Prospects, Obstacles, and Potential Consequences of the Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement

In political circles, there is talk that the beginning of this week is marked by a countdown for the final resolution of the Iran nuclear negotiations with the 5+1. Tuesday is the deadline for reaching a comprehensive agreement. Observers are focused on this day, whether it arrives a little earlier or later. Abbas Araqchi, a senior member of the Iranian negotiating team, said on Saturday that the outcome of Yukiya Amano's visit, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to Tehran last week was positive. He also expressed Iran's strong hope for progress in resolving the issue of what the West calls 'the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.' Yukiya Amano, who met with President Hassan Rouhani and Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, during his visit to Tehran, stated upon returning to Vienna that the parties have reached a better understanding, but much work remains to be done. The Kayhan newspaper, reflecting the views of the so-called concerned circles and critics of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team, complained on Saturday that clarifying the possible military dimensions is still a precondition for the implementation of sanctions relief against Iran. Alongside military officials, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran has made clear his opposition to allowing IAEA inspectors access to military sites in Iran and interviews with Iranian nuclear scientists to resolve outstanding issues between Iran and the Agency. Following the meeting on Friday between John Kerry and Mohammad Javad Zarif, the foreign ministers of Iran and the United States in Vienna, a video was posted on YouTube in which Zarif expresses his latest thoughts in English with Persian subtitles addressed to the members of the 5+1 group and public opinion, including Tehran's readiness to achieve (as he puts it) 'a good and balanced agreement and open new horizons for dealing with violent extremism.' Zarif also stated that despite some differences, the two sides have never been closer to reaching a sustainable solution. Will the outcome of the negotiations by Tuesday or slightly earlier or later lead to a comprehensive agreement on Iran's nuclear issue? Are there factors that could prevent the two sides from reaching a comprehensive agreement? If a comprehensive agreement is reached, how will the lifting of sanctions against Iran be implemented? Guests this week on the program 'Views' have answered these questions: Shirin Tahmasbi-Hunter, an analyst of Iran-U.S. relations and research professor at Georgetown University in Washington, Saeed Barzin, a sociologist and political analyst in London, Reza Taghizadeh, a political science professor in Glasgow, and Mohammad Sadegh Javadihesar, a journalist and political analyst from the reformist camp in Mashhad. Embedshare 'Agreement' from the perspective of Shirin Tahmasbi-Hunter, Saeed Barzin, Reza Taghizadeh, and Mohammad Sadegh Javadihesar from Radio Farda. Embedshare The code has been copied to your clipboard. The URL has been copied to your clipboard No media source currently available 0:00 0:37:25 0:00 Direct link 32 kbps | MP3 Open in a new window. Ms. Tahmasbi, how do you see the status of the nuclear negotiations? Do you think Iran and the 5+1 will reach a comprehensive agreement by Tuesday? Shirin Tahmasbi-Hunter: Both sides have invested a lot in this matter, and it is important for both sides to achieve some form of agreement from these negotiations. Of course, predicting such an important matter is very difficult because in negotiations like this, a problem can arise at the last moment, and at the same time, if there have been previous problems, they can be resolved at the last moment. As far as I see the negotiation process, it seems that neither side will say they will definitely have an agreement. They always try to keep expectations from getting too high. However, from some of the statements made by both the American side and the Iranian side, it seems that both sides are somewhat willing to compromise on certain issues, which increases the hope of reaching an agreement. Whether it will be on Tuesday or a day or two later cannot be predicted. But I am generally cautiously optimistic that an agreement will be reached. Mr. Barzin, what is your view on the situation as described by Ms. Tahmasbi and this optimism in the current conditions? Can opponents of the negotiations in Tehran and Washington or France, Israel, and Saudi Arabia prevent the negotiations from reaching a conclusion? Saeed Barzin: I think I might be a bit more optimistic than Ms. Tahmasbi. The potential impact of opposing groups has gradually decreased over the past six months. Six months ago, it was about 50/50, four months ago it decreased, and a week ago it was perhaps down to 25 percent. Today, it might be less than 10 percent. The opponents are generally divided into four groups: one group consists of regional countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel, another group is in Washington, a third group includes hardline parties within the country, and a fourth group consists of parties that seek to overthrow the Islamic Republic. All these groups have different interests, strategies, and tactics, but they share one common goal: they do not want Tehran-Washington relations to improve, even in a limited way. The logic and reasoning they use are also different. For example, domestically, they argue that Iran has given too many concessions or that Iran wants to surrender. Or the opposition parties to the Islamic Republic argue that if the West engages with Iran, human rights will be violated, or that the Iranian regime is unreliable and any form of international cooperation is futile. The power of these groups is significant, but I think it is limited in the current scenario. Among other things, hardliners within the country have become a minority, and their power is declining. The opposition parties to the Islamic Republic, those who want to overthrow it, have little influence on international relations. Saudi Arabia itself has been a significant factor in the ongoing crisis in the Middle East. The voices of Israel and the Washington lobby are not currently in demand. They have pursued a scorched earth policy, which is not appealing in the current circumstances. Mr. Taghizadeh, what do you think about Mr. Barzin's and Ms. Tahmasbi's statements? Additionally, if this quote from a senior Iranian nuclear negotiator is correct, that the issue regarding the acceptance of the Additional Protocol has been resolved, what is the formula for the IAEA's access to facilities that Iran considers sensitive, especially military sites? Reza Taghizadeh: At this stage of the discussions, the success or failure of the negotiations is solely influenced by the political decision of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. If Mr. Khamenei wants, he can derail these negotiations. However, my impression is that he