Rahimi, the System, and Economic Corruption

Principlists and media aligned with security forces are trying to present the final conviction of Mohammad Reza Rahimi, the first vice president of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the tenth government, as a sign of the system's will and particularly as a strength of the judiciary in combating economic corruption and its integrity. At a ceremony held by the Muslim Journalists Association to honor political and media activists involved in condemning Rahimi, awards were given to Alireza Zakani, Ahmad Tavakoli, and Elias Naderan, conveying various messages including: absolving the system from economic corruption and demonstrating a strong will to confront it; the leadership's pioneering role in fighting economic corruption; the judiciary's decisiveness and the cleansing of corruption attributed to the faction loyal to the government and absolute defense of the Supreme Leader; preparing the ground for heavy sentencing in the case of Mehdi Hashemi, Statoil, and Crescent. Now, the question arises whether the outcome of Mohammad Reza Rahimi's case signifies the system's decisiveness in combating economic corruption cases, leading to the system's pride and attributing economic corruption to a part of the negligent officials, or conversely, whether this issue confirms the depth of the intertwining of the Islamic Republic with economic corruption. The relationship between the system and economic corruption can be considered at several levels. First, the legal structure and legal relationships of the system in preventing, discovering, and punishing offenders and violators of public property. The second axis is the weight of offenders among senior managers of the system in terms of quantity and quality. The third relationship is how economic and political corruption are connected. Political corruption, in general, refers to individuals occupying positions for which they do not have the technical, social, and specialized qualifications. It is almost impossible to find a political and governmental system in the current conditions and history that is completely free of corruption among its officials. What distinguishes the position of governments is the level of transparency in performance, the existence of deterrent mechanisms against violations, and the volume and intensity of corruption. Considering the above considerations, the Islamic Republic has a negative record in terms of economic corruption throughout its existence. However, in the 1980s, the least economic corruption occurred among government officials, peaking during Ahmadinejad's presidency. The highest volume of corruption, both quantitatively and qualitatively, emerged during this period in contemporary Iranian history. Since the Supreme Leader has absolute power in the structure of the Islamic Republic and there is no effective oversight over him, the concentration of power and trust in individuals based on ideological commitment makes economic corruption synonymous with the political system based on the rule of the jurist. The practical consequence of this system, regardless of the leaders' agreement or disagreement with corruption or their inclination towards simplicity, will be the promotion of economic corruption. In Rahimi's case, known as the Iran Insurance misconduct case and the active corruption network in the Fatemi building, issues have not been fully clarified, and the nature of the misconduct and its underlying layers remain ambiguous. The limited and drip-feed information from the judiciary, which has so far tried to quietly pass by this case without it being widely reflected in public opinion, reflects a kind of engineered approach. What connects the corruption in this case to the political system is not only the fact that the major embezzler in this case was the first vice president and the second person in the executive branch for four years, but also that the special and unconventional handling of this case has caused embarrassment for the Islamic Republic. The initiation of this case was publicized in late 2009 through Elias Naderan's revelations. The judiciary also stepped in and announced the discovery of significant misconduct in Iran Insurance. However, over the past six years, during which 54 individuals were arrested and interrogated in this case, political considerations have completely dominated it. At one point, Rahimi, while denying the allegations, claimed he was silent for the sake of the leadership. The judiciary also tolerated Rahimi, and eventually, when the tenth government was in a calm descent, Rahimi's case was pursued more seriously, leading to his conviction being issued and confirmed by the Supreme Court. During his tenure as the first vice president, Rahimi enjoyed a kind of immunity and privilege. He was a major suspect in a case where lower-level suspects were arrested from the beginning. Rahimi claims he did not commit embezzlement and only spent 1.2 billion tomans from an individual named Jaber Abdali as assistance for the election campaign expenses of 170 representatives of the eighth parliament. Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, rejecting Rahimi's claim, stated that the root of Rahimi's misconduct was receiving bribes to resolve an issue for someone who had about 60 billion tomans in bank debts. This individual, likely 'D.S.' from the case, claimed in court that Abdali took 12 billion tomans from him on behalf of Rahimi, but the promised arrangements were not fulfilled. He also mentioned 'Morteza Tamaddon' and some forces from the Tehran governorate. The judiciary has not clarified the status of the money that was provided to the majority of principlists in the eighth parliament from the resources of this economic abuse. It is necessary to establish the connection between embezzlements, forgery, and rent-seeking with the funding of parliamentary representatives' campaign expenses, and the funds that were lavishly spent from public assets must be returned. Contrary to the claims of principlists at that time, Rahimi and his team were not only seeking to form a parliament supportive of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's circle. The dominance of Mohammad Reza Bahonar indicates that the dominant faction of principlists and the traditional and clerical-market spectrum were also involved. Rahimi was elected as the secretary of the principlists' election headquarters in a meeting attended by Seyed Mohammad Abtahi, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, and Ali Larijani. Additionally, all 170 representatives claimed to adhere to the leadership and implement his views. The investigation into Rahimi's misconduct was also diverted from its normal course due to the interventions of the leadership and Ahmadinejad's threats, and its outcome was determined after several years of delay. Rahimi's starting point was the right-wing government and principlists. Ahmadinejad's recent positioning and Rahimi's open letter to him also clarified that Rahimi was not part of Ahmadinejad's circle and opposed all his actions that led to a rift with the leadership and principlists. However, Rahimi, until he entered the tenth government, had exaggerated about Ahmadinejad the most. Alireza Zakani and Elias Naderan claim that they became sensitive to Rahimi's misconduct since 2004 and therefore opposed his presidency over the Court of Audit. Zakani goes further, stating that Rahimi's presidency was the result of intervention by Mehdi Karroubi and the votes of reformist representatives. This claim does not align with the facts. In the seventh parliament, the total number of reformist seats and aligned forces did not exceed 55. Rahimi became the head of the Court of Audit with 226 votes, which was due to the explicit support of the majority of principlists. Zakani's false and contradictory claim becomes more apparent when he and his allies were willing to remain silent in the face of the presidency of someone they considered corrupt. They only seriously pursued Rahimi's case when Ahmadinejad began a new path distancing himself from the leadership and principlists defending the third of Tir discourse. There are significant signs and indications that could validate Rahimi's claim that he has been caught in Ahmadinejad's trap. The misconduct in the Iran Insurance case is not the only example of misconduct in the judiciary's archives. There are many stagnant cases of misconduct and abuses by governmental and ruling officials that have not been seriously addressed so far. Ahmad Tavakoli himself is under suspicion of exploiting his political position for illicit financial gain. Currently, Rahimi's sentence has not yet been executed. His final confrontation and Ahmadinejad's reaction in absolving himself have complicated the political dimensions of the case. It was expected that Rahimi would engage more with the judiciary, but currently, he has shown a greater inclination to confront Ahmadinejad. This confrontation may stem from the reality that Rahimi knows that the essence of economic and financial misconduct by senior officials in the Islamic Republic does not lead to entrapment and punishment, but rather being in a politically incompatible position with the will of the dominant power is problematic. In fact, the approach to economic corruption in the Islamic Republic and its appointed sections is instrumental and political. Therefore, he sees his conviction not as a result of the extreme principlists and the judiciary's officials, but rather blames Ahmadinejad and his provocations.