Radio Farda's Interview with Researcher on Bin Laden Documents Regarding 'Relations' Between Iran and Al-Qaeda

The Central Intelligence Agency of the United States has released new documents related to the attack on Osama bin Laden's hideout in Pakistan. Part of this documentation, previously reviewed by researchers at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, pertains to the 'relations' between the Islamic Republic and the Al-Qaeda group. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies is a staunch critic of the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the nuclear agreement. In the file released by the CIA, known as the 'Bin Laden File,' 19 pages are dedicated to details of the relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Al-Qaeda, written by a senior member of Al-Qaeda and previously unpublished. The document examines this individual's view of the relationship between Al-Qaeda and Iran, explaining how Iran offered 'everything they needed' to their 'Saudi brothers' in Al-Qaeda. Among the proposals from the Iranian government to Al-Qaeda mentioned in these 19 pages are financial aid, weaponry, and military training in Hezbollah camps by members of this organization for senior Al-Qaeda figures in exchange for attacks on U.S. interests in the region and beyond. At the same time, according to these documents, tensions arose between the two parties at another point in time, leading to the detention of several senior Al-Qaeda members in Iran. Iran has questioned the authenticity of these documents. Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's foreign minister, stated that these documents are 'fake news' and 'selective.' Hamid Baidi-Nejad, Iran's ambassador to the UK, is another official who reacted to these documents, accusing the United States of having created Al-Qaeda itself. Nader Sedighi, a Radio Farda colleague in Washington, conducted an interview with Bill Roggio, one of the two senior researchers at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies who reviewed and studied this file and its attached documents. To what extent are the CIA's claims in the Bin Laden file credible? I believe they are very credible. Look, the 9/11 Commission Report refers to such connections. The State Department and the Treasury Department of the Obama administration pointed out several times how specific Al-Qaeda leaders benefited from and resided in Iran. Iran has also been a provider of needs for the Al-Qaeda network, and there is generally independent information regarding these collaborations, so there is no basis for doubt about the accuracy of the files or the involvement of the U.S. government. What we do in our [research] is to scrutinize the actions of the U.S. government and the reactions of other governments and jihadist organizations and how they operate, and when we delve into these points and observe the actions of the Iranian government, we conclude that the credibility of these claims is indisputable. After 9/11, several Al-Qaeda leaders took refuge in Iran. Although reports indicate they were under surveillance, they were never prosecuted, and some were even involved in conspiracy plots. How could this be possible? Unless there was some sort of deal between [the Iranian government] and Al-Qaeda. The CIA file specifically names two individuals: 'Hamza bin Laden,' the son of Osama bin Laden, whose wedding took place in Iran, although such a ceremony could have been in Pakistan or Afghanistan, and 'Mohammad Islamaboli,' the brother of Khalid Islamaboli, the assassin of former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who, according to the CIA, lived in Iran for a long time after 9/11. How did the CIA know this information in detail? Osama bin Laden was born in March 1957 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He had not held citizenship since 1994 and is the founder of Al-Qaeda. Bin Laden and the group he led were involved in extensive terrorist attacks worldwide, from Tanzania and Kenya to New York in the United States. Hamza bin Laden, his son, has been on the U.S. terrorism list since this year. There is a wedding ceremony of Hamza bin Laden where Mohammad Islamaboli and Suleiman Abu Ghaith are shown, with the former sitting next to [Hamza] bin Laden, along with several others taken after 9/11. Another individual seen in these is someone I am almost certain is 'Saeed bin Laden,' another son of Osama bin Laden and an operational commander [of Al-Qaeda]. Given the timing of these, which dates back to the summer of 2011, before Osama bin Laden's death, and Hamza [bin Laden], his son, and [Mohammad] Islamaboli and Suleiman Abu Ghaith were in Iran, such evidence cannot be easily fabricated. There are two instances of Hamza's wedding. Well, aside from these examples you mentioned, are there other cases that the CIA has not published but you are aware of, and if so, would you like to share some of them with us? Yes, there is information about Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq who was killed by the U.S. in 2006. There is a biography of him in this file that states how Zarqawi was captured in Iran and was allowed to decide what he wanted? And he decided to go to Iraq. I must say that the CIA did not want to publish these documents; my colleague [Thomas Joscelyn from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies] and I struggled with the U.S. government for six years to obtain these documents. Obama administration officials closed the case and said there was no other information in it that would be interesting to the American public. What were the consequences of the cooperation between the Iranian government and Al-Qaeda as the CIA documents state? Were actions taken against U.S. interests in the region or elsewhere? The Foundation for Defense of Democracies is a neoconservative think tank founded in Washington in 2001. This think tank organizes various events and gatherings throughout the year, including providing views and reports to lawmakers, officials, military personnel, and diplomats in the United States. The documents are very credible. The 9/11 Commission stated that seven of the hijackers passed through Iran, and we know that Al-Qaeda fighters did the same, and the example concerning Zarqawi that I mentioned. The [Iranian] government allowed Zarqawi to go from Iran to Iraq, with or without knowledge of his position, which was not a regular fighter but a high commander; the documents also state that Iran asked Zarqawi if he really wanted to go to Iraq? And he replied that yes, he wanted to go to Iraq. Therefore, the Iranian government knew that Zarqawi was going to Iraq to lead operations against the U.S., and there is further documentation that indicates the [Iranian government] supported the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Of course, this was not a romantic relationship between Iran and Al-Qaeda. There was a lot of distrust between the two, but it was an operational relationship. The Iranian government has adhered to these relationships since then, at least as long as Al-Qaeda strikes against U.S. interests anywhere, regionally or globally. And are there other documents indicating the continuation of cooperation between the Iranian government and Al-Qaeda? Absolutely! Until the summer of 2016, the Obama administration provided a list of Al-Qaeda operatives using Iran as a logistical base and focused on the type of cooperation between Al-Qaeda's leadership and the Iranian government to coordinate operations across the region. The U.S. government emphasized last year and still states that Al-Qaeda leaders are conducting their operations from within Iran. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif rejected the publication of this file by the CIA, calling it fake news. I cannot say much about this claim. When a senior official in the repressive Iranian regime, a regime that supports terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and various militias in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, calls this report fake news, I take this as validation and confirmation [of the report]. What is the current state of potential relations, if such relations still exist? We know that Iran continues to allow Al-Qaeda operatives to carry out their activities from within Iran. At the very least, as long as these actions weaken the U.S. in the region, the Iranian government turns a blind eye to their actions. The reality is that to this day, Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Republic of Iran have not attacked each other except in Syria, where they have agreed to disagree. Iran's minimal assistance to Al-Qaeda includes allowing their presence in Iran, fundraising, planning attacks, facilitating the movement of [Al-Qaeda members] in border areas like the borders of Iran with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and possibly financial support and military training.