Reformists at the Crossroads of Change: Pathway or Collapse?

"We stand with the people. Until now, we begged and pleaded for three seats in the parliament and asked you to change your behavior a little, but we saw it was of no use." These words were spoken by Mohammad Khatami, the former president of Iran, in an audio file released on May 9, 2024. The release of this file, along with his abstention from voting and that of some members of the Reform Front in the parliamentary elections of February 2024, created the impression among many critics and protesters of the Islamic Republic that the reformist movement in Iran has finally changed its approach. However, just days after Khatami's remarks and with the presidential chair vacant following the death of Ebrahim Raisi, members of this political front are now scrambling for the presidential elections. The reformists are entering these elections at a time when at least part of their base is dissatisfied with how this participation is being handled and believes this will be the last election for the reformists. The reformist movement, or as some of its critics call it, "government reformism," has lost its previous relative legitimacy in Iranian society for some time. In December 2017, in protest against rising prices, the slogan "Reformist, principlist, the story is over" was chanted. Although figures like Masoumeh Ebtekar deemed this slogan inaccurate and unfair, it was merely part of the public discontent. This discontent was more pronounced during the widespread protests of November 2019 and ultimately manifested in the 2021 presidential elections when Abdolnasser Hemmati, the candidate supported by the reformists, garnered only about 2.5 million votes, roughly 9% of the total votes cast, equivalent to about 4% of the total eligible voting population. Both the collective approach to reformism and the closed atmosphere of the regime, particularly the bloody repression of the "Women, Life, Freedom" protests, led them not to participate in the 2024 parliamentary elections. But what has changed now that they want to participate in the presidential elections? Has there been a change in their approach or a difference in the political mechanisms? Where does the internal dissatisfaction within the front stem from? A window into the early presidential elections from the perspective of statistics and figures opens up against the backdrop of non-participation. In February 2024, Mohammad Khatami, known as the spiritual father of the reform front, stated in a statement following the "Women, Life, Freedom" protests that reforms within the political structure of the country have hit a "solid rock of deadlock" in the way experienced in the Islamic Republic, emphasizing that "there is no sign of the ruling system's willingness to reform and avoid past and present mistakes." This change in approach coincided with a change in the head of the front, leading to speculation that reforms are seeking to change direction and get closer to the people. However, just as these remarks found a place in the social and political space, before the 2024 parliamentary elections, this political movement split in two. The Reform Front decided not to participate in the elections, while another group from within this movement or close to it issued a statement insisting on their participation in the elections. This group's action, known as the "Window Openers," revived the debate that reforms are still the "safety valve of the regime." On February 9, 2024, the Reform Front of Iran stated in a declaration that it could not participate in an election "devoid of meaning, non-competitive, unfair, and ineffective in governing the country." But a few days later, a statement signed by 110 individuals under the title "Let’s Open a Window" was released. This statement, despite emphasizing the lack of "freedom in elections," called on various groups and the public to participate in the elections to prevent the entry of extremist and "anti-development" candidates into the parliament with a "protest vote," thereby increasing the positive impact of the parliament on people's lives. Following the release of this statement, Mohsen Armin, the vice president of the Reform Front, said, "The society is so outraged and angry that participating in the elections will not lead to any outcome that ensures the public good." In contrast, Ali Bagheri, a former secretary of the front who was also a signatory of the "Window Openers" statement, argued that the window openers have not engaged in political action and have not even "presented a list to the public or introduced a candidate." This strategy was also criticized by others; critics argued that the window openers do not accept political responsibility. Armin stated: "Participating in the elections will not lead to any outcome that ensures the public good." Abbas Abdi and Saeed Hajarian, prominent figures of the reform movement, also criticized this statement. Hajarian wrote in a critical text that the statement was released at a time when society was completely opposed to elections and perhaps to politics in general. He criticized the statement's authors for not correctly understanding the political conditions of the country and for engaging in unrealistic theorizing instead of addressing existing realities. After the death of former President Ebrahim Raisi, the Reform Front once again began to consider participating in the elections. Mohammad Javad Rouh, editor-in-chief of the Ham-Mihan newspaper, explained two approaches of the reformists on June 8. The first approach favored introducing one to three reformist candidates and entering the competition only if they were approved. The second approach suggested that all reformist and moderate figures register so that decisions could be made from among the remaining candidates after approval, and if necessary, some could withdraw in favor of candidates with higher chances, similar to the 2013 elections. On June 10, the Reform Front announced that their participation was contingent upon the approval of at least one of their designated candidates, who would be selected by a two-thirds vote of the general assembly members, and their names would be announced before the end of the qualification review. Moreover, all members of the front are obliged to adhere to this