Qasem Soleimani, the Hero of a Heterogeneous Coalition

In the history of the Islamic Republic, the extraterritorial branch of the Revolutionary Guard, known as the Quds Force, has always had a military-security identity. For this reason, not only were the details of its officials and personnel not disclosed by the authorities of the Islamic Republic and the Revolutionary Guard, but for a long time, the existence of an extraterritorial branch was not officially acknowledged. Many operations attributed to the Islamic Republic in European countries, Argentina, and East Asia were linked to the Quds Force, and like other security agencies of the Islamic Republic, the confidentiality of the identities of its officials and managers also applied to the Quds Force. However, in recent months, images and reports of the commander of this force in Iraq have been published, and from American magazines to Iranian state media, the prominent role of Qasem Soleimani has been examined. This change in previous protocols, with the commander attending state ceremonies, giving interviews to domestic news agencies, and corresponding with government artists, seems deliberate, as if Soleimani is not only displeased with being in the spotlight but is facilitating this subject himself. There could be multiple reasons behind this change, from the tactics of a global power to the psychological warfare of a regional power, from gaining prestige for a military organization with a tarnished image to leadership programs aware of their legitimacy, and finally, the efforts of a failed nationalist, revivalist movement to resurrect itself from the contradictions of the ancient Persian Empire and the current Velayat-e Faqih in Iran. This article briefly examines these reasons. Qasem Soleimani's presence in Iraq does not date back only a few months. For several years before images of him alongside Iraqi military forces were published, Soleimani was effectively Iran's primary official in Iraq. The author personally heard from officials in Iraqi Kurdistan three years ago that both the policymaker and executor of Iran's policies in Iraq and the Kurdistan region was Qasem Soleimani. Iranian officials had told the Kurdistan region's authorities that the leader of Iran had entrusted the Iraq dossier to the commander of the Quds Force. So, if the Islamic Republic implemented failed policies in Iraq in previous years, Soleimani is the primary and direct responsible party. The emergence of ISIS was a multi-causal phenomenon, one of the main reasons being the consequences of the policies dictated by the Islamic Republic to Nouri al-Maliki's government. In the last years of Maliki's premiership—especially after the complete withdrawal of American forces—pressure on Sunni Arabs increased in every respect, and their participation in political and economic management reached its lowest point in the hundred-year history of Iraq. The Sahwa forces, formed by Sunni Arab tribes to fight groups affiliated with al-Qaeda (most of whom later joined ISIS), were dissolved, and Nouri Maliki reneged on his promise to integrate Sahwa commanders into the Iraqi army. Relatively peaceful Sunni protests in several parts of Iraq were met with unprecedented violence. Iran—read Qasem Soleimani—decided to turn Iraq into its own domain, and these erroneous policies, alongside several other variables, led to the emergence of ISIS, which is now the most serious threat to Iraq, Iran, and the entire region. The United States, aware of Iran's role in these policies of the Iraqi government, cut its support for Nouri al-Maliki, and all of Iran's—read Qasem Soleimani's—efforts to maintain Maliki came to naught. The initial publication of images of Qasem Soleimani coincided with a change in the Iraqi prime ministership and the rise of Haider al-Abadi as a less known and less trusted figure for Iran. It seemed Iran deliberately wanted to convey to the new Iraqi government that it was still maintaining its prominent presence in Iraq while also telling Qasem Soleimani that the responsibility for restoring the previous conditions lay with him. Meanwhile, the United States, having achieved its main goal of ousting Nouri al-Maliki, not only did not show sensitivity to Soleimani's presence and maneuvers but several American publications praised him. The U.S. government was unwilling to send even one soldier to the front lines in Iraq, knowing that the shattered Iraqi army needed help. They were also sure that publishing Soleimani's photo on the cover of an American magazine would not only incur no cost for them but would also serve as a sort of punishment for Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which had not cooperated with the U.S. as they should have. Inside Iran, no one opposed this unveiling of a face. The Revolutionary Guard was revealing a figure whose image, unlike its other prominent faces, had not yet been tarnished. The reality is that for two decades, since the Revolutionary Guard effectively entered the political and economic scene in Iran, since the time its commanders wrote a threatening letter to the then-President Mohammad Khatami, mentioning breaking pens and cutting tongues, the position and acceptance of the Revolutionary Guard among the Iranian public had been tarnished. As time passed, this figure became more stained. The role of the Revolutionary Guard in economic corruption, the role of its commanders in bringing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power, and again four years later, helping to elect him following the suppression of the Green Movement, all damaged the credibility of the Revolutionary Guard. Naturally, presenting a Revolutionary Guard commander as a knowledgeable and sharp military figure, even from the Americans' perspective, would benefit the Revolutionary Guard. Now, if this figure is introduced with the help of several media outlets, both domestic and foreign, as a mystic who has traversed the path and reached enlightenment, all the better! Interestingly, the mystic nature of Qasem Soleimani gained traction without any evidence or background, following an interview by ISNA with an unidentified individual. According to this anonymous source, Qasem Soleimani was introduced as the best person in 'absolute obedience to the leadership.' This means that the Iranian leader's involvement in the unveiling of this Revolutionary Guard figure was also included. However, all of this was not enough to cement this figure in public memory and compensate for the failures of the Maliki era in Iraq. A military figure approved by the Americans, a mystic who has traversed the path, and an absolute obedient to the leadership still could not answer all the questions in the public mind regarding Iran's role in Iraq. This is where the humiliated ancient revivalist nationalism came into play to both gain a reputation among its disillusioned believers and help create a mythical hero. The comparison of Qasem Soleimani with historical commanders of Iran in one of the foreign media quickly drew parallels to the pre-Islamic era and ultimately likened him to the champions of the ancient Persian Empire, without regard to the significant contradiction of absolute obedience to the Velayat-e Faqih, which is one of the main characteristics of their commander. None of the storytellers of Qasem Soleimani have provided evidence of his heroism, intelligence, or mysticism; they have all participated in a temporary coalition with contradictory goals to create an image of a person with a potentially terrorist background. The author considers this coalition to be temporary, as the current image of Qasem Soleimani is viewed as short-lived and transient. He will either soon see the end of his presence and return to his anonymity, or if he insists on remaining in the spotlight, he will not be able to maintain this current image for a long time.