Questions and Answers from the Arms Control Association Regarding the JCPOA

Recently, the Arms Control Association published a newsletter in two parts in response to many frequently asked questions regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The text below has been published with minimal changes from the original material. The original and many related articles about Iran's nuclear deal are accessible on the Association's website (here). The short text below has been translated into Persian with minimal changes and contains accurate information that dispels many doubts. In a few cases, for clarity, some words or phrases are included in brackets [ ] that are not present in the original text. 1- Iran's Nuclear and Missile Program - Is Iran still pursuing a secret nuclear weapons program? No. Based on evidence collected and published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran had a weapons program that it halted in 2003. These activities, generally referred to as Possible Military Dimensions (PMD), are currently being actively and seriously addressed by the Agency. This aligns with the assessment of the National Intelligence Organization conducted in 2007 and is based on the moderate confidence expressed that "Iran has not restarted its nuclear program." According to the IAEA's 2011 report, there may have been activities related to Iran's nuclear weapons that were not part of a coordinated program. In the 2014 Worldwide Threat Assessment, National Intelligence Director James Clapper also stated that Iran would not be able to divert safeguarded nuclear materials and convert them to weapons-grade suitable for bomb-making without detection. - Does Iran have a ballistic missile that could be equipped with a nuclear warhead or is it building such a missile? The U.S. intelligence community estimates that, with significant foreign cooperation, Iran could technically produce an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), but there is no report that it is doing so. To date, Iran has never tested any long-range missile. The maximum range of Iran's missile system (2000 kilometers) is considered to be medium-range ballistic missiles and, contrary to what some have suggested, is not classified as an ICBM. For Iran's missile range to reach the United States, an intercontinental missile with a range of 9000 kilometers would be required. Theoretically, Iran could potentially produce such a missile within ten years through coordinated efforts, but it is unlikely. Furthermore, if the comprehensive nuclear deal closes pathways to obtaining a bomb, the ballistic missile would pose less of a threat as it could not be equipped with a nuclear warhead. 2- Impact of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) - Did the interim agreement of 2013, or the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), halt advancements in Iran's nuclear program? Yes. The implementation of the November 2013 agreement prevented the development of Iran's nuclear program and rolled back most factors that were sensitive from a nuclear proliferation perspective. Under the Joint Plan, Iran limited uranium enrichment to 20 percent, which was one of the key and concerning points for the 1+5 countries regarding nuclear proliferation, as 20 percent enriched uranium can more easily be converted to weapon-grade material (i.e., above 90 percent). Additionally, Iran took steps to neutralize its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium gas. Iran halted major construction work at the Arak heavy water reactor, froze a number of installed and operational centrifuges; and agreed to surprise inspections, including daily access to enrichment facilities. Iran also agreed to produce only centrifuges that would replace broken and out-of-service ones. Without the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), Iran would have been able to significantly increase its enrichment capacity and likely complete the Arak reactor. Did Iran comply with the conditions of the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action or did it violate those conditions by operating advanced IR-5 centrifuges? According to the IAEA's quarterly report on November 7, 2014, Iran intermittently injected natural uranium hexafluoride for the first time into a single IR-5 centrifuge [of the advanced type] at its pilot facility. Although this action did not assist in implementing the conditions of the plan, it was not considered a violation of the Joint Plan of Action since those conditions prohibit the use of advanced centrifuges for accumulating enriched uranium. At the same time, to avoid any illusions, on November 24 of that year, Iran agreed not to inject any uranium into the IR-5 centrifuge during the interim agreement period. On November 24, 2014, the Agency reported, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated that Iran remained faithful to this commitment. 