Reasons Behind the Destruction of the Sunni Prayer House

As the region surrounding our country burns in the flames of religious sectarianism, why is a Sunni prayer house being destroyed in Tehran? While many border provinces that share borders with Sunni countries suffer from religious (and economic, etc.) discrimination and are sensitive to it, why is the prayer house of our Sunni compatriots in the capital of a predominantly Shia country being destroyed? While the President has recently traveled to Kurdistan and calls for unity, facing complaints and protests regarding the inability of Sunnis to hold certain not-so-important positions in the country, and attempts to resolve issues and outline a brighter horizon, why are Sunnis in Tehran suddenly witnessing the destruction of their prayer house? While some anti-Sunni sectarian media are being shut down by Iranian security officials amid (or at least under the pretext of) rising sectarian tensions in the region, with the approval of the Supreme Leader, the call to prayer of Sunnis is allowed to be broadcast by official media in some areas, or after decades of delay, the teaching of the mother tongue in schools in Kurdistan is granted permission at certain levels and times, or the establishment of a Kurdish language unit at the university level, which was previously shelved during the reform period, is now back on the agenda, creating joy and hope among Sunnis who still do not have permission to establish a mosque in the capital of the Islamic world's Um al-Qura, the destruction of a tolerated prayer house is being toyed with. Why is this happening? The timing of this inhumane act coinciding with Hassan Rouhani's trip to Kurdistan leaves no doubt that this act is a form of defiance against the government by some obstructive elements. This, of course, is a familiar tradition in political rivalries in the Islamic Republic (like some other countries devoid of loud claims of morality and religion) where internal political rivalries transcend the boundaries of national interests and benefits. (Internal political rivalries during the height of the Iran-Iraq war are a prime example, and the destruction of the nuclear agreement at any cost is a more recent instance of this). But at what cost and by whom is this obstruction taking place? The history of political maneuvering within the power structure has shown that the price is not very important! But by whom? Apparently, this act was carried out by municipal agents (as executors) with the collaboration and participation of some police and security officials. It is true that the mayor of Tehran is an electoral rival of the current president, but the security importance and consequences of this act are so high that no one, especially someone with the political and security background of the mayor of Tehran, would risk such an act and jeopardize their position. The presence of some security officials also indicates that there is a significant background to this issue (just as the installation of billboards by the municipality that openly opposes the official foreign policy of the country in nuclear negotiations indicates the same supporters and reliable background). It has not been reported who the police forces, especially the security ones, accompanying the municipal demolition agents were and from where they received orders, but uncovering the truth of the matter and the institution and superior individuals who made this highly security-related decision, which has both domestic and regional (and even global) security implications, should not be too difficult for the government, whose Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Intelligence are at least officially responsible for managing the country's police and security forces. Aside from clarifying the institution or individuals making the decision and commanding the demolition operation, what is important is why such a risky decision was made and what its cause is? The initial questions of this discussion also become significant here. Some reasons and causes that can be imagined in this regard are that some behind-the-scenes elements, as the president said, have stepped into the field of action in the destruction of the government from the think tank, simultaneously with the president's trip to Kurdistan, taking another practical step to undermine the government's policies to discourage the hopes of religious, ethnic, and linguistic minorities in the government. This is something they do in other areas as well. The strange rise in execution statistics during the new government by the judicial system (and unfortunately sometimes under the guidance of the security apparatus, which is also under the government's responsibility) is a sign of this policy, both to send a message to the world that the government in Iran does not hold the upper hand and to convey a message of defeat and hopelessness internally that nothing has changed and the established power acts more strongly than before. "Don't let your guard down!" (This is a common behavior in the "lumpen rationality" prevailing in the powerful security-military faction in the country, which deserves further discussion). Aside from this proximate (apparent and close) cause, there are also more distant (deeper and less apparent) causes that can be imagined, including the sectarian dogmatism in a small but powerful segment behind the scenes of the religious power structure in Iran that exists among some high-ranking clerics. Some of these are within and many more are outside the official political power structure in Iran, and at specific and significant moments in the post-revolutionary history, they have been able to exert significant influence from behind the scenes. The addition of the principle of being Shia as one of the conditions for becoming president in the constitution at the very beginning prevented Sunni compatriots from holding important and public positions, and threats of shrouding and street confrontation if one of the Sunnis (Mr. Jalali-Zadeh) even became a secretary in the board of directors of the sixth parliament, and finally, the dogmatic display of power in preventing the screening of the multinational and costly film "Resurrection" due to the portrayal of one of the sons of Shia Imams, and numerous other examples indicate this influential factor that could also have impacted this decision-making. However, the position of the World Assembly for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought against this act and its condemnation indicates the sensitivity and seriousness of this act at a time when sectarian wars have a highly security-related nature due to intensified sectarian conflicts. Now, the decision-makers of this action, who cannot be at the lower layers of power and due to the security repercussions of this act likely stem from security institutions, especially from powerful individuals within them, are certainly aware of these security matters; so what higher interest have they considered that they have made such a risky decision? From a security perspective, of course, the "security" of the rulers (not the people) and according to their security indicators (not rational and national indicators) can also suggest another reason and cause: There is no precise figure for the population of Sunni compatriots in Iran. This issue is even more pronounced regarding the Sunni population in the capital, the metropolis of Tehran. Various numbers are mentioned in this regard, ranging from several hundred thousand to even figures that approach a million. The significant migration