnessed ideological convergence but territorial divergence between bin Laden (Al-Qaeda) and Mullah Omar's Taliban. In Iran, it seems that a displacement has occurred between these two positions and statuses. The one at the top of power and sovereignty wants to completely utilize Iranian territory for the interests and concerns of maintaining and expanding its power and anti-American jihadist policies. But what makes this so-called agreement incomprehensible and leaves the tongue at a loss to express it is that such a balance, despite the anti-American policies of the Islamic Republic over these four decades, has acted for Iran itself and the 'possibility' or 'probability' of establishing normal relations between Iran and America in practice and de facto in creating such a balance, and the insistence on eliminating this balance and its deterrent force through this agreement and the 'we do not negotiate' policy of Khamenei is what will place Iran in a vulnerable, weak, and humiliating downhill position in its entire geopolitical landscape; the Caspian, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East. Examples of this issue are clearly evident in the Islamic Republic's relations with Russia regarding Syria. Paying tribute after tribute, from human and financial resources, and violating national sovereignty regarding Noujeh and also the Caspian in Russia's military use while ignoring Putin and repeatedly announcing Russia's commitment to Israel's border security and cooperating with it in over a hundred missile and air strikes on the positions of the Quds Force and Hezbollah, and open negotiations with the enemies of the Islamic Republic throughout this time and now refusing to invite the Islamic Republic to the main peace negotiations, should be considered a small sample of what awaits Iran. It should be noted that demonstrating such weakness will not be limited to Iran's relations with Russia. Reduction is reduction. This agreement itself is the most evident reflection of this reality that the Islamic Republic is steering Iran towards. Creating a balance of power and preventing the emergence of such an imbalance has different mechanisms. The most important of course is creating a balance of power in the military domain, both positively and through the natural use of the dynamics of parallel competition in that geography. Advanced countries with advanced economies pursue this dynamics through mutual investment and creating free markets, advancing their relations at different layers. Where competition is mandatory, they manage it as much as possible but simultaneously welcome areas and layers where common interests of cooperation are possible. Countries operate based on the infinite lifespan of politics, and the goal is growth and progress within the framework of maintaining peace and stability. Iran, in its relations with Russia, is deprived of many of these levers. Russia is a natural competitor for Iran in both Europe and East Asia in the energy market, and as has been clearly demonstrated, a tough competitor for Iran in Middle Eastern regional politics. By entering itself into security equations and providing security, it is a subtractive competitor for Iran. Russia lacks a 21st-century economy. The Russian economy ranks alongside Spain's economy. It is smaller than California's economy! And for this reason, growth and expansion of trade relations cannot strategically be considered an advantage for Iran. More importantly, despite such realities, that is, the same 21st-century economy seeks to maintain a special and distinctive position and identity that its history has somehow made it deserving of, but it has also placed it in the orbit of 20th-century disputes with Europe and America. This situation makes Iran not a friendly neighboring country and partner in growth and progress for Russia, but primarily a tool and means for gaining leverage in its main and strategic relations with the West. Here, there is no overlap. This very Russian agreement is entirely a military contract—but unilaterally for Russia. This is not even a pivot towards the East for the Islamic Republic (at Iran's expense). This is not a mutual defense agreement. The only thing that exists is the transformation of Iran into a buffer and strategic depth for Russia. Regarding the creation of balance and power equilibrium, the other three countries, namely Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan, have a completely different and distinct issue from Iran. Firstly, these countries do not face the same position, weight, regional neighbors, and geopolitical requirements as Iran. Secondly, these countries, despite Russia's protests and efforts at the beginning of the post-Soviet era (and with support for Russia's oil industry), entered into multiple contracts with major international companies, and now at least over 14 countries and 30 major international companies are engaged in extraction in these countries and the Caspian waters. Additionally, in this very agreement, they obtained 'permission' for the Trans-Caspian pipeline from Russia and Iran. The West and the US, with their effective weapon of sanctions, have practically ensured that balance for these countries. Iran, however, will not find such an opportunity even through economic partnership in the Caspian, as oil and gas resources in Iran's coastal sector account for about one percent of total trillion resources, and even that is at a depth that makes extraction economically unjustifiable. The claims of Mr. Rouhani and Zarif regarding increased security due to the 'absence of foreign forces' clause are baseless and ridiculous. Even for the Islamic Republic's sovereignty. The US and Israel do not need to use these countries to attack Iran, nor was there any such plan or program in place. Azerbaijan will maintain its close relations and cooperation with Israel and the US. Therefore, this agreement confirms and legitimizes what these four countries have done over the past 20 years through bilateral and trilateral agreements to maximize their share without the presence and existence of Iran. The notion that Iran's share of oil resources is unclear is incorrect. In fact, it is a lie. By signing this agreement, those divisions will automatically determine Iran's share. Iran's share of oil and gas resources in the Caspian will be zero and zero percent. The resources available in this section of the Caspian account for one percent of the total, and if the geography of these resources is limited to what is stated in this agreement, Iran's share will practically be zero and zero percent. Iran's share of the exclusive fishing area is unclear but will be in the range of 11 to 13 percent. Iran will be deprived of any coastal and water territorial area and will not have exclusive sovereignty over even the 15 nautical miles. Iran will face a new and dangerous geopolitical reality due to the 'absence of foreign forces in territorial domain' clause. This agreement, which is a one-sided (and not mutual defense) agreement in favor of Russia, turns Iran into a buffer and strategic depth for Russia. The consequences of such a reduction will be reflected in all of Iran's relations with other neighbors. The spirit but not the reality of this action by the Islamic Republic is placing Iran under Russian protection. It is not a reality because neither the agreement nor Russia's history nor its current performance reflects any sign of such support. Russia is a competitor and, in geopolitical reality, a strategic challenge for Iran. This agreement even poses a danger to the current relations between Iran and Russia by disrupting the balance of the two factors of these forty years, making it impossible to manage them within the framework of good and balanced relations while maintaining Iran's political independence. What is clear is this: Iran cannot accept such an agreement. What should be done? The legal regime of the Caspian currently, and until a new agreement (agreed upon by all coastal countries) replaces it, is based on the two agreements of 1921 and 1940 between Iran and the Soviet Union, and the 1991 agreement transferring Soviet obligations in Almaty among these four coastal countries. In the first two agreements, Iran's share is clearly and unequivocally determined at 50 percent of the total Caspian Sea and all its resources, and in the 1991 Almaty agreement, all four coastal countries...