Religious Reformists Swimming in a Sea of Ambiguity

Officials of the Islamic Republic, both past and present, have claimed for decades, both before and after seizing power, to be laying out a new plan for governing the world (a global Islamic government) and creating a new human being (a model human according to their doctrine). They share a common ideal: the implementation of Islam, with Sharia and the lifestyle of Shia clergy being an inseparable part of it, but they pursue this through various methods and tactics. These methods and tactics have changed, diversified, and expanded over time. Many officials have also oscillated between different methods. What are these new plans that the world and a significant portion of the Iranian population ignore out of 'ignorance or hostility' (according to these officials)? Do religious reformists have a more significant plan than traditionalists? At this juncture, Shia Islamists present two not-so-new ideas for overthrowing humanity and creating another world: 1) The implementation of Sharia and the imposition of the Shia clergy's lifestyle as the solution to all problems, resorting to force without delay in every community where Muslims are the majority (militant Islamists, with Ali Khamenei as their prominent figure), and 2) The implementation of Sharia through gentler and more peaceful 'cultural' methods, resorting to violence only as a last resort (reformist Islamists). Mohammad Khatami, the former president of Iran, defends this second plan: 'Religious reformists, loyal to faith, have a right to speak for the people's rights and dignity in this world... We must convince all the elders and well-wishers that this perspective can strengthen Islam in our time and prevent widespread violence. It can reduce the costs of violence for our society and region.' (ISNA, November 26, 2014) As you can see, he does not outright reject the use of violence in this second plan but believes it can prevent 'widespread violence' (like ISIS violence) - but not limited violence. It seems that when Mr. Khatami speaks of gentleness, he is considering avoiding unnecessary violence for the regime's survival, not violence in the form of widespread public executions: 'When we say we are gentle, it does not mean we will compromise on our national interests... In which era were national interests defended more, while at the same time, efforts were made to avoid tensions as much as possible? Our dignity and greatness do not lie in constantly waging war with the world; the more we can prevent war and conflict to protect our interests, the more significant this step is.' (same source) The meaning of this last sentence is that from the reformists' perspective, de-escalation in Syria and Iraq or widespread executions have not been possible and should continue as before. Religious reformist groups, including Mohammad Khatami, have remained completely silent regarding the Islamic Republic's military intervention in Syria and Iraq or the widespread public executions. Guidance towards non-violence strengthens and supports the harsh regime. Mohammad Khatami, as one of the leaders of this movement, presents religious reformism as a viable and executable movement within the existing government framework: 'The reformist movement is ongoing within our society. Reformism adheres to religion, but an interpretation of religion that is suitable for our times, a religion that recognizes human rights, a religion that respects the rights and dignity of both men and women, and a religion that states the people's vote is valid and should be the basis for action; we defend this religion with all our being.' (same source) However, reformists, by claiming a different interpretation, seek to strengthen the existing regime, which currently follows the governance methods of Khamenei and Khomeini: 'If reform has something to say, it is to strengthen this regime, and if God forbid there is a deviation, it should be corrected. Others want this regime to fall; we say this regime must exist, and of course, you must accept the necessary reforms; otherwise, many of the issues that are said to be the essence of the regime will harm the regime itself.' (same source) The issues that are said to be the essence of the regime are, in fact, the laws and decrees issued and the policies desired by the two Supreme Leaders of the Islamic Republic and its constitution. The performative presence of women. Khatami, to soften his proposal from political Islam, gives a performative role to women, who fundamentally have no place in the decision-making system of the Islamic Republic, whether in the reformists' or militarists' plans. He grants women, against whom the most significant discriminations have been imposed, a share of power in the realm of imagination: 'Isn't the problem of countries and the world today violence? We must inject the spirit of gentleness, kindness, and being together into the government and the international arena. When society becomes very masculine, one should expect more violence and hardship in it. Alongside the fact that both men and women should observe moral issues, one of the ways to remedy the problems existing today in society, the region, and the international community is to strengthen the positive spirit that is abundant in women.' (ISNA, November 26, 2014) Hasn't 36 years of opportunity to grant equal shares to women, while reformists have held significant power, been sufficient? Which one should they believe? To separate the religious reformists from ISIS, Khatami states: 'Today, this fanatic, murderous, and terrorist movement in the world professes belief in religion, performs the outward rituals, but with some forms that existed in the past and pays no attention to the content, and they want to return society to a place that is impossible. God has allowed this society to grow and reach this stage. Humanity today, in its evolutionary journey that God has willed, has reached this point. You cannot turn them back.' (same source) If the issuance of historicist decrees regarding the evolutionary course of humanity and the direction of history is to be considered, ISIS and similar groups in the Islamic Republic also live under the same historicism, believing that the fate of humanity is to live under their rule. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic, according to the reformists' beliefs, emphasizes religious appearances to the same extent that ISIS does, based on the fatwas of Shia jurists. The model that Khatami presents against ISIS is not a Sufi and spiritual Islam but Khomeini's Islam, which does not differ significantly from ISIS's Islam: 'If they propose an Islamic caliphate, the Imam proposed the Islamic Republic. The model in which the people are fundamental, the people have rights, the government is dependent on the people, and the official is accountable to the people, where there is freedom of thought, justice, and ethics.' (same source) These indicators that Khatami mentions have not been realized either during Khomeini's or Khamenei's era. Khatami does not specify how those who stand against the actions of the Islamic Republic and ISIS, both of whom claim pure Islam, should judge which one is more 'Islamic' based on what criteria. Circumventing the hijab issue. Khatami, to attract women to the reformists' programs, states: 'Is our most important issue today bad hijab? ... Of course, no one approves of bad hijab, but politicizing hijab causes the emergence of bad hijab to be presented as a political protest, which if misplaced sensitivities are removed, these issues can also be resolved; what is important to us is the right that is violated for women in villages, cities, and families. If our women feel that the Islamic Republic and cultural figures are defenders against the injustices inflicted on women, many issues in society will be resolved, and we can have these approaches according to the situations we have and turn them into programs and implement them.' (same source) In Khatami's speech, it is finally unclear how mandatory hijab - which religious reformists both believe in and do not believe in - should be implemented. Assuming mandatory hijab is applied in gentle ways, if some women are not satisfied with the religious reformists' defense of their rights and still demand to choose their own attire and establish free intimate relationships, how will a soft and gentle religious government react to them? The marginalization of the hijab issue, which has been a tactic of reformists in dealing with women's issues, ultimately leads to the marginalization of gender segregation, women's employment, and all women's issues in general, as Khamenei and his traditionalist and militarist companions are as sensitive to hijab as they are to women's mixing and work outside the home. Ambiguity does not work. All of Khatami's statements regarding a new proposal about the relationship between Islam and politics and presenting an alternative to the current situation will gain flesh, blood, and social base among the segments of society only if religious reformists reject mandatory hijab, the nuclear program, military intervention in the region, executions, and the overall implementation of Sharia judicial rulings and the privileges of the clergy in the government. Only then can it be believed that religious reformists are democratic, anti-violence, do not favor discrimination against women, and are seeking de-escalation. Within the existing understandings of Islam, the reformists' proposal can be framed not as another interpretation but as a method to achieve the religious government envisioned by Khomeini. Religious reformists have even refrained from articulating their intended methods in many areas. Without these, not only will the people of the world and Iran not believe these statements, but also the supporters of the reformist movement in Iran will not believe them either. With ambiguity and equivocation, it is impossible to have a social force behind oneself and mobilize them. Choosing between the bad and the worse only works once or twice and ultimately disheartens people.