Prisoner Exchange: What Happened Behind Closed Doors

January 16, 2016, corresponds to 26 Dey 1394, will be a memorable day in international relations, as on this day Iran and the United States reached a final agreement within the framework of two years of negotiations known as the 1+5 talks and were able to implement the nuclear agreement, the JCPOA. On this day, after the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency announced that Iran had taken all steps to begin implementing the JCPOA, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Foreign Minister, and Federica Mogherini, the EU's foreign policy chief, announced that all multilateral financial and economic sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program had been lifted in accordance with the JCPOA, thus demonstrating that multilateral diplomacy had succeeded in preventing an inevitable war. Alongside this historic event, just hours before the announcement of the lifting of sanctions on Iran, another event quickly astonished social media users. Initially, two websites affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence of Iran reported in exclusive reports, citing judicial officials of the Islamic Republic, that four dual-national prisoners had been released from Evin Prison and seven Iranians imprisoned in the United States had been freed, and in addition, the names of 14 other Iranians had been removed from the Interpol wanted list. After this, news agencies succumbed to the waves of joy over the end of the nuclear conflict with Iran before interpreting and analyzing this event, and for a long time, various aspects of how the nuclear agreement was implemented were closely examined. Hundreds of commentators and experts in military, economic, international relations, and national security, alongside military-political experts, analyzed and interpreted the JCPOA for the world's media. Meanwhile, the details of the release of dual-national prisoners from Evin Prison did not receive much attention, although it became clear that their number had increased from four to five. Robin Wright, a prominent journalist and researcher for The New Yorker, was the first to address this issue in her article and shed light on aspects of the prisoner exchange puzzle. According to Robin Wright, reaching an agreement for the release of prisoners was the work of a senior official at the U.S. State Department who was able to assign an American team to conduct very secret negotiations with Iran. As a result of these negotiations, prisoners from both countries were released on January 16. Apparently, fourteen months prior to this event, the U.S. President had authorized the establishment of a very secret channel for dialogue with the Iranians regarding the release of Americans who had disappeared or been imprisoned in Iran, to engage in very secret negotiations with the highest representatives of the Iranian government. This action stemmed from the nuclear negotiations and was a move that carried a very high diplomatic risk. Wendy Sherman, the senior U.S. negotiator, was the first to raise the issue of the release of American prisoners in Iran; the Iranian side demanded the release of Iranian citizens imprisoned in U.S. prisons, and the prisoner exchange file was opened from that time. It is still unclear which Iranian official and at what level agreed to parallel negotiations for the release of prisoners. Was this within the President's authority, or was the Supreme Leader directly involved? For over a year, Wendy Sherman had been discussing and exchanging views with her Iranian counterpart, Majid Takht-Ravanchi, Deputy for Europe and America at the Iranian Foreign Ministry, regarding the prisoner exchange. Eventually, it was decided in late 2014 that the matter would be pursued separately from the negotiations related to the nuclear agreement and within the framework of another official channel. According to Robin Wright, this issue was approved by President Obama after discussions, but it remained so secret that most members of the U.S. negotiating team involved in the critical nuclear negotiations were not informed about it at all. At one point, a change in the composition of negotiators caused fear and concern that the essence of the matter might be jeopardized. The leadership of the Iranian negotiating team was entrusted to a senior security official at the Foreign Ministry, and although this team was still considered a diplomatic group in terms of composition, the involvement of a security official in the negotiations led the Americans to believe that the outcome was unpredictable. On the U.S. side, Brett McGurk, a senior member of the State Department, led a small team that included individuals from the Justice Department, FBI, and the U.S. security community. Most meetings were facilitated by the Swiss government and took place in Geneva. Robin Wright, without naming anyone, quotes an Iranian official as saying that negotiations under the title of 'humanitarian gesture' came close to agreement three times during over a year of secret meetings and were halted each time without a definitive outcome. For those who followed the ups and downs of the lives of American prisoners in Iran through the press, this was more understandable, especially when we follow the trial of Jason Rezaian and see how his trial becomes convoluted in ways that do not seem logical. For instance, at one point it was said that the defense attorney had access to his case or had not, or that he had been tried and a verdict had been issued, but the details of the verdict were not announced. Or it was announced that a prison sentence had been issued, but the duration of it was not disclosed. Can such details be hidden in a formal and legal trial? The clear interpretation is that the publication of news regarding Jason Rezaian's trial was more about creating motivation to continue the prisoner exchange negotiations. In fact, the trial file rose and fell step by step with the results of the secret negotiations, and when the negotiations were halted, a cloud of ambiguity enveloped the case. Multiple obstacles arose, last-minute requests, legal barriers, and unforeseen issues, such as the prohibition in U.S. law against exchanging prisoners with prisoners, necessitating finding another legal basis that does not imply an exchange; for instance, a presidential pardon, or for humanitarian reasons, and so on. The reasons for the secrecy of the negotiations in the U.S. - at a time when electoral challenges between candidates from the Democratic and Republican parties for the upcoming U.S. presidential election had begun, if any news about the secret negotiations for the release of prisoners leaked out, the Republican Party could use it as a factor to strengthen its position. The Obama administration was getting closer to the annual congressional speech and wanted to create no excuse for the rival party. For this reason, the two