Rafsanjani, in the Circle of Myth-Making

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is an important politician in the contemporary history of Iran. His significance and influence stem more from the myth-making surrounding him by both supporters and opponents than from his activities and position in the geopolitical landscape and power equations. The reaction and the large volume of articles and analyses published after his death indicate the continuation of these myth-making efforts, showing that his shadow will remain over the political arena of Iran for at least a while longer. His political legacy does have effects on Iran's crisis-ridden politics, but the myth-making will play a larger role on both sides of the aisle. On one side, he is portrayed as a hero, a savior, a symbol of rational politics, the father of the nation, the Amir Kabir of the era, a balancing force, with a record of human rights activism, a defender of the people's demands, and a strong man who managed to keep himself in the power bloc forever. On the other side, some opponents depict him as a constant pillar of the regime, an instigator present in all scenes of post-revolutionary crimes, and a partner of Khamenei's power. One side sees him as a symbol of economic corruption, while the other praises his integrity and commercial genius. Rafsanjani and his close team also welcomed this myth-making and basked in its glory. He had abilities that were average but certainly far beyond those of an ordinary graduate of Qom Seminary. However, the reality is that his continuous presence in the power structure for 38 years, even if significantly weakened in the last decade, was his biggest asset. This continuity, given his powerful history during Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership in Iran's highly unstable political scene, had already set the stage for exaggerated portrayals of him. On the other hand, the longevity of religious despotism and the chaotic political conditions in Iran led to a selection model of choosing the lesser evil, pushing a significant portion of society's forces, out of desperation and hopelessness for liberation from existing dangers, towards the moderates in the government as a bulwark against the advances of the hardliners, which played an important role in strengthening his position in society. It must also be considered that Rafsanjani gradually changed his position, especially after being pushed out of the upper echelons of power. Once a fervent advocate of social justice and leftist economic views, he became a proponent of free-market economics, foreign investment, and joining the global trade network. He distanced himself from initial revolutionary fervor in political and cultural spheres but ultimately preferred the Chinese model, which is based on broad cultural and economic development while keeping political development and changes superficial and limited in governance. Rafsanjani never transcended the fundamental components of the Islamic Republic and the participation of insiders in politics. He did not fully believe in democracy. Until the last moments of his life, especially during the publication of Ayatollah Montazeri's audio file regarding the atrocities of the 1988 executions, he did not hesitate to preserve Khomeini's political legacy. He never critically confronted his past and claimed, falsely and misleadingly, to have always been moderate in his positions. However, his significant changes and especially his variable orientations in the political arena alone suffice to invalidate this claim. Rafsanjani was one of the instigators and custodians of the Islamic Revolution's deviation towards religious despotism. Without his organizational and political capabilities alongside Ayatollah Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti, Ayatollah Khomeini would not have been able to establish the Islamic Republic in its current form. He was a supporter of the authoritarian and Shiite fundamentalist faction during all the critical political moments of the 1980s and significant events of that era. However, he did two important things during those years that provide a fair assessment of his gray record. Despite the incorrect emphasis on continuing the war with Iraq after the liberation of Khorramshahr and inflicting heavy human and material losses, he played an undeniable and important role in ending that devastating war. His unsuccessful efforts to end hostilities with the United States and establish relations were positive and beneficial for the country, although they did not materialize. Rafsanjani was at the height of his power from 1980 to 1988 and was practically considered the second man, but he was not immune from attacks either. If it were not for Khomeini's explicit support in the McFarlane affair, the process of his downfall in the highly unstable political scene of the Islamic Republic might have begun. His presidency coincided with a transitional period of leadership. Part of the myth-making relates to his role in Khamenei's leadership. Initially, Rafsanjani was an advocate for a council-based leadership of the Supreme Leader like Khamenei in the Assembly of Experts, which was not approved despite his repeated voting arrangements. His presidency was tied to a transitional leadership period. Part of the myth-making relates to his role in Khamenei's leadership. Initially, Rafsanjani was an advocate for a council-based leadership of the Supreme Leader like Khamenei in the Assembly of Experts, which was not approved despite his repeated voting arrangements. His recounting of the memory and his confirmation of Khamenei's leadership had an impact. However, he was not the only one recounting that memory; Seyyed Ahmad Khomeini and Abdul Karim Mousavi Ardebili also had similar narratives. Some members of the Assembly of Experts also asked him to recount that memory independently of its accuracy. Under those circumstances, Rafsanjani had no better option than Khamenei, and essentially, in a situation where the council leadership option had been rejected and Ayatollah Montazeri had no opportunity to present himself, it was hard for anyone other than Khamenei to gain the majority support of the Assembly of Experts at the time. Therefore, it is not incorrect to say that the proposal for Khamenei's leadership was a calculated risk for Rafsanjani, especially considering Khamenei's weak power during his presidency and his relatively moderate and reformist history compared to other figures of the Islamic Republic. The years 1988 to 1992, when Rafsanjani's opponents were labeled as 'enemies of the Prophet' by the new ruling faction of the Velayat-e Faqih, marked the end of Rafsanjani's prominence in the top tier of power after the revolution. During that period, there was an urgent division of power among the new power holders, but from the second term of his presidency, it became clear that the top of the power pyramid was unwilling to continue this sharing and wanted to perpetuate the model of political monopolization of the Islamic Republic by sidelining old friends and allies. This perspective was not limited to the leadership; even the right-wing faction, of which Rafsanjani was once a prominent figure, was unwilling to give him five out of thirty seats representing Tehran in the parliament. Encouraging