Reflections on the Change of the Head of the Basij Organization

The change of the head of the Basij Organization is significant; although it is somewhat predictable, no specific reason for the replacement of 'Gholamhossein Ghaibpour' in place of 'Mohammadreza Naqdi' has been published in the official media of the Islamic Republic. In the decree issued by the supreme leader for the new head of the Basij, there is nothing particularly noteworthy; however, the shift at the top of the Basij Organization cannot be considered without reason or purpose. Naqdi steps down from the head of the Basij while having held this position since October 2009. Meanwhile, Aziz Jafari, the commander of the IRGC, who was appointed two years prior to Naqdi, continues to hold his position. It seems that based on some signs and evidence, one can speak of the importance of the change in the head of the Basij Organization and provide an explanation for the reasons behind this event. A review of some of Ghaibpour's political-security views is enlightening. Ghaibpour, born in 1962 in Shiraz, joined the 19th Fajr Division in Shiraz during the Iran-Iraq War and became responsible for ideological-political training in that division. He later rose to the position of deputy commander of the division and was responsible for the engineering axis of the division. After the war, while still under 30, he became responsible for the training of the IRGC's ground forces and later commanded the 25th Karbala Division in Mazandaran. After 2006, Ghaibpour commanded the 19th Fajr Division in Fars for two years and was appointed to command the Fajr IRGC in Fars Province following the merger of the resistance and ground forces. After the death of Hossein Hamadani, a senior commander of the Quds Force in Syria, Ghaibpour replaced him and took on the responsibility of organizing the Imam Hussein Battalions, which are considered a continuation of authoritarianism. Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the IRGC, described the mission of the 'Imam Hussein Headquarters' as 'the task of preparing people-based and Basij-oriented brigades and divisions across the country' with a 'defensive and military' mission. Before his new role, and until August 2016, Ghaibpour also commanded the Fajr IRGC in Fars. In the fall of 2014, Ghaibpour, addressing the 'political guides of the IRGC in Fars', emphasized the need to recognize the 'enemy' and those who 'wear a facade of loyalty but are not men enough to say we are the enemy', severely criticizing the leaders of the Green Movement. He stated that they are 'politically impure and cannot be cleansed even with Zamzam water; unless they express remorse and repentance in the presence of the leadership and the people.' Previously, in 2012, Ghaibpour had also remarked: 'Some elites during the 2009 sedition, when the revolution was at a dangerous crossroads, covered it up with their silence and lost it, but they should know that to return to the system, they must, like Har, put their boots around their necks and say we were wrong.' After his appointment by the Supreme Leader as the head of the Basij Organization, he reiterated in an interview that his position regarding the Green Movement and its leaders 'remains the same as I have previously stated and has not changed.' Ghaibpour stated: 'I have previously called the leaders of the sedition politically impure, and I still insist on this position; the leaders of the sedition are politically impure and cannot be purified even with Zamzam water; unless they come to the presence of the nation and the Supreme Leader to repent.' He also evaluated his position in line with the views of the Supreme Leader and 'non-conservative guarding.' Against Reformists Ghaibpour, prior to the last parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections in February, while serving as the commander of the Fajr IRGC, stated: 'Now the reformists are firmly preparing for the parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections, and to win these two, they will first approach the universities, and you will see what sessions and gatherings they will hold.' He added: 'Who guarantees that the 2009 sedition will not be repeated? The student Basijis are not supposed to be neutral elements.' A few days before these elections, he stated: 'To choose a representative of the Islamic Revolution, we must pay attention to important criteria such as adherence to and practical commitment to the principle of Velayat-e Faqih, stance against the 2009 sedition, standing against global arrogance and the United States, and impermeability against the enemy.' He emphasized that 'the insightful people of Islamic Iran will not vote for the supporters of the sedition and those who remained silent against it, even if they are candidates for the Assembly of Experts.' Ghaibpour has also reiterated the claims of 'Kayhan' against Khatami and has severely criticized him, stating: 'Why did Khatami meet with the Zionist George Soros before the 2009 elections, and what issues were exchanged between them during that meeting?' He has even described Ali Motahari as lacking 'mental and psychological balance' and 'on the enemy's side.' Against Hashemi Rafsanjani Ghaibpour has made harsh remarks against the head of the Expediency Discernment Council, criticizing Hashemi Rafsanjani, stating: 'Some who were once pioneers in