The case of the 2017 presidential election has concluded; Rouhani emerged victorious while his rivals were left unsuccessful. However, the story of Ebrahim Raisi, the main standard-bearer of the conservatives in the election, remains significant despite his defeat. This narrative seems to be connected to the issue of succession for the second leader of the Islamic Republic, positioning Raisi as a suitable candidate. Regardless of what Saeed Jalili, Raisi's senior companion, has expressed about forming a 'shadow government' and maintaining the potential of Raisi's 16 million supporters after the election results were finalized, last week two security news agencies affiliated with the IRGC (Fars and Tasnim) conducted a joint interview with the unsuccessful candidate, which contained important themes. Furthermore, in continuation of Raisi's media presence and highlighting him, some media outlets aligned with Raisi have republished news and photos of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces meeting with the custodian of the Astan Quds Razavi. These events cannot be overlooked from the perspective of the projects and outlooks of power factions. Raisi is not the only candidate for the succession of the Supreme Leader, but it can be confidently stated that despite his failure in the presidential election, he remains one of the prominent options in this regard from the viewpoint of certain power factions. A few weeks after the presidential election results were announced, coinciding with rumors about Raisi potentially leading the Expediency Discernment Council, the two IRGC-affiliated news agencies (Tasnim and Fars) engaged in a joint interview to promote Raisi again and republish his latest positions. The very act of conducting a joint interview by these two agencies is significant and noteworthy, and some of their questions also carry meaningful judgment and content. For instance, they ask Raisi about creating a 'shadow government' and its 'mechanism,' and beyond that, they inquire: 'Do you intend to unify influential figures of the conservative camp under your umbrella?' In other words, from the perspective of these two security agencies, Raisi is assessed to have the potential to gather influential forces of the conservative camp 'under his umbrella.' Aside from these points, Raisi in this interview expresses sharp criticisms of Rouhani's biases and views. He accuses the president of believing that 'the only way to survive is to pay attention to the will of foreigners' and attempts to convert 'revolutionary thought and spirit into despair, and the Islamic Revolution into a marginal entity absorbed in the new global order.' In addition to Raisi's repeated criticisms of Rouhani and his efforts to justify and explain the reasons for his electoral defeat, another noteworthy point in this interview is Raisi's expressed attention to the urban middle class. He also attempts once again to justify his meeting with the controversial singer 'Amir Tataloo.' In this context, he describes 'removing societal fears regarding the revolutionary current' as 'one of the most important future missions.' Moreover, while emphasizing his 16 million votes, he tries to present a non-partisan image of himself, claiming: 'I define myself outside these narrow and exclusive circles (political classifications).' Regardless of Raisi's positions, the reality that occurred in the May 29, 2017 election was that he and his supporters garnered about 38% of the votes. These supporters included a diverse range of conservatives politically and discontented individuals socially regarding the economic situation and the record of the moderate government. As a result of this support, not only did a significant minority emerge, but Raisi also rose as the 'Sayyid of the Underprivileged' and increased his prominence in society. This situation seems to encourage some security factions supporting Raisi to continue backing him and promoting his views. The struggle for the succession of the Supreme Leader has begun, both overtly and covertly, and manifests itself in various domains; the various pressures against Rouhani—who himself is considered one of the important succession options—can be evaluated from this perspective. Based on such assessments, the media propaganda of Raisi's supporters and the efforts of his supporting factions to maintain his political-social presence become comprehensible. Raisi's supporters in the political power structure do not want to easily relinquish the 'social capital' organized in the previous elections and the 'constructed image.' Thus, while reflecting news of Raisi's meetings, his positions are republished and highlighted, and he remains prominent not as a defeated candidate in the elections but as a significant political figure. As a few new examples just in the current month of Tir, one can refer to the following: - Meeting with members of the National Security Commission of the Parliament, and commenting on issues such as 'national security,' 'defenders of the shrine,' and 'missile activities'; - Meeting with Ammar Hakim, head of the National Alliance of Iraq, and discussing regional issues; - Meeting with members of the Education and Research Commission of the Parliament, and commenting on the relationship between the government and culture, development, and economy; - And the latest news, meeting with Major General Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. The volume of these meetings and their reflection in the media does not correspond to the legal status of 'the custodian of the Astan Quds Razavi.' What positions Raisi holds in the context of these meetings and their news is a project defined for him; a project that did not end with the presidential election. It should not be forgotten that Raisi's candidacy in the elections and the support of a diverse range of conservatives with him have provided him with a different recognition and status compared to a few months ago. Although from another perspective, his candidacy in the last elections opened the door to sharp criticisms against him in various areas (from the mass execution of opponents in 1988 to his promotional meeting with Tataloo), and made the majority of society sensitive to his background and views. Although Rouhani's victory in the 2017 presidential election dealt a serious blow to the projects of the security factions supporting Raisi, evidence shows that the tale of the unsuccessful conservative candidate remains.
Raisi: The 'Tale' Remains
Ebrahim Raisi, despite his defeat in the 2017 presidential election, continues to be a significant figure in Iranian politics, with ongoing media support and speculation about his potential role in the succession of the Supreme Leader. His recent interviews and public engagements suggest that he is positioning himself as a key player within the conservative faction, aiming to unify supporters and maintain his political relevance.
👥 Key Players
⚡ Actions
📰 What Happened
Ebrahim Raisi remains a significant figure in Iranian politics despite his 2017 electoral defeat.
- IRGC-affiliated news agencies interview Ebrahim Raisi
- Ebrahim Raisi criticize Hassan Rouhani
- Raisi's supporters promote Ebrahim Raisi
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
Raisi remains a key player in the succession narrative for the Supreme Leader despite his electoral defeat.
📝 Key Evidence
🏷️ Entities Mentioned
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%