In recent weeks, the country has witnessed a wave of strikes by civil society forces and social groups. First, truck drivers raised the banner of strike in the post-national protests of January 2018, alongside the intensification of the chronic and functional economic crisis. Their social and quantitative scope, which included professional demands and was entirely intra-group in nature, encompassed at least 200 cities across the country. It is unclear what percentage of truck owners temporarily ceased work in the cities and how much of the national transportation was affected by these protests, but the impact was so strong that judicial and political authorities threatened them severely, attributing charges of "disruption of road transport" and "creating disturbances for drivers," considering them deserving of punishment for rebellion. Before and after the truck drivers, factory workers also sporadically went on strike across the country in protest against unpaid and accumulated wages. During this time, strikes were also initiated in some markets, but their volume and media reflection were relatively less than other strikes. The protests of market traders were mainly a result of the lack of business prosperity, government intervention in price regulation, the securitization of the economic space, and ongoing and widespread economic recession. Finally, teachers, in a nationwide movement that covered most provinces of the country, refrained from work for two days and staged sit-ins in their schools. These chain actions, although not organized and planned, were influenced by one another and were organized and executed at an intra-group level by professional and social forces. However, contrary to the hasty reactions of some political forces and groups seeking to surf the political wave of these strikes, none of them had a political nature and pursued the specific interests of each group. In some gatherings and labor strikes that escalated into violence due to police intervention, some political slogans were chanted, but these incidents were peripheral to the events. None of these forces claimed to pursue public interests or a common demand of the Iranian people, nor did they propose a specific political strategy. Monitoring the positions of these groups indicates that, at least at this moment, they cannot be considered part of the political social force that consciously seeks a transition to democracy or persistently remains in the front lines of struggle and protest. The government's economic problems and constraints, especially the noticeable decrease in its financial power, have played a significant role in the emergence of these strikes. If the government can meet some specific demands of these groups, many of them will return to their normal lives and show no interest in participating in political processes and campaigns as before. At the same time, a connection can be established between some of the teachers' demands, such as "free education," and politics in the sense of public good, but the teachers also did not directly and deliberately frame their movement within the context of political protests against the government's performance or to support political changes. The main issue for teachers is the protest against discrimination, one aspect of which is the significant disparity in the national salary and payment system, so that teachers have consistently been among the lowest-paid government employees since the revolution. They also struggle with extensive shortages in insurance and welfare services, which have deprived them of the ability to endure the current harsh living conditions. Another aspect is the creeping and gradual expansion of paid education, which has resulted in a significant inequality in access to education for children and adolescents and has exacerbated class differences in the country. However, the non-political nature of the aforementioned strikes does not mean that there is an insurmountable wall between social-professional protests and politics. The consequences of these strikes, in a situation where the political system does not recognize them and pursues a security response, along with the government's logistical, financial, and infrastructural incapacity to meet demands and the deep crisis of trust, have heated the political struggle. The recent strikes are a manifestation of civil disobedience. It should also be noted that in a situation where there is no political stability and existing governing institutions have lost their legitimacy and credibility, the formation of a new political system has strong mass support, and the dissatisfaction of various social groups has spilled into the streets, social protests have the potential to quickly become political or qualitatively and quantitatively expand within the political movement. In each of the professional efforts of teachers, truck drivers, workers, market traders, farmers, etc., a tendency to attract support from other social sectors has been observed, which could enhance the political outcome of these efforts if this tendency is transformed into targeted negotiations and organized communications. However, ultimately, these forces are not political actors, and the realization of their demands directly and without the mediation of political groups is also not feasible. Of course, there have been exceptions where, in specific experiences, these social and professional forces have suddenly become the main force in managing political changes. Even from among them, like the Polish labor movement, a revolutionary leader has emerged. But in the conventional sense, social forces are consumers and applicants of the solutions and programs of political forces. The expansion of strikes, which has not yet reached a level that paralyzes the government and is far from the strikes of the pre-revolutionary era, indicates despair from the institutions and political officials of the established system. A kind of despair from both main factions of the system and fear of an uncertain future has led these social groups to rely on their own capabilities and synergize