decision. Motahareh Shafiei wrote in a note in the Arman-e Melli newspaper on June 16: "The era is over when the reform movement would think of supporting a candidate from another stream after its own candidate was disqualified, and now it only emphasizes support for a reformist candidate." However, alongside these statements, on June 16, a new statement from individuals who had previously been "window openers" was released, increasing the number of signatures from 110 to 151. They included figures like Mohammad Javad Zarif, Mas'oud Shams al-Wa'izin, and Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi and called themselves "Path Openers." Shams al-Wa'izin stated in an interview that this act meant filling a space that a political movement has left empty or may leave empty. This statement invited "the ruling system and society" to move towards a new type of agreement that would benefit both sides simultaneously. They called on "diverse citizens"—which later turned out to mean "educated individuals"—to use the elections "to strengthen the moderate reformist center and enable issue-oriented and pathway-opening agreements." This group, which appears similar to the "system's alarmists" during Hassan Rouhani's presidency, is concerned about development while having no commitment to it or being unable to have one. They also lack any specific political approach and even lack concern for gradual reforms. Their sole strategy is to vote and stand against a figure like Saeed Jalili, whom even some conservative factions criticize. Despite these controversies, on June 18, the Reform Front announced that Abbas Akhoundi, Masoud Pezeshkian, and Eshaq Jahangiri were designated as the front's exclusive candidates for the presidential elections. Prior to that, the front had asked candidates to sign a charter that emphasized the implementation of the third chapter of the Constitution and the provision of the rights of the Iranian people in its fourth clause. Interestingly, none of these three individuals are members of the Reform Front. Nevertheless, among these three, the Guardian Council granted entry permission to Masoud Pezeshkian, the current representative of the parliament and former Minister of Health, as a presidential candidate; an event that surprised many. Some believe that by emphasizing his principlist stance, he is still a "rented womb" for reforms; a matter that became more pronounced after the identities of his campaign staff were revealed, as they were closer to the cabinet members of Rouhani's government. However, Azar Mansouri, the head of this front, also stated in a speech that they were not looking for a "full-fledged" reformist candidate. The ballot box as the only strategy The "Path Openers" statement and the reformists' approach to participating in the elections led many critics to say that "reforms have shown their true face," questioning what has changed in this atmosphere, especially since the regime has closed all doors to change more than ever, and most institutions are trapped in an "extremist mentality." Such criticisms are even voiced by some members of the front, although they say they face threats of "expulsion" from the front and are also under pressure from "higher authorities." Nevertheless, some core members of the reformists believe that this election and Pezeshkian's presence in the presidency could provide "path-opening" for Iran, but they do not explain how Pezeshkian, who constantly speaks from an ideological perspective and emphasizes fairness, piety, and justice, can open such a horizon for a society that has chanted the slogan "Women, Life, Freedom." The reformists' strategy during this short period has been based on "path-opening" and "wave-making." They emphasize Pezeshkian's personal character, praise his ethics, and insist on his expertise. Meanwhile, many in society do not consider him suitable for such a position, especially since he has stated that he seeks to implement the leader's orders and existing programs; programs that have resulted in a further deterioration of the economic situation and orders that have led to the suspension of the third chapter of the Constitution (the rights of the people) of this political system. Interestingly, the reformists are also trying to create a favorable image of Pezeshkian, referring to him as "the healer of Iran" or equating him with figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi, Settar Khan, and Bagher Khan. At the same time, some members of the front, like Masoumeh Ebtekar, say that Pezeshkian and the reforms have come to the field "for Iran" and are not seeking power. However, if there is no concern for power, what goal remains for the party? The possibility of returning to power and reusing the facilities and also the rents that power provides them are among the main motivations for the reformists' efforts to "create waves"; a possibility that may be the main reason for their change in approach to the elections. With this formulation, the embodiment of the slogan "for Iran" is initially reduced to the Islamic Republic and then to some members of the Reform Front. Reactions to the disqualifications in the presidential elections; the Reform Front's support for Pezeshkian Saeed Hajarian wrote in May 2024 that the reformists suffer from a lack of party creativity, theoretical and practical shortcomings, and ineffective presence in the administrative system. He considered the consequences of this situation to be a reduction in their social base and a weakening of their role as a buffer between society and the government. A manifestation of this reduction in social base can be seen in the statement read by students at Sharif University against Pezeshkian: "We do not believe that the color and flavor of this presence is anything other than a deception to gain a few more votes for the ballot box. We are fed up with your colorful deception every day." This criticism also comes from part of the base of this front. They are particularly concerned about the future of reforms—given that the governing policies in Iran have not changed—especially the trap that the government has set for them. They believe that if reforms win votes, they will destroy themselves, and if they do not win, a stronger nail will be driven into the coffin of this movement in the political structure.