Raisi at the Level of the Judiciary of the Islamic Republic

Ebrahim Raisi replaced Sadegh Amoli Larijani in the last days of the year 1397 (2018) after Larijani left the judiciary almost six months before the end of his traditional 10-year term and took the chair of the Expediency Discernment Council. In recent weeks, extensive discussions have taken place in the public sphere of Iran regarding this appointment and its political and judicial implications. The shift in stance of Hassan Rouhani and some reformists, as well as their welcoming of Raisi's presidency, has also formed another aspect of the discussions. This note attempts to show that although the appointment of a person with Raisi's background at the head of modern judiciary in Iran, founded by Ali Akbar Davar, is disastrous, it is a natural choice consistent with the judiciary of the Islamic Republic. It will also be explained why he cannot bring about a change in the dire conditions of the judiciary in the country: Reformists and Raisi; from the 'Execution Ayatollah' to the 'Well-Dressed Cleric'. Ebrahim Raisi has been elevated and grown in the dominant and main power sector of the judiciary. This sector initially took control and management of the judiciary with the injection of judges from among the students and graduates of revolutionary seminaries who defended Ayatollah Khomeini, merging religion and state, and holding a negative view of modern judiciary in Iran while attempting to return to the traditional paradigm in the early months of the Islamic Republic's life. Later, in organizational connection with the institution of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist outside the legal and apparent frameworks of the judiciary, it took over the management of sensitive cases and reduced this power to a tool for legally legitimizing security confrontations and maintaining a climate of repression and a closed political and cultural space. The judiciary's dependence on the institution of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, apart from its roots in the constitution and the legal powers of the leader, is also somewhat dependent on the presence of specific managers and officials who advocate for the extralegal interventions of the Guardian Jurist and the formation of special judicial branches to overlook legal limitations in order to implement the political, economic, and security projects of the political system. These individuals are also indifferent to ethical and moral standards and do not hesitate to act with cruelty and ruthlessness. Although Raisi did not study at the Haqqani School before the revolution, due to the connections he established with the revolutionary clergy and participation in classes taught by instructors such as Ayatollahs Morteza Motahhari, Ali Meshkini, and Hossein Noori Hamadani, he was selected among students trained by Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti to meet the management needs of the regime in the Islamic Republic Party. This event laid the groundwork for Raisi's rise in the power bloc, and he adapted himself to the needs of the dominant power sector to ascend the ladder of promotion. Belief in Shia Islamic fundamentalism, ideologically based traditionalism rooted in Imamiyah jurisprudence, political authoritarianism, and the theory of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist made him a suitable option for the political current known as the Imam Line in the post-revolutionary period. His presence in the cities of Masjed Soleiman and Shahroud and his confrontations with political opponents and dissidents, as well as organizing ideological sections in military barracks, prepared him for managerial positions in the judiciary. From the time he took on the role of a prosecutor in Karaj County in 1359 (1980) by the order of Ayatollah Ali Qodusi until 1394 (2015) when he left the position of Attorney General to take over the management of the Astan Quds Razavi, he consistently aligned himself with the demands of the power bloc, particularly the leadership office. In the major crime of the 1988 executions, in which Seyyed Ahmad Khomeini played a significant role in organizing, Raisi was one of the most extreme executive agents. During Khamenei's leadership, when part of the expectations from the judiciary was focused on strict action in purging the regime's officials according to the second Guardian Jurist's plan and marginalizing the left faction of the regime, he actively participated in this project and proved his loyalty to the right faction and later to the new principlists and the new leadership of the IRGC, allowing him to hold important responsibilities during the presidencies of Sheikh Mohammad Yazdi, Seyyed Mahmoud Shahroudi, and Sadegh Larijani, eventually rising to the position of the second highest in the judiciary. The belief in the lack of independence of the judiciary and its real and legal dependence on the institution of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, obedience and support for Khamenei's absolute rule, maximum violence against opponents and dissidents, and the belief in maintaining the classic and orthodox face of the Islamic Republic are the main reasons for his rise in political power, which now includes not only the presidency of one of the three branches of government but also the first vice president of the Assembly of Experts and the