3- Nuclear Negotiations with Iran - Does the UN Security Council resolution require Iran to stop enrichment, dismantle enrichment facility components, and destroy the Arak heavy water reactor? No. Since July 2006, the UN Security Council has issued six resolutions calling for the suspension of enrichment activities and the suspension of work on the Arak heavy water reactor. None of the six resolutions passed by the Security Council called for the destruction or dismantling of enrichment facilities or a permanent halt to enrichment. The call for suspension was aimed at bringing Iran into compliance with the IAEA investigations so that the Agency could address its concerns about possible past military activities in Iran to find a diplomatic solution to resolve issues regarding Iran's nuclear program. During the discussion of the recent resolution in June 2010, the British ambassador to the UN, Mark Lyall Grant, speaking on behalf of the 1+5, emphasized that the goal of the resolution was to "keep the door open for ongoing engagement" with Iran regarding its nuclear program. He stated that the aim of such diplomatic efforts should be to reach a long-term and comprehensive solution that respects Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Security Council resolutions have never aimed at destroying Iran's non-military nuclear program in the future as long as it complies with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) conditions. - Did President Obama change U.S. policy from stopping Iran's enrichment to managing it? No. Beginning in mid-2006, the George W. Bush administration changed U.S. policy and opened the way for Iran to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, provided it met specific conditions. The 2006 proposal states that if Iran can demonstrate that "there is a valid and coherent economic rationale supporting its existing civilian nuclear energy program," the enrichment ban would be lifted. Additionally, Iran would be required to make all nuclear facilities transparent and demonstrate that it has no clandestine nuclear program, and respond to outstanding questions regarding the military aspects of its nuclear program. This is the same formula that led to the agreement between the 1+5 and Iran in 2015 with similar features. - Does the 1+5 recognize Iran's right to continue its uranium enrichment program by effectively recognizing a "right to enrich" within the framework of the NPT? Article four of the NPT allows non-nuclear weapon states to access peaceful nuclear technology in exchange for a commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons programs, provided they comply with IAEA safeguards. At the same time, the NPT does not explicitly reject or accept the right to enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel for member states. The United States does not recognize a "right to enrich" under the NPT regulations. In the interim agreement and in the JCPOA, the United States and the 1+5 partners accepted that Iran has an enrichment program and maintains a limited enrichment program in accordance with its "practical needs" for non-military activities. Acceptance of the existence of a program is not the same as recognizing that a treaty grants a "right." The United States has acknowledged the existence of the program. [The United States has accepted that a program exists, but not that the NPT grants such a right]. After reaching the interim agreement in November 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry reiterated that U.S. policy in this regard remains unchanged and, as he has always stated and reiterated, "there is no inherent right to enrich." - Why does the JCPOA not require Iran to dismantle its nuclear weapons capability? Iran has had nuclear weapons capability but has chosen not to develop nuclear weapons. The 2007 intelligence assessment tells us that Iran has tested a range of technologies, including uranium enrichment, warhead mechanisms, and delivery systems, to have the option of launching nuclear weapons within a very short timeframe "if it wants to." For practical reasons, dismantling such capability, including the technical knowledge, is not feasible. Even if Iran were to completely dismantle its nuclear infrastructure, it could rebuild it. The knowledge and initial industrial capacity that Iran possesses would not be destroyed by harsher sanctions or military attacks. - Why did arms and ballistic missile sanctions become an issue during the negotiations? Arms sanctions and sanctions against ballistic missiles were imposed by the United Nations as part of Resolution 1929 on Iran's nuclear activities to bring Iran to the negotiating table. At the end of the negotiations for the framework agreement in April 2015, the parties strongly debated when the severe UN arms sanctions would be lifted. Iran, along with Russia and China, argued that these sanctions should be lifted simultaneously with the implementation phase of the JCPOA, while the United States insisted that the sanctions should continue for a period. The final agreement extends the current restrictions on the transfer of heavy weapons to Iran and activities related to ballistic missiles for five and eight years, respectively, and is considered a significant achievement for the United States. - To what extent do current multilateral restrictions affect the development and proliferation of ballistic missiles? Not all ballistic missiles pose equal threats and risks. Ballistic missiles designed to carry a 500-kilogram warhead over a distance of more than 300 kilometers are generally recognized as having the least delivery capability in nuclear weapons. A multilateral regime known as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) monitors the transfer of such systems or related technologies to non-member countries (Iran is not a member). All members of the 1+5 are members of this regime, except for China, which voluntarily adheres to its guidelines. The restrictions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) have not been able to stop Iran's missile program, but they have managed to prevent the development of Iranian solid-fueled ballistic missiles. Additionally, U.S. prohibitions on ballistic missiles, along with UN prohibitions on transferring these missiles to Hezbollah, will remain in place.