Proposed Cabinet of Pezeshkian; From Low Efficiency Average to Elderly Leadership

Masoud Pezeshkian, who introduced his list of proposed ministers for a vote of confidence to the parliament on August 21, is the first president to officially consult with the supervisory and intelligence institutions of the regime for selecting ministers. Given Pezeshkian's coordination with Ali Khamenei and the hard core of power, and considering the red lines of the twelfth parliament, it seems that the proposed cabinet composition will not face significant difficulties in gaining a vote of confidence, with a maximum of seven individuals potentially receiving a red card from the twelfth parliament. Based on the claim of Javad Zarif, head of the government transition steering committee, only three out of the 19 proposed ministers were the first choices of this committee for Pezeshkian. Thus, it can be said that Pezeshkian has ignored this committee or at least failed to gain its approval in negotiations with the top of the power hierarchy. However, according to Zarif's claim, Pezeshkian had set up parallel mechanisms from the beginning to obtain proposed options. The selection of the three mentioned individuals, one of whom is likely Abbas Araqchi, is a normal occurrence. In fact, these three individuals were not the result of attention to the opinions collected and summarized in the committee, but rather individuals on whom there was consensus under the current conditions, and this committee also selected them for the cabinet. The proposed economic ministers of Pezeshkian; 'A team that did not meet expectations.' The claimed criteria of the steering committee, such as selecting 20% women, having 60% of ministers under 50 years old, and selecting ministers from Sunni and religious minorities, were ignored. Two of the introduced options are Turks from Azerbaijan, but their number and backgrounds are not sufficient to satisfy the quantitative and qualitative expectations of Iranian Azerbaijani voters. The only previously announced criterion that was observed was that over 60% of the options are first-time ministers, which is not a new matter. This indicator was 85% in Ebrahim Raisi's government. Pezeshkian's proposed cabinet is positioned between Rouhani's third government and Raisi's second government, which can be seen as a tactical retreat by the institution of the Supreme Leader as a means to stabilize and expand 'purification' in a larger step at the end of the fourteenth government's term. Pezeshkian is somewhat distanced from the potential government of Jalili, which could have been filled entirely with hardline conservative figures, but his proposed cabinet cannot be considered a break from Raisi's government; rather, it seems to have aimed at a blend with Rouhani's second government. 'Non-political, like Pezeshkian himself.' Pezeshkian's proposed cabinet is almost as non-political as he is. There is no figure who can be said to have significant political experience in the cabinet. Seven of the introduced individuals do not belong directly to any political faction, and the political orientation distribution of the remaining proposed ministers is between government-centered reformism and traditionalism, moderate conservatism, and centrism. Five individuals, including Mohammad Reza Zafarghandi, Abdolnaser Hemmati, Nouri Ghazaljeh, Ahmad Donyamali, and Ahmad Meydari, belong to reformists, but none are part of the moderate and progressive reformists. Hemmati and Ghazaljeh are close to the Executives of Construction Party. Zafarghandi belongs to the traditional faction that shares a high level of discourse with Khamenei and the institution of the Supreme Leader. Donyamali is known for having only the label of reformism and is actually part of the close circle of Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf. He even supported Qalibaf in the recent elections and referred to Pezeshkian as a 'blocked government.' Ahmad Meydari previously belonged to the progressive reformist faction but has distanced himself from politics for years and reportedly did not even sign the statement known as 'opening the window' claiming 'improvement-seeking.' None of these individuals are among the first and second-tier forces of reformists. Meanwhile, Rouhani's government had appointed several 'general reformists' as ministers. The 'centrists' also have three shares in Pezeshkian's proposed cabinet, none of whom are among the main figures. On the other side of the political spectrum, 'conservatives' have four shares among the introduced options. Among the ministers of Raisi's government, three (Ismail Khatib, Abbas Ali Abadi, and Amir Hossein Rahimi) are included in this group. Alireza Kazemi, the proposed candidate for the Ministry of Education, also served as the caretaker of this ministry for six months at the beginning of Raisi's government. Farzaneh Sadegh Malavijerd, who initially entered management positions in Tehran's municipality through the reformist city council's elected