prosecutor of the Special Court for Clergy. It is expected that he will soon step down from the management of Astan Quds Razavi. Therefore, Raisi is the only head among the heads of the judiciary in the Islamic Republic who has a continuous 39-year activity record and has followed a steady path of growth without ups and downs, being one of the constant players in the regime's repressive structure. He is part of the main power sector of the Islamic Republic's judiciary, which holds an unwavering belief in the necessity of basing the judiciary's legal foundations on Sharia rulings and opposing modernity. This sector, centered around Ayatollah Beheshti, despite the opposition of some revolutionary jurists and judges, altered the judiciary structure that had been shaped by Ali Akbar Davar's reforms and revived traditional relations based on 'Dukeh al-Qaza' to some extent. Thus, Raisi is the closest individual who represents the reality of the Islamic Republic's judiciary both theoretically and practically, revealing the severity of its violence and injustice. This reality fundamentally illustrates the plight of the judiciary in Iran. Judicial reform in Iran, similar to the time when Davar became the Minister of Justice, requires revolutionary action and the dissolution of the existing judiciary and fundamental changes in the political power structure: Views: The Outlook of Ebrahim Raisi's Presidency over the Judiciary. However, statements have been made regarding the advantages of Raisi's presidency during this period, which are both mythical and call into question the moral credibility of those making these statements among lawyers, statesmen, and political congressmen. There is almost a consensus among politicians and legal experts that the judiciary has not only not emerged from the ruinous state described by Seyyed Mahmoud Shahroudi in 1378 (1999) but has also regressed. Raisi has been a senior manager in the judiciary for the past two decades, and this chaotic situation, which has even provoked protests from some so-called loyalist forces and has exhausted the entire society with its maze of inefficiency, corruption, and injustice, is the product of the performance of managers like Ebrahim Raisi. He has belonged to the power sector during his tenure and has had extensive authority. Now, what transformation can he bring about? Raisi referred to the leadership decree as the charter of the judiciary in his inauguration ceremony! Naturally, from this perspective, judicial transformation does not emerge, and his selection should be seen as a message indicating the preservation of conservatism in the judiciary. Raisi's background, current positions, and political connections indicate that there will be no change in the judiciary's approach to providing legal and judicial cover for the systematic and continuous suppression of human rights. Of course, he may not be able to implement some of his past actions due to changing conditions and times, but it is naive to think that the judiciary will change its position in support of the hot and violent policy! The scope and level of violations of citizens' rights may even expand. During the 96 presidential election and especially during the debates, he showed that he is weak in managerial ability and understanding of issues. Some have claimed that due to Raisi's background in the Inspection Organization, he could be effective in combating corruption! Given the systematic nature of corruption in Iran, its rampant nature, and its extensive scope and depth, there is little room left for the credibility of this claim. In this situation, the personal integrity of someone whose financial health has not yet been verified is not very effective. Raisi's presidency over the Audit Organization did not lead to a significant reduction in corruption either. Additionally, important reports from the Inspection Organization that led to the formation of legal cases during his presidency, such as the Export Bank embezzlement, corruption in Tehran Municipality, and Shahram Jazayeri, had significant political ramifications. On the other hand, it should be noted that during the previous heads of the judiciary, some were also tried and executed on charges of economic corruption, and these actions and widespread punishment sentences did not stop the increasing trend of economic corruption. The core of economic corruption lies within the political system and its disruptive functions. Raisi himself belongs to this core. The only difference in his presidency in this area could be the expansion of confrontations with reformist forces within the system based on economic corruption cases, which will victimize reformists and moderates. Overall, although Raisi's presidency over the judiciary is an unpleasant event, it also well reflects the dire reality of this institution and the necessity for its surgical intervention. At the same time, it should be noted that previous heads did not differ significantly from him. Dependence on the institution of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, from a realistic perspective, does not allow for meaningful change, whether positive or negative. Of course, politically, especially in terms of mocking the people's choice in 94 (2015) and those who are pursuing justice for the crimes for which Raisi has direct and indirect responsibility, it is like pouring salt on a wound.