Power Relations and the Mirage of the Atomic Bomb

President Donald Trump of the United States, in a tweet on August 16, described North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's decision as 'wise and prudent' and called an attack on the U.S. 'unacceptable' with 'catastrophic consequences.' There is no doubt that if the North Korean leader had acted on his threat, he would have faced a severe and disastrous response. However, Trump's tweet should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the 'wisdom' of the North Korean leader, as the original decision was irrational and unwise. The North Korean leadership's current delay in executing that decision is itself evidence of a lack of wisdom. By any measure, Kim Jong-un had no choice but to retract his statement and refrain from a military attack on Guam. In fact, Kim Jong-un had threatened to develop North Korea's weapons program and attack Guam out of ignorance and due to miscalculations after rejecting a UN Security Council resolution. Negotiation and dialogue have always been open for North Korea, which spends its citizens' resources on developing nuclear bombs, and through negotiation, North Korea could have gained more concessions. North Korea has long since withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and multiple efforts to bring it back to multilateral negotiations have been fruitless. North Korea is not obligated to adhere to the prohibition on developing nuclear weapons. This country has expanded its nuclear capabilities in a situation of non-commitment to the treaty and apparently possesses not only the ability to produce ballistic missiles but also to equip and launch those missiles with nuclear warheads. Although this capability has not yet been proven to recognize North Korea as a nuclear power, and for various reasons, there is no necessity for this recognition, caution in such circumstances is essential. The least threat from North Korea is the use of microbial and chemical warheads as weapons of mass destruction. After the Hiroshima and Nagasaki disasters, the world's nuclear powers accepted the reality that nuclear weapons are for prestige and deterrence and should not be used in practice. This understanding of nuclear weapons was accepted by major nuclear powers from 1945 to 1991. Each nuclear-armed country had hundreds, if not thousands, of small nuclear bombs that could be used as equivalents to conventional bombs. These bombs were created during the trial-and-error phase of nuclear development, and only recently have some of them been destroyed through disarmament agreements, while weapon-grade plutonium has been stockpiled in arsenals. North Korea's nuclear capability is far too insignificant to conduct major transactions with the U.S. or its allies based on it. Therefore, the missile threat has been presented as a lever of pressure on the U.S. The threat from North Korea to target Guam with long-range ballistic missiles is reckless and lacks the element of rationality, which is a prerequisite for managing nuclear power. This decision clearly shows that Kim Jong-un intends to use this threat merely to prevent U.S. military maneuvers in the region, so he can present it as a major victory. The atomic bomb is a weapon that is not made for use – the world's nuclear countries achieve nuclear balance and deterrence only through calculation and even by revealing their nuclear capabilities, not through threats and actions to demonstrate and designate targets. Israel, which has never been officially recognized as a nuclear power and has a very opaque nuclear policy, has never threatened other countries with nuclear weapons, even though it is said to possess around 200 nuclear warheads. North Korea is vulnerable – let’s assume that North Korea has several nuclear or even biological and microbial warheads that can be launched by intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, threatening based on these capabilities could lead North Korea or any other country to the brink of complete destruction. In nuclear strategy, the main issue is not just having a nuclear bomb and the capability to launch it. If a country – say North Korea – has limited nuclear weapons and launches them at a major nuclear power, because it has initiated nuclear war, it automatically provokes a nuclear response. The opposing country will primarily bomb the known locations and facilities of the attacking country, which may leave no nuclear capability remaining for the attacking country, as the country responding defensively is likely to destroy all of the attacking country's nuclear capabilities. Additionally, the use of a nuclear bomb in its defensive attack may annihilate countless citizens of that country and even neighboring countries, causing severe and permanent injuries to many more. Such a response completely obliterates the attacking country's capacity for retaliation unless the attacking country has managed to hide silos deep in the oceans or in secret locations or even in allied territories for second and third responses. We know that while North Korea's initial capability is questionable, it certainly lacks the secondary capability to use if it survives. At the same time, a country that delivers a nuclear response does not feel responsible for the killings and destruction caused by the use of nuclear bombs in front of the international community, as it considers its action entirely defensive; although morally, the response should be proportional to the aggression that caused it, no country takes the risk, and there is no guarantee for a proportional response. What further justifies this action is the lack of sufficient information regarding the rogue nuclear state, as there is not enough knowledge about its capabilities and goals, but its threat must be taken seriously. That is, when North Korea claims to have nuclear bombs and intends to target Guam with ballistic missile attacks, the assumption should be made that it will do so, and because of the secrecy and underground nature of its nuclearization process, there is insufficient information regarding its nuclear bomb stockpiles, thus the U.S. response could be unlimited. Such a reaction could potentially endanger the lives of all 26 million North Koreans. With this reasoning, when the rational element is absent in North Korea's decision, how can the retreat from that decision and the postponement of the