mayor, later became deputy minister of housing through Mohammad Reza Islami in Rouhani's second government and remained in this position until last August in Raisi's government. After her dismissal, she became an advisor to Mehrdad Bazrpash and subsequently took on the position of CEO of the Kowsar Property and Assets Organization belonging to the 'Martyrs Foundation.' Security candidates; 'Conservative and loyal to the leadership.' In the security sectors, the selected candidates have conservative and 'loyalist' tendencies. In the cultural and educational fields, they have moderate and conservative inclinations, which, given the significant cultural rifts and the deep divide between the university and the government, their final output does not differ much from the ministers of Raisi's government. In the economic sector, one might observe an advantage compared to Raisi's government, but the capabilities of the proposed ministers are less than those of Rouhani's government, which had a weaker economic performance after the then U.S. government's exit from the 'JCPOA' compared to Raisi's government. Three points about Mohammad Reza Aref, Pezeshkian's first deputy. Abbas Araqchi stands between Mohammad Javad Zarif and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in foreign policy, being closer to the institution of the Supreme Leader than Zarif. As he stated in a meeting of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, he is committed to the 'strategic actions law of the parliament' in the field of nuclear activities and negotiations aimed at reconstructing the JCPOA. Since policymaking in foreign crises occurs outside the government and within the institution of the Supreme Leader, and the main problems of Iran's economy also stem from the political economy domain, it is very unlikely that the mentioned ministers can do anything significant and sustainable alone, and in other words, they are dependent variables. Pezeshkian turned his back on his promises to select a larger number of female ministers and also to choose three Sunni ministers. The selected female candidate also does not have a history of advocating for freedom and women's rights, and her positions are closer to conservatives. The selected deputy for women also belongs to the conservative faction of reformists. With these circumstances, it can be said that Masoud Pezeshkian remained faithful only to his main condition of selecting a cabinet aligned with Ali Khamenei and choosing individuals who believe in macro policies and high-level documents. The weaknesses of the cabinet; from low average expertise to elderly leadership. The proposed ministers score low on criteria such as expertise, efficiency, and public service. Their major weakness is the lack of political activity experience and disregard for the demands of civil society forces. Based on the review of their backgrounds, they have adhered to the red lines of intelligence institutions on behalf of the institution of the Supreme Leader in every position they have held. In addition, the ministers of intelligence, justice, and the interior also have a clear history of participating in the suppression of public protests. Pezeshkian's proposed cabinet, considering its deputies, also faces the challenge of elderly leadership. The average age of the cabinet is 60 years, making it the oldest cabinet after the revolution, following Engineer Bazargan's government. Pezeshkian himself is also the oldest president of Iran. The average age of Raisi's government and Rouhani's first government at the time of introduction to the parliament was 54 and 57 years, respectively. This factor also leads to conservatism and further constrains agility and connection with society. Masoud Pezeshkian and the narrative of 'reformism without reforms.' Another significant weakness of Pezeshkian's cabinet is the lack of coordination among its members, which can hinder a unified direction in the government. In this respect, the cabinet has a contradictory and fragmented appearance similar to Pezeshkian's own positions, which are a mix of conflicting views and a lack of proper understanding and analysis of the main governance issues of the country. With these considerations, it can be said that Pezeshkian's proposed cabinet is likely to continue the existing political situation and will revolve around the same axis in the power structure, but the expectations of the institution of the Supreme Leader for accepting adjustments in the presidency of the executive branch are unlikely to be met. Pezeshkian's government, like his presidency, has faced a lack of attention and support from the majority of the people from the outset. Additionally, his proposed composition has led to disappointment among his supporters at the first step and accusations of betrayal. In such a situation, not only is the deep gap between the government and the people difficult to repair, but the ability to solve the country's economic problems through this government is also questionable.