Reactions to the Call for 'National Dialogue' by the Motalefeh Party Ahead of Elections

Four months remain until the elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts in Iran. The conservative camp on one side and the moderate and reformist tendencies on the other are each trying in their own way to increase their supporters by forming gatherings and meetings, creating new organizations, strengthening old ones, and establishing coordination councils. The latest pre-election event is the call by the old Islamic Motalefeh Party for a 'national dialogue.' So far, the newly established reformist party 'Neday Iranians' has welcomed this call. At the same time, independent figures and groups without parties or whose activities have been suspended or banned view such a dialogue as a limited conversation between the dominant and defeated factions of the Islamic Republic of Iran rather than a genuine national dialogue. We are with you with these questions: What is the function of what is called 'national dialogue' four months before the upcoming elections? Does the method and strategy that government factions are using to gather support increase their chances of receiving more votes? How do independent, non-organized, and excluded tendencies view the electoral atmosphere in Iran? And finally, what role does public opinion play in this competition? This week's guests on the program include Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari, a member of the central council of the reformist 'Etemad-e Melli' party in Mashhad, Nasser Zarafshan, an independent political activist and lawyer in Tehran, and Saeed Barzin, a political analyst in London. The invitation of the 'Motalefeh Party' to a 'national dialogue' from the perspective of Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari, Nasser Zarafshan, and Saeed Barzin. Mr. Javadi Hesari, with four months left until the parliamentary elections, the Motalefeh Party has now called for a 'national dialogue.' So far, the relatively newly established reformist party 'Neday Iranians' has welcomed this call. It has been said that the increasing rift between conservatives and reformists led to a bipolar atmosphere before the 2009 elections and the emergence of protests and conflicts following the announcement of the results. Is the proposal for a 'national dialogue' an effort to prevent a similar situation in the upcoming elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, or not? Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari: I think this could be one aspect of it. It can certainly help moderate the different currents in the country, including conservatives and reformists. However, in the first part, I cannot fully agree with you. Because I believe that during that period, not all conservatives thought that way, nor did they think that the team of Mr. Ahmadinejad wanted to polarize society and take advantage of this so-called struggle of right and wrong for their own benefit. A large part of conservatives and prominent conservative figures did not accompany the movement that they called sedition. For this reason, they were accused of being silent during the sedition. In my opinion, the wise people of the right realized that they were played in that affair and wasted a significant part of the country's capital on the illusions and fantasies that Mr. Ahmadinejad created for them. Now, to prevent that incident and the repetition of similar cases, they can engage in dialogue. More importantly, I think it is a national discourse for newer approaches for constructive interaction among all factions. The reality is that in the Islamic Republic, everyone has come to the conclusion that none of the factions can be eliminated. Rather, they must interact with each other based on their commonalities. Neither the conservative current can be completely eliminated nor the reformist current. They have roots in the essence of the revolution and share many similarities in the ideals and revolutionary dialogues, and therefore cannot be eliminated. This dialogue can be more focused on this matter. Mr. Zarafshan, this proposal for a 'national dialogue' also reminds us of the extensive correspondence between the then-secretaries of the Motalefeh Party and the Participation Front during Mohammad Khatami's second presidential term. Can such actions, given that history, prevent the polarization of the political atmosphere of society in these four months leading up to the elections? Is the likelihood of polarization greater or the likelihood of interaction among these factions? Nasser Zarafshan: I do not understand at all what the Motalefeh Party or, as they say, the Motalefeh Party has to do with a 'national dialogue.' When we talk about 'national dialogue,' it implicitly means that the Motalefeh Party itself must be one side of this dialogue. Mr. Javadi Hesari also mentioned that factions have come to the conclusion that none of them can be eliminated and must coexist. Very well. All this story is limited to the power structure. In this discussion we are having now, I want to know what role the people play. The Motalefeh has no connection to a 'national dialogue.' If a 'national dialogue' is to take place in Iran, the Motalefeh has no place in it. The second Khordad people are also part of the current government. Their dispute, without any pretense, is about how much of the power cake they should have. They say our share of this cake should be more than this. But the people's issue is not that. Although the protest force of their struggles is always used by the factions of power for their own reckoning, the factions of power only remember the people's interests when they have disagreements with each other. For this reason, we have always seen both sides of the dispute sometimes revealing parts of what they know about each other, of course with a calculated dose that benefits them in their reckoning. For example, Mr. Rouhani, in the election debates when confronting Mr. Qalibaf, referred to Mr. Qalibaf's role and his plan in dealing with students on July 18 and used this issue for his own election, but at that moment, if we remember, he added that there are many secrets in this chest that I do not want to disclose. For this reason, the people really do not trust either of these two factions. I am not saying they will not participate in the game. They also want to take advantage of the differences between these two factions, and in fact, we are facing a two-sided game. One side is the main and grand game, and the other side is the people who try to use the differences of the ruling factions, especially at times when these differences become acute, and the other side is the government with both of its