Qalibaf; From Khamenei's Sermon to the Most Security-Oriented Speaker of the Islamic Republic

Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, who became the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly with the majority vote of representatives in the twelfth term, is the most security-oriented Speaker in the history of the Islamic Republic due to his long-standing background in high-ranking positions within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the police force. On Tuesday, June 8, despite two other competitors, Mojtaba Zolnouri and Manouchehr Mottaki, he secured 198 votes out of a total of 287 representatives. The 62-year-old Qalibaf, while once again taking the chair of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, is expected not to end his political ambitions here and is likely to register for early presidential elections in the coming days. Born on September 23, 1961, in Torqabeh, near Mashhad, Qalibaf is considered a 'fellow townsman' of Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. Some political observers believe that this geographical connection with the Supreme Leader has been a factor in his military and political promotions. He himself has stated that he has known Khamenei since before the revolution, around 1977. At that time, when Qalibaf was a high school student, he became involved in revolutionary activities against the Pahlavi regime, and as he himself stated, reading declarations and sitting at the sermons of clerics, including Ali Khamenei, became his 'hangout'. Qalibaf's closeness to Khamenei's circle began before the revolution. His familiarity with radical Islamic and revolutionary ideas led him, at a young age during the revolution, to take up arms for what he described as 'defending the revolution' and to become a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the ideological military institution that emerged from the revolution. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war provided the ground for the rise of Qalibaf and others who went to war not based on military training and defense of the country but based on religious beliefs and 'defending the revolution'. He quickly rose from an ordinary soldier to commanding a battalion, a brigade (Imam Reza Brigade), and a division (5th Nasr Division), which was specifically for forces from Khorasan province. However, Qalibaf's real military growth occurred when there was no longer a war. After the war, he became the commander of the Najaf Headquarters, or the Western Headquarters of the IRGC, to suppress unrest in western Iran that arose after the war. Qalibaf himself stated, 'The west of the country was not completely safe yet. I stayed for a while until security in the west was complete.' After the war, the period of strengthening Qalibaf's influence within the IRGC and simultaneously benefiting from the privileges of war arrived; entering economic activities and entering universities with special quotas for 'combatants' were among these privileges. With these quotas and his influence, Qalibaf obtained a higher education degree while holding multiple time-consuming jobs. He also took command of the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters, the economic arm of the IRGC, in 1994 after becoming the deputy commander of the Basij Force. For three years in this position, under the guise of 'post-war reconstruction', he established many economic relations and strengthened the IRGC's presence in the country's economic arenas. In 1997, Qalibaf suddenly reached high military ranks, and Khamenei appointed him as the commander of the IRGC Air Force. His rise to such positions coincided with the beginning of the suppression of Iranian civil society, which had particularly manifested itself by mobilizing to participate in the presidential elections of June 1997. Qalibaf has repeatedly reached military and political positions by Khamenei's decree. He was one of the IRGC commanders who signed the famous threatening letter to then-President Mohammad Khatami. In that letter, referring to the student protests of July 9, 1999, it was stated that the 'patience bowl' of the IRGC commanders had run out, and if these protests were not suppressed, they could 'not tolerate more than that'. Hassan Rouhani, who was then the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, later revealed in election debates that Qalibaf had said in security meetings for suppressing student protests that they should 'pour gas on them'. Qalibaf's military achievements as the commander of the IRGC Air Force are unclear, but if Khamenei, who holds the command of the armed forces of the Islamic Republic, was not satisfied with him, he probably would not have entrusted him with another important position, namely the command of the police force, after three years in 2000. In 2004, Qalibaf also became the head of the Central Headquarters for Combating Smuggling of Goods and Currency. Qalibaf and Economic Corruption: 'New Principlism' of Qalibaf; a manager whose name is tied to corruption. After more than two decades in high military positions, in 2005, Qalibaf showcased his political ambitions by running for the presidential election that year. It was said that he was the candidate supported by the office of the Supreme Leader, but ultimately Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the election. Qalibaf tried his luck again in 2013 and 2017 to reach the presidency but was unsuccessful again. However, these defeats did not diminish his influence in power. On September 4, 2005, he was elected as the Mayor of Tehran by the Tehran City Council to replace Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had left this position after being elected president. Qalibaf emphasized his 'pilot' background in his first election appearance. He was re-elected for another four years by the Tehran City Council in 2009 and 2013, and immediately after his mayoralty ended, he was appointed by Khamenei to the Expediency Discernment Council. In 2019, he entered the campaigns for the 11th parliamentary elections and after being elected to the parliament, he was able to become the Speaker of the Parliament in 2020, thus becoming one of the leaders of the three branches of the Islamic Republic. During his tenure in the parliament, several anti-human rights laws, including the so-called 'Chastity and Hijab' bill against women's freedom of dress, were passed. Despite all this, he has gradually found strong opponents within the parliament and among the so-called 'principlists'. The corruption cases and decline in support among government supporters. In public opinion, the exposure of multiple corruption cases related to Qalibaf has led to a decrease in his popularity even among government supporters, to the extent that his votes in his second parliamentary election significantly dropped. The exposure of corruption cases has decreased Qalibaf's popularity even among government supporters. Nevertheless, neither repressive actions in military institutions, nor multiple corruption cases, nor serious rivalries among principlists have diminished his influence in the core of power. Despite becoming the Speaker of the Parliament, Qalibaf is still considered one of the potential candidates for a higher position, namely the presidency.