Reasons for Rouhani's Cautious Reaction to the U.S. Withdrawal from the Nuclear Agreement

Despite the harsh threats from military and political officials of the Islamic Republic regarding withdrawal from the nuclear agreement if the U.S. leaves it, Hassan Rouhani, in his first reaction to the announcement of the U.S. President's decision, stated that Iran would remain within the framework of the agreement and continue cooperation with Europe to meet Iran's demands. Although the Iranian President conditioned remaining in the JCPOA on the outcome of negotiations with Europe in the coming weeks and continued consultations with Russia and China, in the short term, he had no low-cost option other than to temporarily declare loyalty to the nuclear agreement. Rouhani and his government, who stayed up late waiting for the U.S. President's announcement regarding the nuclear agreement, may have hoped that in the best-case scenario, the U.S. exit from the agreement would be 'soft' and would allow enough time for European countries to adjust to the new conditions. Instead, Donald Trump's remarks began with fierce attacks on what he called the Islamic Republic's terrorist activities and threats to regional peace, and after announcing the definitive withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, he threatened to impose the toughest possible sanctions against the Iranian government in due time. At the end of his not-so-long remarks, the U.S. President signed a new executive order to initiate the process of reinstating previously suspended sanctions. Following the implementation of the JCPOA by Barack Obama, the then U.S. President, several previous executive orders that had placed 400 institutions and individuals on the U.S. sanctions list were revoked. With Trump's executive order on Tuesday, the suspended sanctions were revived and would be implemented within 120 to 180 days. As a result of the reinstated sanctions, foreign trade, banking transactions, and especially Iran's oil exports to European and Asian countries would face new restrictions. Compared to the content of the U.S. President's strict decision and the manner of its announcement, the Islamic Republic's President's reaction was cautious, and his tone was moderate, indicating a desire to continue cooperation within the framework of the JCPOA in the current situation. It seems that a prior coordination at the highest levels of the regime was made regarding Iran's type of response to the U.S. President's potential decision on the nuclear agreement, and Rouhani was merely tasked with announcing it; as initial reactions from Baqeri, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and Jafari, the Commander of the IRGC, the day after the U.S. announcement of withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, were also patient and implicitly supportive of the government. If the Tehran government had retaliated after the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and left the JCPOA, it would have lost the support of the three European countries that issued a statement emphasizing the necessity of preserving the JCPOA and expressed 'regret' over the U.S. exit. Thus, the ball would effectively be in Iran's court. The simplest consequence of Iran's announcement of withdrawal from the nuclear agreement could have led to the commencement of industrial-scale uranium enrichment and the refusal to send enriched uranium exceeding 300 kilograms abroad, halting the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, and reducing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the most severe scenario, it could have resulted in the initiation of enrichment at a concentration of 20 percent or more and even the announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In such a case, the Islamic Republic would not only lose the support of the three major European countries but would also witness the reinstatement of all past Security Council sanctions, including Security Council Resolution 1929, and would find itself overnight in a potentially military-threatened situation. According to Security Council Resolution 1929, Iran was placed under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter and was obliged to comply with its provisions. Although if the Security Council resolutions were reinstated, Iran would not be fully under Chapter VII, and other countries would need another resolution from the council to justify a military attack against Iran, citing a violation of Article 42 of the Charter, any military engagement in the region or military provocations attributed to Iran could make this transition possible. Such conditions could affect Iran's internal situation and significantly reduce the government's role in decision-making and managing the country by opening the door for the military to take over affairs. Rouhani's decision on Tuesday night to remain in the nuclear agreement, despite previous threats from Ali Akbar Velayati, the international affairs advisor to the Supreme Leader, and Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, regarding withdrawal from it, showed that the main concern of the Islamic Republic's leadership in the current situation is to calm the internal situation in the short term and seek ways to navigate through the crisis in the medium term while intensifying the semi-dormant internal crisis.