factions, each trying to use the people's force to increase their share in the power dispute. In the course of the 2009 struggles, a reality emerged that is before us. This emergence, due to its two important characteristics, is worth contemplation and pause regarding the current situation of these four or five months. The lessons that can be learned from it are lessons related to this society and stem from the characteristics of this society. One of these two characteristics is that the events of 2009 are a reality. Mistaking one's demands and illusions for reality is not the case. Because it is objective and real, it prevents us from falling into abstract mental generalizations that will never happen. Its second characteristic is that it is the closest major emergence to our current society. It carries the latest changes and the effects of changes that have occurred in our society. In terms of time, it is the closest real example to today. For this reason, what is happening between the Motalefeh and other parties is not a 'national dialogue.' Mr. Barzin, is there a possibility for interaction to ensure stability before the elections or not? What do you think about the statements of Mr. Zarafshan and Mr. Javadi Hesari? Saeed Barzin: In my opinion, there is a serious opportunity, but it depends on the skill of political groups inside and outside the system. A new discourse is taking shape that I call 'electoral stability.' This discourse has two elements: one is political stability and the other is the electoral process. In this sense, it can be interpreted that the government wants stability. It wants continuity. It wants firmness. And on the other hand, the government needs the people's votes for the people to come and vote and be present at the ballot box. This becomes an opportunity for a dialogue or a deal between the two sides, namely the nation and the government. Regarding Mr. Zarafshan's remarks, there is now an opportunity for forces outside the system to clarify public demands. A real program. Considering the current realities. Outside of ideological generalizations and real possibilities. A program that is not a fantasy, such as the human rights charter, the inter-parliamentary charter, etc. Let's clarify public demands now, encourage party activity, union activity, the women's movement, so that the government is not afraid. That is, the expectation that you will open the space and we will create chaos, create disorder, cannot be a program for the government to engage in dialogue with. I also want to point out Mr. Javadi Hesari's remarks. There is currently a program for dialogue with conservative forces, with moderate forces, and with the silent seditionists. But we must talk to someone who does not think like us. Right now, what encouragement have the reformist political parties made for this dialogue with the hardliners? There are only four months left. We have learned a great lesson from the nuclear agreement, which is that it is possible to negotiate and dialogue and somehow meet the interests of both sides. Now the initiative is in the hands of the Motalefeh Party and the Neda Party, which said this 'national dialogue' is useful. I think other reformist parties should join this movement. Let's see what Mr. Javadi Hesari says. But Mr. Javadi Hesari, I want to ask another question. It has been suggested that reformists and moderates organize more or less based on organizations and parties, while conservatives gather around prominent figures or circles. Is this assessment correct or not? Mohammad Sadegh Javadi Hesari: Of course, this is a mindset, and in my opinion, it is not a reality. In the political sphere, unfortunately, we are not very willing to accept the realities and predictions. If you allow me, I would like to at least mention part of Mr. Zarafshan's remarks that were directed at reformists, that reformists are seeking to reform the structure of the Islamic Republic and not to overthrow it. Therefore, they pursue dialogue with the government and within the government, and in the sense that he says the two factions of the government are against the people, I think this is a subjective interpretation far from reality. With all due respect to Mr. Zarafshan, I must say that this is very far from reality. If we even poll the Iranian society statistically, at least 15 to 20 percent of the votes always belong to conservatives, and 20 to 25 percent of the votes always belong to reformists. Back then, when there was relative freedom with 80 to 75 percent participation, this ratio of votes was maintained. If we consider the government separate from these 70 to 80 percent or 50 to 60 percent of votes, there are sections that do not have the right to vote. I do not know what criteria dear Mr. Zarafshan uses to lump everyone together and say that people are either on the right or on the left and therefore are part of the government, and if they are not, they are against it. Such approaches are somewhat subjective and not real. Mr. Khatami, who received 22 million votes, or in the last elections, both factions of the country participated in 2009 and received a high vote. But the deviations that occurred in the elections led to misunderstandings and electoral misconduct, if we can control these, the reformist faction and the conservative faction have serious theoretical differences with each other, but that does not mean that either of them seeks to eliminate the other at any cost, even through revolution. No. We believe, as reformists, that we want to have democratic behavior and give our opponents the right to vote and the right to act. If there are places where they did not do this, we criticized them that you should not take away the possibility of healthy competition from society with legal or extra-legal means. Like the supervisory oversight or the kind of selective practices that have been done, you come and close the door for elites to enter the management sphere of the country and manage the country with a specific interpretation. They have gone that way, and often they have, but ultimately they have come to the conclusion that they cannot completely eliminate the rival current, which is reformists, and whose basis is democratic behavior. Therefore, we have no choice but to engage in dialogue with these types of people. We must go to people like, for example, Larijani or the Islamic Motalefeh Party and then go to other influential figures in the government. Our access to Mr. Khamenei, the leader of the revolution, is very limited. Or a mentality has been created for them that they may not easily accept us. But we can establish an interaction with these actors who are trusted in this area, which can lead to some openings.