Reasons Behind the Decline of Erdogan's Party in Turkey's Political Competition

As the early elections in Turkey approach on November 1, analysts and political experts are once again focusing on the current situation in Turkey. What is particularly noteworthy ahead of the elections is understanding the reasons behind the decline in votes for the Justice and Development Party (AKP). This party, during its first seven years of power, which is referred to as a period of gaining experience and political skill, managed to earn the support and favor of the Turkish people due to its consistent political will. It is evident that the lack of a clear political program from the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), along with their insistence on outdated slogans and a decline in public credibility and support, led to the political success of the newly established AKP. Additionally, the implementation of the 'electoral vote barrier' which could determine entry into parliament was another factor contributing to the AKP's success. However, the Erdogan party suddenly faced a decline of more than 10% in public votes during the June 7 elections! The MAK polling and statistical institute, recognized as close to the Erdogan government among three other reputable polling institutes in Turkey, announced on September 21 that the AKP's votes had decreased by another 9%. In southeastern and eastern Turkey, the statistics indicate a reduction of over 32%, while the number of supporters for the People's Democratic Party (HDP) has increased, suggesting that the HDP could secure over 50% of the votes in these regions. The AKP, which has been considered a developed party model since 2002 and was hopeful in achieving its goals by 2023, now faces serious challenges. What could be the reasons for this? Has Erdogan's unilateral approach led to this reality, or have there been shortcomings in the government's executive policies that have forced the people to turn away from this party? As this issue has drawn the attention of political experts, it has also compelled the foundational thinkers of the AKP to reflect deeply. The first reflection of this issue can be seen in the removal of several elected representatives from the previous elections from the new candidate list for the upcoming November elections, who had caused trouble for the party. Meanwhile, Erdogan himself revealed his change in political approach in a conversation with reporters on Eid al-Adha, announcing his absence from future election campaigns. A brief look at the performance and power transition process within the AKP allows for near-certain speculation about the decline in the party's votes. A) Emergence of tensions and internal party disputes: The first major reason for the AKP's regression was articulated by Bulent Arinc last week. He was previously a founding member of the AKP and has held various roles such as Deputy Prime Minister, presidential advisor, government minister, and government spokesperson over the years. In a live interview on one of Turkey's official television channels, Bulent Arinc stated that the AKP has shifted from a 'we' management style to an 'I' management style. He implicitly revealed that the party is being run by Erdogan's unilateral demands, leading to internal party tensions. Notably, during the 14th annual congress of the AKP held in Ankara in early September, the absence of prominent figures such as Abdullah Gul, Bulent Arinc, and several founding and former officials of the party was evident. This indicates that serious political-party divorces are occurring within the party after Abdul Latif Sener. B) Ignoring historical mistakes during the political tenure: The AKP, with its successive successes, became politically intoxicated. It came to believe that the public's perspective aligned with its party origins, and the opposition from various parties regarding the AKP's political mistakes could only be seen as projection. In this context, the economic corruption of four ministers in the previous cabinet and their collaboration with Reza Zarrab, an Iranian-Turkish investor, alongside the discovery of money laundering by the Halkbank and the collusion in municipal tenders and contracts, led to public attention being drawn to the failure to achieve social justice and equality in the government. A society that, on the brink of the modern age, still hoped to escape political-social inequality through military coups faced the exoneration of guilty ministers like Egemen Bagis and Zafer Caglayan, while military commanders were imprisoned for various reasons such as the Balyoz and Ergenekon operations. Alongside this, the frequent changes in political views of the party, especially Erdogan's regarding foreign policy (issues in Syria and Iraq, support for ISIS) and domestic policy (changes in the educational system, creating conflict with the Fethullah Gülen front), and insistence on a male-dominated policy structure led the people to feel marginalized and unimportant in the AKP's perspective. Furthermore, the enrichment of party affiliates and the creation of class divides among the middle class, rising unemployment, neglect of hiring exam results, preference for nepotism, a mere 3% salary increase for employees and workers against over 10% inflation, disregard for the rights of victims in the Zonguldak coal mine disaster, oil smuggling benefiting ISIS, and the transfer of weapons via trucks to Syria are among the issues that can be highlighted. C) Political-social restrictions and civil liberties conditions: Erdogan, having achieved 52% in the presidential election, assumed absolute support from the majority of the people in realizing his policies and views, hastening the transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system. His insistence on this transition became one of the main points of contention between his party and other parties. In this context, the HDP paid the price for opposing the presidential system in the lead-up to the June 7 elections, and Erdogan shelved the issue of resolving the Kurdish crisis and the reconciliation process. This led to ethnic tensions between Turks and Kurds and also fostered religious distinctions between Sunni and Alevi communities. Meanwhile, those protesting these issues were labeled as terrorists or foreign agents, and intellectuals and journalists have suffered from severe social-political restrictions since the Gezi Park protests. Alongside these, the use of harsh language instead of conciliatory tones, threats instead of encouragement, and unilateralism instead of public participation have distanced people from the AKP. Additionally, interference in election rallies and obstruction of coalition government formation should not be overlooked.