Reformism Died Years Ago. That's It!

Saeed Hajarian stated during Khatami's second term, "Reformism is dead. Long live reformism." His point was that if Khatami and his government failed to meet demands, reformism itself was alive and would rise again one day. He was correct, and four years after the government was handed over to the military-security faction, reformism resurfaced in the form of the Green Movement. Khatami's failures with the dual bills, the closure of over a hundred publications in one year, the imprisonment of hundreds of journalists, writers, and political activists, the attack on student dormitories at Tehran and Tabriz universities, and the chain murders of politicians and writers did not deter reformism. During Ahmadinejad's first term, reformists did not abandon their demands and faced pressure from security, military, and paramilitary forces. However, the Green Movement, instead of consolidating the reformists' positions, completely dissuaded them from reformism. In the years following the Green Movement, the reformist movement, confronted with overwhelming waves of repression (street killings of over a hundred people, show trials, over ten thousand political prisoners, torture and mistreatment of prisoners, and the Kahrizak scandal) and the significant emigration of activists abroad, set aside all the movement's demands and merely carried the name "reformism." Of course, instead of swearing allegiance to Khamenei, the IRGC, and the clergy approved by Khamenei, reformists could have remained silent and waited for a time when public discontent increased and the government's capacity for repression decreased to demand a referendum and free elections. However, they could not bear the distance from power and its resources. For this reason, they practically stepped out of the role of protestors and critics. The death of the reform movement and the transformation of reformists into another faction supporting Khamenei and the IRGC can be observed in several instances. For example, Mohammad Reza Tabesh, a well-known reformist, commented on the possibility of reformists supporting Ali Larijani in the 2021 elections: "We must reach a decision on this. If we have a candidate and our candidate passes the Guardian Council, then this question cannot be a correct one." (Etemad, October 16, 2017) The mere fact that Ali Larijani is considered among the potential reformist candidates (which is highly likely since the Guardian Council will most likely reject their exclusive candidate) indicates a transformation that has occurred within this group. In the 1990s, reformists introduced Ali Larijani as a member of the suppression circle (with the production and broadcasting of programs like 'Identity' and 'Light' and the constant airing of confessions of reformists), and this was believable given his presidency over the state radio and television and his background in the IRGC's security sectors. Now one might ask whether Ali Larijani has become moderate and reformist or whether reformists are no longer reformists. Their support for Hassan Rouhani, whom they considered a coup plotter in the 1990s and 2000s (when he replaced Mousavi Khoeiniha at the Strategic Research Center), also represented a regression from past positions. After the announcement of sanctions against the IRGC and the lack of confirmation of the Islamic Republic's adherence to its nuclear commitments by Donald Trump, the three figures whom reformists have long introduced as moderate and opponents of the expansionism and provocations of the Islamic Republic to the Iranian people and the world—namely Hassan Rouhani, Mohammad Javad Zarif, and Mohammad Khatami—completely and explicitly supported the IRGC's missile programs and military interventions, and the first two presented the repressive organization as popular without any basis. If someone has a framework and principles in their political dealings, they do not change their positions 180 degrees under current conditions. Therefore, it cannot be said that these three and other individuals and groups known as reformists merely took different positions in response to Trump's statements (which were all factual regarding the Islamic Republic and the IRGC). Is it not more accurate to say that individuals like the three above used Trump's statements as an excuse to express their heartfelt desires? They, being defenders of the Islamic Republic, naturally must defend the IRGC and its programs. Even during periods when opposition to the IRGC's behaviors and missile launches was evident, they practically supported the IRGC. To see the death of reformism, it is enough to look at the behavior of the government supported by reformists over the past five years. Over three consecutive days in October 2017, Iranian citizens learned that the oil minister of Rouhani's government was hiring the daughter of a parliament member, the same minister was exclusively laying a gas line for the villa of the economy minister, and not only security and political ministers but also the science minister had to be approved by Khamenei, who rejected ten proposed individuals. Reports of corruption and abuses of power by the government, alongside the delegation of decision-making to Khamenei and the IRGC, turn into a tale of a single piece of paper. Ironically, a group under the grand title of "reformist" sells a government whose ministers are all Khamenei's ministers and whose head is one of the six appointed by the Guardian Council as a government of hope and prudence to a people who have no other option than one of the butchers ruling the country (one of the exporters of death sentences for thousands of prisoners in 1988). When instead of Mesbah and Jannati, Daryaei Najafabadi, Rey Shahrani, and Fallahian were sold as candidates on the hope and prudence list for the Assembly of Experts, or members of the reformist list were unknown relatives of other politicians from this faction, the minds of the loyalists were not at all tickled to see what difference existed between them. What goal and demand of the reformists has been realized by mocking Khamenei while he holds absolute power in the country? What behavior has emerged from the principlists that the reformist faction has refrained from? Seventy-six percent of Rouhani's government managers are the same managers from Ahmadinejad's government, half of the ministers have security and military backgrounds and are obedient to Khamenei and the IRGC, and the government has yielded in all matters (from assigning the cancellation of concerts to Friday prayer leaders and UNESCO's 2030 document to delegating foreign policy in the region to the IRGC and paying resources looted by usury) to the demands of the principlists. Nevertheless, Rouhani's government is introduced to the people as a moderate government opposing the principlists, thanks to a total of ten to fifteen sentences from Rouhani during election campaigns or every few months. After three decades, can we not expect those who genuinely desire change and reform in the country to open their eyes and see the reform movement under a gravestone full of dust, a gravestone that no one even pours water on? The government of hope and prudence, like Ahmadinejad's government, constantly lies (Zarif holds the highest record), manipulates statistics, embezzlements continue (like the 8,000 billion embezzlement in the teachers' savings fund), government expenses and liquidity have skyrocketed, censorship of books and filtering and jamming continue as before, employment has a disastrous status, and the arrest of journalists and the hostage-taking of Western citizens continue. It is unclear what difference exists between Rouhani's government and Ahmadinejad's government and between reformists and principlists. Another astonishing point is that reformists have sold this illusion of duality not only to a part of the Iranian people but also to the European and American left, and leftist Western media refer to Zarif and Rouhani as moderates. What actions should groups and individuals known as reformists take or not take for their supporters to accept that reformism is dead? Apparently, no action from them has such a function. Supporters of reformism within the framework of the Islamic Republic believe in an unfalsifiable and irrefutable way that reform is possible under this regime, that a political movement called reform exists, and that people should vote for it in every election without any changes having occurred under this reformist movement in the country over three decades. In Saudi Arabia, only a few women sit behind the wheel and post it online (along with international pressures), and the Saudi government allows women to drive, but in Iran, hundreds of thousands of women took to the streets in March 1979 protesting against compulsory hijab, yet the government does what it wants. Three million people took to the streets on June 15, 2009, and not a single newspaper was unbanned or a single person was dismissed, and no law or policy changed. Over the past three decades, the government has not taken a single step to show its reformability, and yet a movement inside and outside the country believes in its reformability. Does this not surprise anyone?