the formation of the Executives of Construction and implicitly supporting Seyyed Mohammad Khatami were his attempts to balance and maintain his position in power, which were more successful due to changes in society. However, the rise of reformists, who blamed him for their exclusion, as well as the emergence of demands that exceeded his capacity and his continued preference for a model of authoritarian governance and prioritizing the interests of the regime over those of the people and the country, led him to confront the reformist movement of Khordad 2. His defeat in the sixth parliamentary elections was another bitter realization for Rafsanjani, as public opinion settled accounts with him this time. Whether during his time in parliament or when he was active in the Pasteur building, Rafsanjani did not have a positive attitude towards political development, human rights standards, and the defense of the people's rights. In many scenes of repression and crime, such as the executions of the 1980s, the extrajudicial executions of 1988, the elimination of critical and opposing political groups, the onset of war, the confrontation with the provisional government, interference in elections, the cultural revolution, and the confrontation with Ayatollah Montazeri and other critical references, he was either present or did not express opposition. In the early years of the revolution, he repeatedly pressured Ayatollah Khomeini to tighten the political atmosphere under the pretext of defending the revolution. However, in some incidents during his presidency, such as the Mykonos affair or the assassination of opponents abroad, the level and extent of his participation and knowledge remain unclear, and claims in this regard oscillate between myth and reality. The desire to be at the forefront of power never left Rafsanjani; since leaving the presidency, he had been thinking about a return. His efforts to lift the two-term presidential limit did not come to fruition. In 2005, he lost the elections to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had once been his governor and provincial governor. In 2009, his support for Mousavi faced strong opposition from Khamenei and significant electoral fraud. However, 2009 was a turning point for Hashemi to restore his position in society. His alignment with the Green Movement, although incomplete and while observing some red lines, weakened his position in the power bloc and cost him the position of Friday prayer leader in Tehran, but he gained social support. This growing social base, a product of elements such as the decline of the reform movement, the failure of the Green Movement, the lack of a vision for structural political changes, the rise of the paradigm of 'conservative reformism,' and the insecurity in the Middle East, made him a popular figure by 2013, bringing him close to a renewed entry into the Pasteur building. However, the shocking red card from the Guardian Council prevented him this time. At the end of his career, he was satisfied that Hassan Rouhani, rather than the principlists, had become president. His last political weighing was the Assembly of Experts elections, where, after failing to get his preferred candidates past the Guardian Council, he managed to secure a good vote in Tehran province. However, ultimately, his position in the Assembly of Experts remained weak, and just as he lost the presidency in the fourth Assembly, he did not achieve it in the fifth Assembly either. He endured a weakened and possibly humiliating position in the power bloc to be able to act on the fateful day. His supporters and defenders also hoped for his role in the post-Khamenei era, and again, various myths were raised about his ability to reform the Supreme Leadership or to elect a like-minded individual. However, he closed his eyes to the world sooner than expected. His death was untimely for moderates and reformists. His absence will pose short-term challenges for them, but it is not irreparable in the medium term. In reality, Rafsanjani could not do anything significant or great for them in practice. His death was untimely for moderates and reformists. His absence will pose short-term challenges for them, but it is not irreparable in the medium term. In reality, Rafsanjani could not do anything significant or great for them in practice. From Rafsanjani's perspective, the timing of his death was appropriate and perhaps the best. He left when he had relative popularity in society. However, given the beginning of the reverse process of declining support for moderates in the political arena and the re-emergence of the deadlock in his proposed political solutions, there was no guarantee that his position in society would not decline. Rafsanjani in 1996 or 1998 could have approached the Rafsanjani of 1997 to 2005, although it was unlikely that he would fall to that degree. In the last years of his life, he was merely a shadow in the power structure. He had no significant or remarkable ability for bargaining and realizing his wishes and plans. The approval of Rouhani's qualifications and the ratification of the JCPOA were realized independently of his role at Khamenei's discretion. His maneuverings had little impact and were mostly reactive. He could not convince the government to approve Hassan Khomeini's qualifications in the Assembly of Experts elections or prevent widespread disqualifications in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections. In the Assembly of Experts, he lost the presidency to Ahmad Jannati. His children went to prison, and he could not even make public the opinions of two judges who reportedly ruled to acquit Mehdi Hashemi. His statements about lifting house arrest and resolving issues of political and ideological prisoners and respecting limited civil rights had no receptive audience in the judiciary and security institutions. His hands were emptier than ever in the IRGC. His only advantage was his connection with traditional and critical clerics, but this relationship was not sufficient to change political equations or provide any limitations for Khamenei's advance. His repeated retreats, inability to achieve success, frequent checkmates by Khamenei, and especially the indirect labeling of him as 'traitor,' intensified media and political attacks from the Velayat-e Faqih, blocked his consultations with officials from Arab countries, revised regional policies, and fully aligned with the dominant power and IRGC in Syria and Yemen, all demonstrate that his hollow and performative presence in power was more a result of the leadership's decisions, which preferred to sideline and weaken him rather than pay the cost of removing an old ally and current rival. Now, the political life file of Rafsanjani is closed, and like any other significant politician, the shadow of his successes and failures weighs on the future of politics in Iran. Although at first glance, it seems that his short-term absence will cause concern for some dissenting forces and may make the transition to democracy more difficult, this perception is also influenced by myth-making. In the last years of his life, Rafsanjani was so weak and powerless that he had no measurable ability to effect change in the political arena. The mentioned consequences are transient and can be compensated.