has consented to the outcome of the negotiations despite his personal dissatisfaction, and that the negotiations will reach an official conclusion before Thursday. The reason I say before Thursday is that if Mr. Obama is able to submit the text of the agreement with Iran to Congress after Thursday, the review period in Congress will automatically increase from 30 days to 60 days. This is based on a resolution passed by the U.S. Senate on April 14, which Obama accepted. Therefore, if there is a delay in this matter, the minimum financial loss for the Islamic Republic due to a few days' delay will be around two billion dollars. This is because of the 500 million dollars per month that Iran receives as a result of implementing two temporary agreements. Regarding the implementation of the Additional Protocol, this protocol is a recognized framework that all member countries accepted in 1997. For Iran, the only assurance the Agency can give to the Islamic Republic is that they have the least interest in inspecting Iran's military sites. Inspections will be conducted with prior coordination, and the definitive intent is that if there is doubt about suspicious activities with military dimensions, this will be done with prior coordination, which somewhat preserves the image of the military and the Supreme Leader, who has declared this as a red line. Mr. Javadihesar, what do you think about Mr. Taghizadeh's perspective, that Mr. Khamenei, despite his wishes, will agree, and under what circumstances might the achievements of the Iranian negotiating team not satisfy the Supreme Leader for signing a comprehensive agreement with the 5+1? Mohammad Sadegh Javadihesar: In my opinion, tying everything to the opinion of Mr. Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, in discussions at this level may be somewhat unrealistic. Mr. Khamenei has stated his conditions. He has previously said that if these conditions are met, the negotiating team has both the authority and the ability to align conditions with the demands of the Islamic Republic. Therefore, this somewhat takes the discussion beyond the text. In my opinion, as long as Mr. Khamenei can play a role in either achieving or failing the agreement, the other side can also have this role. That is, the U.S. can also play this role. As they have indicated, if it is not approved by Thursday, it goes to Congress, and Congress can delay it for up to two months. Multiple lobbies can intervene and create conditions that differ from today's assumptions and circumstances. In that case, if Iran does not accept, it is not Iran's fault. The fault lies with those who, through continuous excessive demands, lead the negotiations to a deadlock. If the Director General of the Agency submits his report to the 5+1 and transparency is achieved, and as Mr. Araqchi said, the baseless excuses and phantom preconditions that have previously caused disputes and led to Iran's case being referred to the UN and the Security Council are resolved... If we consider all of this, I believe that Mr. Amano's report and the political approach, as Mr. Zarif said, a political approach aimed at ending the problems can be very decisive. Because legally, nothing substantial has been provided to justify stopping or changing the course of negotiations, except for the existence of political wills. If these political wills, which all evidence indicates are seeking an agreement... because I have often said that the Iran-West agreement is a mutual necessity for both sides... the fact that it has been extended for a week and they say that if necessary, they will continue for another two days indicates that no negotiating party wants to destroy 95 percent or 93 percent or 70 percent or 80 percent of what has been agreed upon for 2 percent or 3 percent or 5 percent of remaining demands. Ms. Tahmasbi, if a comprehensive agreement is reached, considering previous experiences with the implementation and lifting of sanctions against other countries, how will the stages of lifting sanctions against Iran proceed in the best case? Shirin Tahmasbi-Hunter: This is also not an easy discussion. I think that if I were among the Iranian negotiators, I would certainly try to clarify these issues in the agreement. However, as the Iranian negotiators have said, this will take some time. They say that various letters need to be prepared for the ministries. But from Iran's perspective, I believe it is very important that these issues are resolved. Because simply saying that an agreement has been reached may lead to the process of lifting sanctions being prolonged to the point where conditions change later. Therefore, I think there are still issues they are negotiating on, and as far as I have seen so far, no decision has been made in that regard. For some in the U.S., especially the hardliners, they think that by continuing the sanction-lifting process, they can maintain their pressure on Iran. Therefore, I hope these issues are clarified before the final agreement is reached. But generally, it seems that some sanctions are easier to lift. These are things that Obama can do himself. Other sanctions are imposed by the UN, which will have a different procedure and process. However, I think that as they say, it will not happen all at once as the Iranian leader said, but rather gradually, and in my opinion, another front of struggle will emerge in the U.S. to determine which of these sanctions are related to nuclear issues or other matters. This will be a lengthy process. The most important issue to consider is that the nuclear dispute between Iran and the West and the U.S. has essentially come under U.S. pressure. Otherwise, they had no interest in entering this affair. This is actually a symbol of the problems that exist between Iran and the U.S. Otherwise, simply having a nuclear program is not the issue. This nuclear program has been used to contain Iran. Now the question is whether Iran and the U.S., following the negotiations that have taken place... which they claim they did not discuss other issues... of course, they did not officially discuss them. But anyway, when Mr. Zarif and Mr. Kerry walk together, they also talk about other matters. The question is whether, as some have stated, a decision has been made in the American political community that the time has come to gradually initiate a process of de-escalating tensions with Iran, which may eventually lead to an agreement with the U.S.? Has this decision been made or not? This same question also exists in Iran, after all this time, now nearly forty years since this issue has continued and has caused significant damage to Iran. Has this perspective been established in Iran that it is time for Iran to prioritize the interests of the country and compromise on some aspects of its foreign policy that have led to these problems? If these decisions have been made on both sides, I believe that not only will a nuclear agreement be achieved, but other matters will also take a positive turn. Now, not that it will happen all at once. Nothing in the world is ever 100 percent.