Religious Enlightenment: A New Reading or Imposing Religion on Modern Life?

What is religious enlightenment? Is it, as some critics of religious enlightenment claim, a contradictory combination of enlightenment and faith? What could be the goal of a new understanding of religion? Critics of religious intellectuals argue that this group seeks to impose religion back into human life by aligning it more closely with modern societal values. Soroush Dabagh, a researcher in philosophy and religion, speaks of critically reflecting on modern beliefs and a new interpretation of religion. However, Ata Houdashtian, a visiting researcher at the University of Geneva and a professor of political science and philosophy at the University of YUMF in Switzerland, discusses the fundamental contradiction between the institution of enlightenment and the institution of religion. Mr. Dabagh, I will ask you the opening question of the program regarding what religious enlightenment fundamentally is. Because some critics of religious enlightenment or religious reform consider this combination of enlightenment and faith to be contradictory, you have also written articles and provided responses. If you could briefly explain what religious enlightenment is for our listeners, we will move on to the next discussion. Soroush Dabagh: It doesn't matter whether it is called religious reform or religious enlightenment. It refers to a critical re-reading of religious tradition in contemporary times, and as far as I understand, according to the philosophers of language, it is a social construct. Religion is the same. There are various types of religiosity, just as there are various types of enlightenment. I believe that narratives of religiosity are recognized through rationality and taking rationality seriously, and there is also a narrative of enlightenment that considers reasoning. We can easily defend the compatibility of the combination of religious enlightenment. The mistake that occurs here is that different narratives of enlightenment are not distinguished from one another. One narrative of enlightenment is the one that emerged in France and is characterized by a kind of conflict with religious tradition, but there are other narratives of enlightenment; an English-German narrative. In that narrative, they were, in a sense, critically re-reading the tradition in light of the learnings of the modern world without necessarily being in conflict with the tradition. Mr. Houdashtian, Mr. Dabagh has attempted to explain to us what constitutes a definition of religious enlightenment from his perspective and also believes that there is compatibility between the two concepts he has combined in this term. You, as a critic of religious enlightenment, have been invited to this program. What is your opinion on this contradiction or this compatibility? Ata Houdashtian: You see, what we heard from Mr. Dabagh is that religious intellectuals and religious reformists are essentially the same. Here, I disagree with this interpretation. The term religious enlightenment is actually crafted by Dr. Abdolkarim Soroush; its characteristics are twofold. One is that as a concept, enlightenment and religion is a contradictory combination that many oppose. Among religious reformists, including leaders of this reformist movement, people such as Shabestari, who is actually one of the main figures of religious reformism, oppose the term religious enlightenment, and Engineer Sahabi, whose speeches are well-known, referred to this contradiction as a bald-headed folly. Enlightenment is a social movement. It has four main characteristics, and making it religious is somewhat contradictory. One is rationalism; this rationalism is against superstition and meaningless celestialism. The second is that it advocates critical thought, which also includes criticism of the sanctity that is the essence of religion. The third is that humanity is central, not God, and not the holy book, which Mr. Dabagh will certainly respond to. And the fourth characteristic, which I believe religious reformists adhere to, is social commitment. That is, it stands against political power. Mr. Dabagh, let’s hear your response, especially to the point that Mr. Houdashtian raised regarding the differences between enlightenment and reformism and that the characteristics of enlightenment, according to him, are in contradiction with religion, meaning they are talking about a kind of essential contradiction. Dabagh: I think it is better not to quarrel over terminology. Mr. Shabestari did not say that we find this expression unjustifiable; he said our preference is to use the term religious reform. None of them said it is contradictory, except for the late Sahabi, who, with all due respect, made a mistake, and personally, I believe he did not speak correctly in this regard. However, individuals are free to use any term they wish. Shariati also referred to religious intellectualism. I say all of these have a meaning and content, and in the articles I have written, whether it is the article on religious enlightenment or the analysis of the concept of religious enlightenment, I have tried to provide arguments that conceptually, this combination and combinations of this kind have no problem. Very well, if we want to move towards content, I would like you to answer my question regarding the discussion that Mr. Houdashtian raised about enlightenment in criticizing sanctity and that humanity is central, and this is in contradiction with religion. What is your response to his point? Dabagh: Yes, you see. First of all, this story of social commitment that he mentioned has no problem. I also strongly believe that an intellectual has had and has a social commitment, and if we look at the prominent figures of this current and the religious reformist movement in contemporary times, from Ali Shariati to Mehdi Bazargan to Abdolkarim Soroush, all of them have had a social commitment and have addressed the ongoing relationships in their society, including Saeed Hajarian. Regarding that expression, religion does not have an inherent sanctity that we call sanctity. Then sanctity has different meanings. I ask you, Spinoza, a philosopher who was also declared an apostate, provided a broad meaning of sanctity, not sanctity in the conventional sense that we know. He is classified among what group; or Kant. What they did was a critical re-reading of the tradition. If sanctity means obedience and questioning, of course, many of these individuals were not obedient and engaged in critical re-reading of the tradition. Now, you can set this aside; throughout our Iranian-Islamic tradition, figures like Suhrawardi and Avicenna were not, in this sense, obedient either. We have modernities, we have enlightenments. If we recognize this plurality and diversity, the current of religious enlightenment