Reformism in the Context of 'Illness'

The reformist movement in Iran is not in a good place; despite the victory of the supported candidate in the presidential elections and even some councils, reformists have been pushed to the margins of the political arena. What is palpably occurring is the play of moderates, centrists, and pragmatists within the conservative camp, under the umbrella of the central power's directives and policymaking. Rouhani has noticeably distanced himself from his main supporters for weeks; the composition of Rouhani's cabinet is a significant indicator. His latest proposal (Minister of Science) faced criticism not only from the student body of reformists but also from some reformist representatives in Parliament; representatives who have faced serious questions regarding their own alignment with reformist standards during the vote of confidence for Rouhani's proposed ministers. In another area and a different example, the well-known story of the house arrest of the leaders of the Green Movement has not ended, and Khatami (the leading figure of the reformist camp) has faced more restrictions. This is while the slogan 'lifting the house arrest' was somewhat considered the 'string of beads' for Rouhani's supporters during the 2017 elections and was shouted in various cities in front of Rouhani. After winning the election, Rouhani explicitly mentioned Khatami and thanked him; however, during the recent restrictions and new threats, Rouhani has not only failed to take any affirmative and creative actions (including attempts for a face-to-face meeting with Khatami) but has also refrained from publicly mentioning his name. Rouhani has clearly leaned towards the main actors present in the power structure; for various reasons (including a glance at the future after the current leader's demise), he sees no necessity to upset the central power hub and to get closer to reformists who are not very effective in interacting with the current forces in power. This coincides with the inability of reformists to pursue their demands from the executive branch; neither the Hope faction nor the Supreme Policy Council of Reformists has shown the necessary potential and determination. This has occurred while the organizational structure of reformists has not undergone any changes or reforms despite numerous criticisms, especially after the last two elections for councils and the presidency. Where lies the problem of reformists? This is an important question; perhaps the first answer is 'where is the problem not?!' From the perspective of the concept of 'reformism' and its theoretical requirements to organizational structure, and from strategy to the personal problems of reformists, numerous critiques can be pointed out. Differences in views regarding the theoretical requirements of reformism range from Mousavi and Karroubi, who seek reforms in the political power structure, to those technocrats of conservatism who have gradual and superficial reforms on their agenda; the 'ship' of reformists in Iran includes diverse and multiple layers. The relationship between the institution of religion and the institution of the state, the position of civil society, and the role of social movements in advancing desired reforms, interpretations of the constitution and its role in advancing reforms, and even how to deal with established laws are among the axes where the perspectives and evaluations of various layers of reformists are not uniform. For example, there is a significant gap between those who have no criticism of the 'supervisory oversight' of the Guardian Council and those who seek to eliminate this issue. Or there is a noticeable difference between the views and definitions of reformists who value civil society and those who only seek minor changes in governance. As such, there is no shortage of differences in views regarding 'religious renewal' among reformists. Even regarding the importance of pursuing and realizing concepts such as democracy and freedom, a noticeable difference in approach has emerged recently, especially in the context of the nuclear crisis and regional conditions and the military-security involvement of the Islamic Republic in Syria, and the Tehran-Washington challenges and the post-JCPOA era. The flaws in the organizational structure of reformists have been evident since the establishment of the Supreme Policy Council of Reformists; elections for the parliament, presidency, and councils have been held since then; an organization that emerged from the combination of the Advisory Council and Khatami's companions and the Coordination Council of the Reform Front. However, the criticisms directed at this council and its composition are numerous. The intertwining of individuals with representatives of political groups is one of the points of challenge. Additionally, the existence of numerous political groups whose organizational background, potential, and political record are unclear is another point of concern. These groups demand 'shares' and it is difficult to define their weight—especially in conjunction with the presence of individuals and named reformists. For instance, Abdollah Nouri calls for the merging and integration of these small organizations and their reduction. The lack of a charter that both real and legal members of the reform organization believe in is another criticism raised; a topic that Mohsen Safaei Farahani is among its critics. All this occurs while there is consensus that Seyyed Mohammad Khatami holds a completely different position. His credibility and social popularity cannot be denied. In such a situation and arrangement, aligning various forces is not easy. Especially since