of Sunni compatriots, especially from the western part of the country to the capital, is a noticeable phenomenon. Their extensive presence in various occupations, from simple laborers to employees and sellers, and also the presence of some Kurdish investors in the capital who are not averse to employing Kurdish workers, and subsequently the migration of their families to the capital, in addition to the migration of other Sunni compatriots from different Iranian ethnic groups, has added to this population. (We have witnessed a smaller example of this phenomenon in Golestan province, where Zabolis and Baluchs have widely migrated to this province for employment, to the extent that it has even affected the composition of the city council members in some important cities of this province). Some manifestations of religious behavior indicate that adherence to religious rituals and practices among Sunni compatriots is quite pronounced and reportedly exceeds the national average. Now, in the capital of a Shia country claiming to be the Um al-Qura of the Islamic world, if permission is granted for the establishment of a mosque and even for the unobstructed and low-risk performance of congregational prayers for Sunni residents or migrants in the capital, gradually the reception of this tolerated outlet could have repercussions that would alert security forces. Let us not forget that delusion and fantasy are among the characteristics of security forces (the murder of the late Dr. Sami due to the delusion of future threat and the excessive pressure on literary writers in Iran to the extent of a conspiracy to throw their bus into a ravine can be seen in this regard). Delusional and fearful analysts in the security forces believe that from two perspectives, opening the space for the freedom to perform collective religious rituals, especially the performance of prayers and prayers on holidays (Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha), could pose security risks. Because they are primarily concerned about any type of gathering and creating strong connections and solidarity among individuals, they have security fears. Part of the confrontation with dervishes and mystical circles, etc., stems from this issue. Therefore, creating emotional and religious ties among Sunnis through their continuous presence in their mosque or prayer house could gradually or at critical moments take on a political hue, and the suppressed grudges and anger from various discriminations could burst forth in these centers. Security forces can wrap this fear in the guise of foreign dependency (Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism) or, at the current juncture, the threat of ISIS. Although some directed religious-political efforts by Saudi Arabia in Iran cannot be denied, and the threat of ISIS should not be overlooked, security forces know better than others that the danger of religious extremism, especially in the capital of Iran among our Sunni compatriots, is very low and manageable, and the religious and political leaders of Sunnis in Iran generally hold very moderate, rational, and national positions, which is a separate discussion. Also, the inclination towards ISIS in Iran is much less than in any country in the region (and even some Western countries!). Another point in this regard, which can also be covered by other wrappers, and here the wrapper of dogmatism and sectarian sensitivities, is the large gathering of Sunnis, especially with a young average age among migrants to the capital, in their mosques at a time when other mosques in the capital are experiencing a downturn. The limited number of these prayer houses compared to the vast number of other mosques in the capital can make their gathering even more noticeable. However, the greater danger of their gathering during the free performance of prayers on religious holidays, especially Eid al-Fitr, is that it could serve as a comparative maneuver against the Eid al-Fitr prayer of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic (which, despite extensive mobilization to increase attendance, is not satisfactory in relation to the population of the capital) and could disturb the eyes of security forces (and other dogmatic extremists). Even if we consider the figure of two million that these compatriots themselves give regarding the presence of Sunni followers in Tehran and its surroundings as exaggerated, the existence of several hundred thousand of them in this metropolis is also sensitive for the lumpen rationality and delusional security perspectives in Iran. Especially in the eyes of those who fear smaller mystical circles and create security issues from the limited population of dervishes, and with a specific foolishness, politically transform the emotional and psychological escape routes of some who seek solace from the disappointment of official politics and religion and the prevailing religious interpretation into a political opposition and add them to the ranks of government opponents and protesters. The Iranian security apparatus, if it has no other talent, has a specialty in turning critics into opponents and opponents into protesters. This is while the national and responsible behaviors of our Sunni compatriots could have been a starting point and reliable points for the growth of real national security and strengthening the public solidarity of the people of Iran and, above all, consolidating relations with some regional countries. Despite the multiple and layered discriminations they suffer from (a- discrimination and the general gap of "government-nation" and as citizens of this land, equal and sharing in the suffering of all their compatriots, b- discrimination and suffering from the "center-periphery" gap like other similar regions in the border provinces of the country, and finally c- "religious discrimination" which has become more prevalent and higher than ethnic and linguistic discriminations in the post-revolutionary government), they still rank among the top provinces in terms of participation in every election; they have tried to leverage their maximum influence to participate in solving national problems, from war to the kidnapping of police officers in Sistan and Baluchestan, and have blocked the strong and powerful waves of jihadist Salafism, etc.; however, instead of being appreciated, they have faced punishment, and instead of encouragement and promotion, they have been met with travel bans, and instead of being granted permission to perform religious rituals, which is one of their most basic religious, legal, and human rights, they have faced the destruction of their only prayer house in a sprawling metropolis. This act itself is a symbol of the inhuman and illegal ignorance that prevails over our homeland. It is not only in foreign policy and the nuclear issue or in regional policies or economic performance that ignorance and violation of national interests are observed in favor of the interests of power or certain individuals and institutions; in the realm of domestic politics, this short-sighted and myopic ignorance is found more than anywhere else. Based on this, the government and civil society in this area must feel more responsible than in other areas, especially the government, which has made promises in this regard. Historical experience in our land has shown that just as advancing political development without economic development is like building a house on sand, economic development without political development, especially in oil-rich lands, is a dream without realization and a wish among a fleeting night dream.