individual potentials within the target community to pursue their desired demands, thereby impacting the public sphere. This environment and the existing political blockage have created an opportunity for political forces seeking a transition from the entirety of the Islamic Republic to present their political commodity, based on fundamental changes in the power structure, the establishment of democracy, and the drafting of a new constitution as a solution that can sustainably solve or alleviate their problems. The fate of a peaceful transition to democracy in Iran is somewhat dependent on the appropriate connection between social-professional protests and political movements. This connection does not occur on its own and requires preparatory measures, planning, and adherence to relevant considerations and regulations. However, the success of this movement requires considering certain considerations. First, the distinction between social protests and the demands of social groups with politics and recognized political actors should be acknowledged, and populist and superficial approaches to establishing this identity between them should be avoided. Another important factor is for political forces to refrain from intervening in organizing these forces and attempting to manage and lead them. Calls for strikes are effective when made by these forces themselves and their trusted leaders. Otherwise, if some political forces, whether advocating for reform of the system or advocating for a complete change of it, try to position themselves as leaders and guardians of these social forces, it will create an atmosphere of distrust and negatively impact the strike process and disrupt the formation of general strikes. The role of political forces should be supportive and also provide solutions to respond to the demands of protesting social forces. The final consideration is a correct understanding of the existing social and professional protests and an accurate assessment of their similarities and differences. These assessments should be realistic and not fall prey to wishful thinking and exaggeration. Everything should be explained neither less nor more, and should serve as the basis for collaborations and interactions in linking political and social-professional protests. This is also necessitated by examining the alignment of the strikes that have occurred and, at a higher level, the activities of social groups in Iran. Truck drivers are still at a pre-organizational activity level and have not developed a lasting collective character like the drivers of the bus company, and their collective movement has been a spontaneous response based on a shared understanding of professional problems such as wages and the provision of necessary spare parts. The situation is different for workers; they have a somewhat acquired state, but their activities still lack high organizational cohesion and arise more as a reaction to acute livelihood problems. Teachers have shown more willingness to engage in organizational activities and pursue programs and policies in the form of a coalition. Market traders also have a situation similar to that of workers; unlike the past, when the market was one of the pillars of political and religious movements, today it does not have a position of powerful collective action. Additionally, the gap between official professional unions and the market traders' base and the prevention of forming independent unions and professional assemblies is another obstacle that has made their organized activity difficult. However, the tendency towards organized group activity among them is high. Teachers are in direct contact with students and the country's youth, which can expand their social impact and create lasting discursive and social effects in future generations. In more precise terms, teachers have the potential for political and cultural movement-making. Truck drivers, farmers, and workers have their unique ability to disrupt economic activities and incapacitate the government in a short time. The market, due to its political history and the government's claim of support from them and its connection with the clergy, can both create a political crisis and disrupt the country's trade relations and public access to goods and supplies. Of course, social groups in Iran are not limited to the aforementioned cases. Bus drivers, taxi drivers, nurses, university professors, government employees, employers, bank employees, producers, journalists, doctors, religious groups, NGOs, professional associations, etc., are also other examples of social groups that, like the aforementioned groups, have not yet engaged in sustained and fluctuating protest actions. Creating coordination and convergence among social groups and agreeing on a general strike that encompasses all requires attention to these differences. Their significance depends on factors such as social homogeneity, scope and social influence, awareness of professional and group identity, level of organization, extent of shared culture, and readiness to pursue group issues within a national and public context among the aforementioned social groups.
Recent Strikes and the Shades and Lights of Social-Professional Protests
In recent weeks, Iran has seen a wave of strikes by truck drivers, factory workers, teachers, and market traders protesting economic conditions and unpaid wages. These protests, while lacking a unified political agenda, reflect deep-seated discontent with the government's handling of economic issues and have the potential to escalate into broader political movements.
👥 Key Players
⚡ Actions
📰 What Happened
Truck drivers, factory workers, market traders, and teachers protested against economic conditions in Iran.
- truck drivers protest Iranian government
- factory workers protest Iranian government
- market traders protest Iranian government
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
The strikes reflect a significant level of civil disobedience against the Iranian government.
📝 Key Evidence
🏷️ Entities Mentioned
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%