some political groups in the reformist camp (specifically the Participation Front and the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Revolution) have been banned from political activity. Differences in views among reformists regarding strategy are undeniable. Reformists should primarily be critics of the current situation and seek gradual and non-violent change, and increase and expand democracy; however, to what extent does this general outlook have a uniform definition across various spectrums? In the diverse reformist camp, from those seeking superficial changes to reformists pursuing structural changes, one can observe a range of approaches. For some reformists, participation in elections has become 'both strategy and tactic'; they see no necessity for activating and strengthening civil society and political action based on social force, and merely encouraging society to participate in elections is sufficient for them. Meanwhile, another group believes in the importance of revitalizing and enhancing civil society and forming a social force supportive of democratization, and views the necessity of expanding the space for social dialogue and public sphere and raising citizens' awareness, and even participation in elections and its consequences from this perspective. The manner of interaction with the central power hub in the Islamic Republic or the emphasis on standards for free, fair, and healthy elections or how to establish relations with moderate and pragmatic conservatives are just a few other examples of issues that occupy different positions in the strategic evaluations of various reformist spectrums. The undeniable personal issues of reformists are another aspect. From personal ambitions and individual status-seeking to opportunism and self-interest, and from a thirst for wealth, fame, position, and power to mere conservatism and pragmatism and fear of challenging the pillars of power and threatening personal interests, a diverse range of these problems has afflicted a significant portion of reformist activists. These issues—occurring in the context of widespread and structured corruption and the establishment of authoritarianism—have adverse consequences for advancing collective goals and programs. For instance, suddenly during the vote of confidence for Rouhani's proposed ministers, serious disagreements and dissonance among the representatives of the Hope faction become evident. Or in the area of defending the fundamental and civil rights of clients or Iranians, we witness a stark difference among actors in the reformist camp. The number of reformists willing to protest the house arrest of Rahnavard, Mousavi, and Karroubi, and the quality of their critical and protest reactions is also a significant indicator. Reformism in the Context of Current Realities: The summary of what has been briefly mentioned, and a glance at what is currently happening in Iran's political space, indicates a noticeable distancing of reformism from its essence and claims and a serious struggle with various harms. Defending the fundamental and civil rights of citizens, emphasizing democracy and freedom and its requirements, insisting on realizing 'Iran for all Iranians, regardless of language, belief, creed, gender, and religion', believing in social justice and other fundamental axes have been sidelined under the shadow of periodic electoral participation or rent-seeking and conservatism and organizational fragmentation. Furthermore, the widespread and harsh repressions following the 2009 electoral coup have crystallized and justified complete realism and mere pragmatism and the preservation of individual and collective interests in the guise of the necessity of 'normalization'. Except for a layer of reformists sympathetic to the Green Movement and its imprisoned leaders who emphasize 'society-centeredness' and do not show empathy by categorizing citizens into 'insiders and outsiders' and are sensitive to the violation of their fundamental rights, other layers of reformism have short-term government-centered projects on their agenda. Projects that, in many cases, do not address the violation of citizens' fundamental and civil rights. This approach has reduced reformists from being an 'effective' political movement and actor to a 'prominent' political movement. This assessment does not overlook the repression of reformists or the ongoing threat faced by some of them. However, the problems listed in the previous axes remain. The consequence of this situation is an increasing gap between the discourse of reformism and the citizens who support it. Khatami's popularity has prevented the deepening of this gap, but it does not provide a reason for increasing despair and criticism towards reformists. Perhaps from this perspective, Rouhani has also adopted a kind of indifference towards reformists, with a realistic assessment of the balance of political forces effective in society and government, and has sought to attract the positive attention of the leadership and the security forces governing the IRGC and even the traditional and governmental authorities in Qom. It seems that Rouhani's glance at the future after the death of the Islamic Republic's leader has not been without influence on this change of position. In the reformist camp, if there is hope for the continuation of reforms and the enhancement of its capacity, it still springs from a layer of reformism that has not forgotten civil society; has fundamental critiques of the established situation; possesses the courage and boldness to pursue and express its critiques; and stands in sincere solidarity with the demands of social layers protesting the current situation.