or religious intellectualism or religious enlightenment in our Iranian-Islamic tradition has a connection with one of the narratives of the Age of Enlightenment. The question I have for you, Mr. Houdashtian, is what can be the concern of this type of religious enlightenment? Is it more worried about the position of religion in human life today, or can it claim that its concern is humanity? Houdashtian: Yes, let me first say that we do not have modernities. Let me say this first. We have a series of central concepts related to modernity that have multiple interpretations in the North and South and the West and East of Europe. For example, the realization of modernity in Germany and its realization in France, Spain, and Italy differs from its realization in England and Ireland. This does not mean that we have modernities. All these interpretations, high and low, North and South, West and East, consider humanity as the subject. Now, returning to what religious enlightenment wants to bring, you see, fundamentally, the issue is not about words or wordplay but rather a school of thought. Mr. Abdolkarim Soroush, who embodies the main outcome of this religious enlightenment, says that religious enlightenment is for the salvation of religion. It has a sociological interpretation behind it. This sociological interpretation is that our society is a religious society, and since the majority is religious, the legislator's outcomes should not go beyond religious laws. This is very important. I will read you his exact sentence: "The difference between religious democracy and democracy - meaning the general democracy that exists in the West - is that the religious people narrate it. We must write laws that do not contradict the certainties and necessities of Islam." This sentence, if it comes from any religious reformer, is anti-democratic. Because the limits of democracy should not be determined by the certainties and necessities of neither religion nor ideology, but rather by the certainties and necessities of our society, our historical period, and our social rationality. Fundamentally, there is no foundation of democracy based on religion. If there is, then it becomes religious democracy, which is exactly what those who think that Mr. Soroush did not say, this word, this sentence has come up. Does the religiousness of democracy mean the precedence of religion over the interests of the people? Or the precedence of the people over religious interests? My answer to this question is that undoubtedly, in the eyes of religious intellectuals, including Abdolkarim Soroush, it is religion that must be saved through a kind of universal democracy that religion determines its limits. Now that you have reached the discussion of democracy, I would like to ask Mr. Dabagh, given the explanations provided by Mr. Houdashtian, what kind of government do religious intellectuals envision? After all, it is a government that is based on laws derived from religion, and in this case, what will be the relationship of this government with enlightenment? Dabagh: I would like to point out one thing regarding the previous point I made. You see, I think I can still argue that we have modernities. If we consider Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance and refer to historical changes in the Western world, I believe that this plurality can be fully recognized. Regarding the democracy issue, let’s not personalize the discussion; now I will explain as much as I know about Abdolkarim Soroush's views, but I would like to speak more about the general discussion than personal matters. Mr. Houdashtian, the points you mentioned belong to the articles on democratic religious governance from twenty-five years ago. A few years later, when the article... Houdashtian: 1388, 28 Bahman, which is his interview with... Dabagh: No, let me say. I was not aware of where you quoted it from; I am stating the core idea. Moreover, I said I do not want to personalize the discussion. In his article analyzing the concept of religious governance, he explicitly stated that the main task of governance is to meet basic needs and to provide the opportunity for addressing secondary needs. Later, when he advanced further in 1388, he explicitly spoke of supra-religious governance. If you refer to Shariati and Bazargan before the revolution, they differed, and in this sense, they did not explicitly speak of the separation of the institution of religion from the institution of governance, at least at one point. However, Bazargan, after the revolution, reached these points at the end of his life. In the last twenty years, most religious reformists believe in the separation of the institution of religion from the institution of governance, but this requires a caveat; religion and politics have a relationship with each other, and religion and governance have another relationship. In American society, religion is not separate from politics either. About half of the society, less than half, if they are religious, their religiosity diminishes in various aspects of life, including their political activities. However, if the society is not religious or religion has no power, like in Scandinavian countries, then religion has a weak social presence and, among other things, has little manifestation in political activity. Legally, however, the separation of the institution of religion from the institution of governance is entirely conceivable, and most religious reformists now believe in this. In a religious society like Turkey, the society can be religious, but the government can be secular because the institution of governance is separate from the institution of religion. Mr. Dabagh, my question about the religious society and whether a secular government is possible was not. My question is about what religious enlightenment thinks specifically about governance. That a society is religious is one issue; that we want to explain this... Dabagh: You are not listening to me. You are not answering my question. That we want to answer the question of whether an Islamic government means that laws are derived from religion, and in this case, what role does enlightenment play? This is a question you did not answer. Let me see what Mr. Houdashtian has to say about this. Dabagh: Why did I not answer? I will say it now. You see, later religious reformists judge that religion is separate from governance in this sense, and in parliament, whatever is approved, considering the rights of minorities, becomes the approved laws. Well, then I ask Mr. Houdashtian, in this sense, how is it possible that Mr. Houdashtian's religious government, specifically in Iran, can have its laws determined without considering and without placing religion or the institution of religion, in this case, Islam, at the center and intervene intellectually in governance?