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Praise and Love Play with Death: Why and How?

Jun 30, 2026 June 30, 2026 7 min read 📰 Radio Farda
📋 Key Takeaway

The article discusses the Iranian government's emphasis on death and mourning in public life, contrasting it with the potential for joy and celebration. It highlights the role of the Shiite clergy in promoting a culture of death and the neglect of pressing social issues that lead to preventable deaths. This matters as it reflects the broader societal implications of governance and cultural attitudes towards life and death in Iran.

🔍 Quick Context Guide
💡 Bottom Line: The Iranian government promotes a culture of death that affects societal values and governance.

👥 Key Players

Shiite clergy ACTOR
Religious leaders
"the Shiite clergy and their Islamist followers have avoided joy and happiness for three reasons"
Iranian government ACTOR
National authority
"the government consolidated with the deaths of individuals in the revolution and war"
Islamist followers ACTOR
Political group
"the Shiite clergy and their Islamist followers have avoided joy and happiness"
Iranian society AFFECTED
General population
"visiting graves instead of visiting elderly, disabled, and sick individuals are abundantly observed in Iranian society."

⚡ Actions

Iranian government ANNOUNCE public spaces, historical monuments
"the opinion of the Guards has been imposed in this case as well, and two bodies were buried in the area of this historical monument."
Confidence: 90%
Shiite clergy PROMOTE death culture
"the clergy has sold the belief in death and the sanctity of joy not only with jurisprudential principles but also with inverted mystical, ethical, and identity justifications to the people of Iran."
Confidence: 90%
Iranian government EXPLOIT citizens' mortality
"the current policies of the government are paving the way for the increasing death of citizens."
Confidence: 90%

📰 What Happened

Iranian government promotes death culture over life, impacting societal values and governance.

  • Iranian government announce public spaces, historical monuments
  • Shiite clergy promote death culture
  • Iranian government exploit citizens' mortality

💡 Why It Matters

🇮🇷 For Iran: Because it reflects a societal shift towards valuing death over life, impacting governance and social norms.
🌍 Regional: Because it may influence regional perceptions of Iranian governance and cultural practices.
🌐 International: Because it raises concerns about human rights and the treatment of citizens in Iran.

📚 Background

The Iranian government promotes a culture of death that affects societal values and governance.

📝 Key Evidence

"the current policies of the government are paving the way for the increasing death of citizens."
→ Proves exploitation of mortality by the government.
📡 Source: INDEPENDENT
📊 Confidence: 80%
Radio Farda is known for critical coverage of the Iranian government.