the revolution now shamelessly speak in a council and cite Japan after the war as an example, saying that they had no armed forces, so we should also have no armed forces. This old man is delivering nonsense. These are not the words of an ordinary person.' He stated that this individual (Rafsanjani) 'has a history in Imam's movement, has been in the war, and is present after the war, but what has happened that he delivers such nonsense? Let the centers of power and wealth burn. The losers in this are those who cannot distinguish the pure from the impure.' Ghaibpour also referred to Rafsanjani's last Friday prayer sermon in 2009, stating: 'The Friday prayer leader, instead of calming the existing atmosphere and informing the people of the danger threatening the revolution and the system, poured gasoline on the fire.' Support for the Guardian Council and Velayat-e Faqih Predictably, Ghaibpour's position regarding the Supreme Leader is quite different and of another nature. He has stated about the Supreme Leader that 'this Seyyed is the deputy of the Imam of the Time, who is an unchanging version, and whoever wants to know how to behave with the Imam of the Age should measure their behavior against him.' He has also expressed the opinion that 'the manifestation of the guardianship of Amir al-Mu'minin today is in the absolute guardianship of the jurist.' Ghaibpour considers one of the problems of the Islamic Republic today to be individuals who 'see themselves as equal to the guardianship; they do not understand the guardianship and engage in ijtihad against the words of the guardianship.' From this perspective, he has severely criticized the reformists, stating: 'In 1999, these same second Khordadi elements, while being delusional and thinking that the system had weakened, openly spoke of a system without a guardian jurist or a system with a weakened guardian jurist, where the leadership had no authority in governing, like the Queen of England or the Pope.' It is not far-fetched that Ghaibpour is among the supporters and admirers of the appointed institutions and those under the leadership; thus, he refers to the Guardian Council as 'the measure' and considers it an institution comprising '12 of the most just and knowledgeable individuals.' He also announced before the 2013 presidential elections that 'we cannot elect a president who is indifferent to the opinion of the guardianship.' The Basij in the 'New Era' Although, in general, Ghaibpour's positions and approaches do not differ from Naqdi's (the former head of the Basij), based on what has been briefly presented, and also relying on the following evidence, one can speak of the importance of this new shift for the top of the political system. The military office of the Supreme Leader stated during the farewell and introduction ceremony of the former and new heads of the Basij that the Supreme Leader 'has stated regarding General Ghaibpour that I know him, and during my trip to Shiraz, I noticed that ill-mannered individuals were angry with him, which indicates the resilience and correctness of General Ghaibpour's path.' Ghaibpour also reacted during his introduction ceremony, stating: 'I never thought that I would one day gain the merit of being directly addressed by my master. Whatever we say about someone being here or there, if the leader is not satisfied, it is of no use.' The head of the Basij is in a position of leadership over this paramilitary organization at a time when the Deputy Minister of Interior for Security and Law Enforcement reports a '69% increase in social protests, including labor, professional, and sectoral protests'; this is in addition to the ongoing economic crisis in Iran and independent of the continued repression of political activists and civil society actors. It is not in vain that Rahim Safavi, 'the senior advisor to the Commander-in-Chief' and former commander of the IRGC, in a congratulatory letter to the new head of the Basij, refers to the 'expectations' of the Supreme Leader and the importance of 'monitoring the tumultuous path' of the system and the 'upcoming events.' It should not be forgotten that Ghaibpour took over the responsibility of the 'Imam Hussein Battalions' after Hamadani, who was killed in Syria; these battalions were formed based on the experience of the bloody suppression of the Green Movement. The Basijis in these battalions receive various specialized training and are considered a significant arm in 'establishing security,' according to senior IRGC officials. Furthermore, the appointment of the new head of the Basij occurs at a time when the Islamic Republic is increasingly involved in the Syrian crisis directly and actively. Ghaibpour's experience in participating in the war with Iraq will also be valuable and important for the central power hub from this perspective. Thus, it seems that Ghaibpour is set to be a leader for the 'new era' of the Basij Organization; a leadership that aligns with the outputs of the Basij organization during Naqdi's tenure but is also a completer and enhancer of this paramilitary organization. The Supreme Leader, by changing the head of the Basij Organization, once again demonstrates how sensitive he is about the functions of the Basij and relies on this arm and military-security approaches to ensure the security of the regime and the continuation of the prevailing authoritarianism.