attack plan on Guam be attributed to 'wisdom and prudence' as mentioned in the U.S. President's tweet? During the Cold War, when major powers produced nuclear weapons for deterrence, they tried to leave open various paths for espionage and counter-espionage to ensure that the rival was convinced that the matter was not a joke and their nuclear capability was not based on bluff. In this way, while competition peaked and the costs of deterrence rose, the practical possibility of using nuclear bombs decreased. The rival was never in doubt about the other side's capabilities, although in many cases, technological gaps caused one side to lag behind or surpass the other, but during the Cold War, there was relatively accurate data on the total number of nuclear warheads held by nuclear-capable countries, and the balance of power was carefully calculated through strengthening military alliances like NATO and Warsaw. Currently, a small country like North Korea is in no position to fill that technological gap or significantly increase its nuclear capabilities or use it as a bargaining chip. The result is that taking the first step in threatening is completely irrational and primarily contradicts North Korea's national security. North Korea's threat regarding targeting Guam was an irrational threat, and there should be doubts about the sanity and leadership of someone who publicly makes such an irrational decision. India and Pakistan – both countries conducted nuclear tests in May 1998 to establish their existence as nuclear-armed states. Shortly after these tests, the production of nuclear warheads began, and in parallel, Pakistan threatened India with nuclear war during the Kargil War in 1999 due to their historical disputes over Kashmir. However, the situation did not go beyond threats, and although the dispute was not resolved, both sides realized that nuclear war could not solve that problem. Today, there is less talk about the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan. Regional alignments of China with Pakistan against India remain strong, and the nuclear bomb has not found a solution for that. Of course, both countries are still investing in this area, but at the same time, both face significant economic and national security challenges that cannot be resolved with a nuclear bomb. Iran – Iran is not a nuclear country and has decided to reverse its nuclear path with the signing of the 'JCPOA' agreement. The President's threat in his speech on August 15 in the Islamic Consultative Assembly that if pre-JCPOA sanctions are reinstated, 'Iran will certainly return to conditions much more advanced than at the beginning of the negotiations in a very short time – not in weeks and months, but in hours and days' should be scrutinized. These statements do not indicate that Iran has such an intention and resemble a conditional statement aimed at deterring the U.S. from reinstating nuclear sanctions. It is even possible that the President made these remarks more for domestic consumption or did not consider all aspects of the international repercussions of his words. Regarding these repercussions, we will only refer to the reaction of the UN Secretary-General, who somehow reminds both sides that 'they should not turn away from the JCPOA at all.' In any case, due to international sensitivity regarding the possibility of secret programs in Iran, this statement from the President is considered provocative and a 'threat.' What is certain is that these statements from the Iranian President, in a context where the level of provocation against Iran is very high, were by no means constructive and had the same effect as a missile test, especially when Israeli officials accuse Iran of having an active underground nuclear program. Small power, big power – the relations of small powers (even nuclear ones) with superpowers are very sensitive and complex. Like walking on a tightrope, one must constantly be aware of the balance of movement and maintaining position. In the case of nuclear war, a small power against a superpower becomes even more sensitive. It should be said that although a small country can engage in adventurism and create disasters, with its limited capabilities, it provokes a reaction that primarily puts its entirety and existence at risk. No nuclear country waits in the face of a missile, microbial, biological, or nuclear attack from another country and naturally retaliates with all its might against all points of the enemy country. Therefore, a small country like North Korea (even if it has a few nuclear warheads) would be quickly reduced to ashes; moreover, the damage from the radiation of such a war in the 21st century could be extensive and lethal. Thus, Kim Jong-un, in threatening to bombard Guam, which is essentially a U.S. base and territory outside of America, has childishly declared war, but neither the U.S. Department of Defense nor the State Department took this threat very seriously and left the door open for negotiation. At the same time, they stated that if he carried out a missile attack, he would have declared war. Meanwhile, the reaction of the U.S. President and the use of the terms 'fire and fury' were more emotional than practical, but if North Korea had acted on its threat, it would undoubtedly have taken the first step toward its own destruction. All of this does not prove that Kim Jong-un possesses sufficient political wisdom and therefore retreated. The original threat was irrational, and the least result of it is the continuation of military maneuvers and the examination of various Cold War methods from sanctions to planning sabotage in North Korea's nuclear program, which North Korea must now grapple with. Furthermore, this irrational threat has increased U.S. defense cooperation with South Korea and Japan, which was certainly not expected by North Korea. Nuclear technology can have countless peaceful applications. From medicine to agriculture, engineering, energy, and other branches of science can and have the right to benefit from the achievements of nuclear technology, but in this context, the path of nuclear weapons is the most costly route that is not always successful. Certainly, possessing nuclear weapons cannot make North Korea victorious in the current conflict, as in this conflict, North Korea is not only against South Korea and Japan and other countries in the Pacific region but also against its superpower ally.