Despite the exchanges between cultural heritage and the Revolutionary Guards, and at one point it was announced that the bodies of those killed in the war would not be buried in Pasargadae, the opinion of the Guards has been imposed in this case as well, and two bodies were buried in the area of this historical monument. Why does the government insist so much on turning public spaces in the country into cemeteries? Commemorating death is part of the story of life, but there is a difference between a government and a society that faces death as an unpleasant reality and tries to postpone it for each individual, initiating healing processes after death, and a government and society that embraces death, welcomes it, praises it, plays the game of love with it, and sees it as the center of holidays and entertainment. Anniversaries of the deaths of political and religious leaders in Iran have become times for traveling and spending time with family. Religious ceremonies in Iran are mostly centered around death, and even those that are not defined by death (like Eid al-Ghadir or Eid al-Fitr) are performed with recitations for the first Imam of Shiites and his children, accompanied by lamentation and weeping. It is natural that in such a society, death is celebrated instead of life; death is introduced as life (in retaliation, there is life); and instead of viewing death as an inevitable reality, it is used as a tool for exploitation or enmity (over inheritance and legacy). How has this happened? The Shiite clergy and their Islamist followers have avoided joy and happiness for three reasons: 1) Part of it is the struggle for power and the belief that through weeping, wailing, and martyrdom, social mobilization can be better achieved and individuals can be connected to the ranks of fighters; 2) The belief that joy and happiness are tainted with sin (drinking alcohol, dancing, music, mixing men and women in Shiite jurisprudence), which all Shiite clergy somewhat believe; this idea has gone so far that even clapping has been banned by some clerics; and 3) The belief that joy leads to immersion in worldly affairs and neglect of the afterlife. This idea may have made sense when Shiite clerics and their followers had some power in worldly affairs, but today, when all the wealth of society is in their hands, such a view seems inconsistent. In all three cases, there has not been a coherent theory governing the perceptions of Shiite jurists and their followers. First, there is no necessary correlation between social mobilization and weeping and wailing. Social mobilization can also be achieved with joy, dance, carnival, and celebration while holding religious ceremonies. Second, the idea of joy as a sin has been a taste of some believers, and any form of dance, music, and mixing of women and men is not inherently sinful even within jurisprudential frameworks. Third, how is it that the quest for power to the extent of absolute power by clerics or the looting of a country's resources by Islamists is not immersion in worldly affairs, but listening to music for a few minutes makes individuals neglect the afterlife? It is interesting that the clergy has sold the belief in death and the sanctity of joy not only with jurisprudential principles but also with inverted mystical, ethical, and identity justifications to the people of Iran. Why has the praise of death found a suitable social ground? Love for the dead instead of the living, forgiveness of the dead instead of forgiveness of the living (which has more effective and necessary functions), and visiting graves instead of visiting elderly, disabled, and sick individuals are abundantly observed in Iranian society. Why? Because in the past experience of the people of Iran, death was an everyday experience (due to famine, various diseases, and infant mortality), and irrational routines and a type of non-scientific and unmeritorious governance have created conditions for experiencing premature deaths. During the Islamic Republic, not only was the government consolidated with the deaths of individuals in the revolution and war, but the current policies of the government are paving the way for the increasing death of citizens. I will refer to three examples where mortality could be reduced and prevented—but no efforts are made in these areas: Example one: From 2006 to 2015, about 11,000 people drowned in Iran (about 1,100 people per year). This could have been prevented with swimming education, distribution and promotion of life jackets, identifying swimming locations (without ideological segregation that causes people to flee from these places), and having lifeguards. Is teaching swimming in schools more necessary for children or teaching the Quran and religious education? Is showing life jackets on state television more necessary or showing government propagandists? Example two: Mortality from excessive or misuse of drugs and alcohol. If the government’s apparent war with drugs and alcoholic beverages ends and non-industrial drugs and alcoholic beverages are sold freely with high taxes (while investing tax revenues in prevention, treatment, and education), the number of deaths in this area will decrease. More than 3,000 people die annually from drug overdoses. The statistics on deaths from alcohol overdoses have not been announced either. Example three: About 20,000 people are killed on Iranian roads each year, which is very high considering the number of cars in Iran (which is much less than in industrial societies). Over the past 20 years, this figure has reached about 400,000. Thus, in large families of about 200, on average, one has lost their life in a traffic accident over the past twenty years. There has not been much effort by the Ministry of Roads and law enforcement agencies, advertising, and health and urban organizations to reduce mortality in these cases, nor will there be. Why? Because the clerics ruling the Islamic Republic are not only not saddened by the deaths of people, but a significant portion of their interests arises from the industry and business of death: from selling graves in Imamzadehs to clerics praying over the deceased and their speeches at memorial services, from reading borrowed prayers for the deceased to reciting the Quran at graves, and from vows for the dead to the promotion of the temporary marriage industry for widowed individuals. Another reason is that people must get used to death so that they are not surprised by executions and deaths resulting from the government’s military interventions and terrorism. The idolization of corpses and the expansion of cemetery spaces is one of the methods of facilitating this love play with death, turning all spaces, including universities and ancient monuments (like the Mir Chakhmaq Square in Yazd), into cemeteries. Between 2001 and 2016, the remains of 491 unidentified victims of the Iran-Iraq war were buried in various universities across Iran. To display this endless love for the corpse, most of them were buried in 25 universities in Tehran province to attract more audiences. Other populous provincial centers also received their share of this love and worship: 15 universities in Isfahan province, 12 universities in Fars province, 12 universities in Khuzestan province, 11 universities in Razavi Khorasan province, 11 universities in Mazandaran province, and two universities in each of Ardabil, Kerman, and Kurdistan provinces. To expose the wealthier classes and those who pay for their education (who are assumed to be further distanced from the government) to this corpse-worshiping fervor, the Islamic Azad University units have had a larger share of burials: the universities where these victims were buried include 84 Islamic Azad University units, 68 state universities, 25 medical universities, 8 technical and vocational universities, 6 teacher training universities, and 2 Payame Noor universities. (Student News Agency, July 6, 2016) Shiite clerics and their Islamist allies know that they have no place in the joyful and happy gatherings of people, but they are needed in mourning ceremonies. In this situation, it is natural that they will prioritize death and mourning over life and joy.

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Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →

Translation confidence: 85%

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