negotiating teams decided to keep everything absolutely secret until the day of the implementation of the nuclear agreement. So far, Republicans have used every means to prove the legitimacy of their positions in their propaganda to gain public votes. How successful this propaganda has been is something that cannot be predicted until the election. For example, opponents of the nuclear deal with Iran have accused the President of releasing tens of billions of dollars to Iran while Americans have been held hostage in Iran. Even after the announcement of the implementation of the nuclear agreement, Senator Marco Rubio, a young Republican candidate, criticized the Obama administration for creating an incentive for other governments around the world to do the same by releasing Iranian deposits. Similar discussions in Iran: The fundamentalist ideological policy, generally referred to in Iranian political circles as 'the concerned ones,' feeds off conspiracy theories more than anything else. Based on this, from this perspective, every tourist is a spy, and every statesman who visits Iran intends to harm the 'interests of the regime.' From this perspective, it is not unlikely that if tomorrow Pope Francis passes through seven trials and visits Iran to pilgrimage at Islamic holy sites, the concerned circles would refer to him as a Western informant. The most interesting example of such judgments was published by an individual who was introduced by the Fars News Agency's cyber group as a 'political expert' on the agency's website. This 'political expert' wrote a short piece after the release of Jason Rezaian that reinforces Marco Rubio's claim more than anything else. This text is presented below without any omissions but with the first letter of the author's name mentioned: [Now it is clear who 'Jason Rezaian' is. M M believes that the main person who was released today is Jason Rezaian, and the other individuals are not that important; the U.S. has given something to Iran for Rezaian, not for the other three. The day Rezaian was arrested, many, including some government officials, protested that he was just a simple journalist and should not face such serious security charges. However, today, without the necessity of publishing details of Rezaian's activities in Iran, one can understand from this behavior of the U.S. that Rezaian was not just a simple journalist. If a concession is obtained from the enemy, this is not the art of diplomacy but the skill of men who, at the right time, with the right and precise action, create a valuable asset for the deal.] What the author attributes to Jason Rezaian is clearly evident from the text of his writing. Moreover, the author states that the Iranian government has received 'a package of concessions' from the Americans. This logic precisely reinforces the argument of Republicans in the U.S. who believe that Iran has taken these individuals hostage to obtain 'a package of concessions.' Signals: Before the prisoners' release was officially announced, news agencies, including the New York Times, published a report from the family of Amir Hekmati that was noteworthy. The news came shortly before the final agreement was published and the implementation of the JCPOA was announced: Amir Hekmati, 32 years old, had been transferred from Evin Prison to a hospital in Tehran for examination and treatment of tumors in his face and neck area, but the source of the news indicated Amir Hekmati's health. Therefore, there was no medical issue threatening Amir Hekmati's life mentioned or referred to in the reports. Eight days prior, Hekmati's lawyer claimed that the U.S. had requested the exchange of this prisoner through its interests office (Swiss Embassy). The U.S. State Department denied the exchange claim. Hekmati had spent over four years in an Iranian prison, and all efforts for his release had been ineffective. His lawyer believed that since his client had served more than half of his sentence, he could easily qualify for parole. In some cases, parole has been granted to prisoners who had only served one-third of their sentence. His lawyer stated that he had submitted a request for parole to the prosecutor's office and was awaiting a response. Although the ambiguity seemed unsolvable, a significant change was certainly on the horizon. Was Hekmati going for a final medical check-up to the hospital so that he could not make a financial claim against Iran in case of release or exchange? If so, why were Jason Rezaian and others not taken to the hospital? In any case, the wait did not last long. The release of prisoners: Finally, January 16, 2016, arrived, and the highly secure and secret negotiations in Geneva bore fruit, and it was decided that prisoners from both sides would be released. Robin Wright writes that the U.S. hoped to announce the news of the prisoners' release that morning, but the Fars News Agency, which is said to be affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, got ahead. Perhaps the eight-and-a-half-hour difference between the two capitals caused the actual announcement time in Iran to occur earlier! The Fars News Agency's report, citing judicial sources, announced that dual-national prisoners in Iran were released under the 'prisoner exchange program approved by the Supreme National Security Council.' This news was not particularly interesting for the U.S., and therefore, it immediately published its own narrative of the prisoners' release, stating that 'seven Iranian prisoners, six of whom hold dual American-Iranian citizenship and were either awaiting trial or had been convicted and imprisoned in the U.S., were pardoned.' Additionally, the U.S. announced that 14 other Iranians whose names were on the Interpol wanted list had been removed from this list and their charges had been suspended. Which four cannot become five: News agencies reported various names. Instead of Siamak Namazi, some lists mentioned Nasrullah Khosravi Roudsari, who was unknown to many people. Apparently, another unknown individual named Matthew Trevithick appeared in some lists. Subsequent news indicated that Matthew was a Boston University graduate and a research assistant to Robin Wright at the Woodrow Wilson Foundation who had gone to Iran to study Persian. Ms. Haleh Esfandiari, former head of the Middle East research section at the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, had also been detained during a trip to visit her mother in Iran and spent several months in prison. She had bought her freedom by paying a bail of 300 million tomans and had left Iran, but Matthew had spent about a month in prison, and apparently, the American delegation did not discuss him much, and his charges from Iran were still unclear. There was also no specific source regarding Nasrullah Khosravi Roudsari and the charges and time of his imprisonment. In any case, it became clear that Siamak Namazi was not released at all. For many Iranians inside...