Release of Stolen Documents from Torqozabad; 'Production of Five Nuclear Warheads in the First Step'

An examination of documents allegedly stolen by Israeli agents from Torqozabad (Fatemieh Town) in southern Tehran reveals that the forecast for the production of five nuclear warheads, each with a yield of 10 kilotons, in the initial phase of Iran's entry into the nuclear club, could have led to the production of a larger number of nuclear bombs with greater explosive power in subsequent years: a pattern derived from North Korean experiences, which culminated in a hydrogen bomb test within 10 years of its first nuclear test in 2006. A joint article by David Albright and Olli Heinonen, along with Ms. Andrea Stricker, an analyst at the Institute for Science and International Security, whose research book on South Africa's nuclear program holds particular credibility, sheds new light on the Islamic Republic's covert efforts to acquire nuclear weapons over the past few decades. The recent article by these three senior experts references documents that Israeli agents claim to have stolen from southern Tehran. Following the revelation of the Israeli agents' infiltration operation in southern Tehran and the transfer of hidden nuclear documents by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu at the UN General Assembly, it was stated that some of these documents were provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by Tel Aviv. A sensitive question raised in the recently published article by the Institute for Science and International Security concerns the fate of nuclear equipment and related documents that the Islamic Republic is likely preserving in various locations across the country and has thus far refused to deliver to its agency representatives. The Islamic Republic's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons date back to the second half of the Iran-Iraq War, which were halted during the intense military attack by the US on Iraq in 2003 due to concerns from President Mohammad Khatami's government about a similar military attack against Iran that year, and the US government claimed the validity of this issue in 2007 after conducting an intelligence review. The Iranian nuclear bomb project included plans for underground nuclear testing, obtaining military-grade enriched uranium from abroad, and establishing the Fordow facility for domestic high-concentration uranium enrichment, with the Supreme Council of Advanced Technologies overseeing the implementation of this plan. Despite the halt in the Islamic Republic's activities to acquire nuclear weapons, discussions with the IAEA during the first decade of the new century regarding what is referred to as the 'possible military dimensions' of Iran's nuclear activities did not yield results. With Iran entering a new round of nuclear negotiations with the US and subsequently the so-called 5+1 group, contingent upon halting uranium enrichment and shutting down sensitive nuclear activities and placing them under closer IAEA scrutiny, the request for the delivery of the Islamic Republic's nuclear documents and related secret facilities for the construction and production of nuclear bomb components was overlooked, with the hope that the Islamic Republic would transform and never pursue the construction of nuclear weapons. With the arrival of the Trump administration in the US and a shift in Washington's nuclear diplomacy towards the Islamic Republic, previous assumptions regarding the past, present, and future of the Islamic Republic's nuclear activities were discarded, and now Iran's persistence in the nuclear agreement is also a matter of speculation or the EU's efforts in this regard. Should the Islamic Republic announce its exit from the July 2015 nuclear agreement, it will not be satisfied with merely continuing enrichment at 3.5% concentration, and in the event of the anticipated expulsion of IAEA inspectors and a declaration of non-compliance with the commitments outlined in the Additional Protocol, it could quickly resume its path towards conducting its first underground nuclear test. According to claims made in the Heinonen-Albright-Stricker article, in 2015 when the nuclear agreement was signed, or in 2016 when it was implemented, the current information regarding nuclear activities with possibly military dimensions of Iran's previous activities was not available to the IAEA. If the documents stolen by Israel from southern Tehran are authentic, aside from proving the Islamic Republic's complete disregard and blatant violation of the commitments outlined in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the important issue is the international community's awareness, especially the IAEA, of the locations or places where the Islamic Republic's documents, archives, and nuclear equipment are kept. The Trump administration described the 2015 nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic as 'the worst deal in history,' and the judgment of the current US president may rely on documents and evidence that the previous Washington administration also had, but based on different analyses and conclusions and trust in the Islamic Republic's parties, and in order to sign a nuclear agreement with Tehran at any cost, it overlooked the topic or requests for the delivery or destruction of verifiable documents and equipment in their possession.