With the emergence of what is called 'Resistance Economy', various interpretations have been presented. The government is trying to present its interpretation of this ambiguous concept as acceptable, but the leaders of the IRGC have different aspirations. It is natural that in a society where civil institutions are suppressed, ultimately an interpretation of 'Resistance Economy' will be implemented that aligns with the tastes and interests of the leaders of power and repression institutions. The economic ambitions of the IRGC leaders are not hidden, and their manifestations can be observed in various forms, especially in the verbal maneuvers of the leaders of this institution. For instance, one of the perennial losers in the electoral arena, the former commander of the IRGC and secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council, Mohsen Rezaei, recently stated: 'The economic problems of the country are due to the economy being held hostage by liberals and Westernized individuals who stood against Imam (Khomeini) and are now standing against the leadership, and the economy of this country will not flourish unless the thoughts of the Imam and the leadership prevail.' In the framework of the prevailing culture of governance in Iran, the use of flattery and sycophancy towards the leadership and accusations against political opponents is a common method for gaining acceptance among the supporters of the Supreme Leader. It is no coincidence that Mohsen Rezaei also employs this method. He further stated: 'The economy is the only support for the liberals to return to the scene, and we hope that the youth who will take over the country's affairs in the future will strive to continue the path that has been followed for the past 36 years and connect it to the revolution of the Mahdi (may God hasten his appearance) and establish the thoughts of the Imam and the leadership over the economy throughout the country.' This same individual has also said elsewhere: 'If the liberals had allowed the forces of the Islamic Revolution and the policies of the leadership to enter the economy, there would not be a single unemployed person in Iran now! Those who are familiar with the most basic concepts of economics know that an economy without a single unemployed person is neither possible nor even positive. This former commander of the IRGC and secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council states: 'Articles 22 and 23 of the general policies of the Resistance Economy, which have been communicated by the Supreme Leader, refer to bringing jihadist values into the realm of the Resistance Economy; therefore, implementing the Resistance Economy through reliance on foreign promises, connection to America, rent-seeking, and corruption is not possible, and even economic backwardness cannot be an excuse for resorting to these destructive elements. Our economic model must be a completely domestic model based on jihadist values.' Such statements, which cannot be coincidental, reflect the heartfelt sentiments of a group that sees its continued existence in complete control over the economy of Iran. It is no coincidence that the media of this group, with astonishing tenacity, simultaneously banging the drum of an ambiguous entity called 'Resistance Economy', demand the expulsion of their political rivals, labeled as 'liberals and Westernized', from power. It is no coincidence that this same individual, in another instance, referred to some aspects of the Resistance Economy and the importance and breadth of attention to this sensitive area in the slogans of the Supreme Leader's year, called Iran the first revolutionary country and emphasized that if, after conquering political, defensive, and security positions, the economic position is also conquered with new and practical discourses, Iran will be the first revolutionary system to achieve this guiding goal. In line with this media war for the complete seizure of the Iranian economy, the Tasnim news agency published an article titled 'The Deviation Line of the Economy, from Mohsen Nourbakhsh to Farhad Nili'. According to this article: 'The presence of Iranian graduates from Western universities at the head of the Central Bank is the main cause of Iran's economic troubles in the history of the revolution and the economic deviation of the country.' The author, to complete his argument, writes: 'The universities of California, Berkeley, and Chicago are the largest spy houses of America in the world that train technocrats at zero cost, or rather, earn income from the host country. Berkeley is known for its mafia, whose graduates went to Indonesia and set this poor country on fire. Millions were massacred during the suppressions of General Suharto, who had entrusted the country to Berkeley graduates, to pave the way for the advancement of reformist programs.' How the IRGC took control of the Iranian economy under the shadow of privatization. According to the extensive privatization program of state-owned enterprises, which was based on a reinterpretation of Article 44 of the Constitution and aimed at reducing the government's share in the economy by 20 percent annually, the government was supposed to reduce its share in the economy. According to this program, the government was to transfer large industries, mother industries (such as large downstream oil and gas industries), large mines (except for oil and gas), foreign trade activities, banking, electricity production and importation, all postal and telecommunications (except for the main telecommunications networks), roads and railways, aviation, and shipping to the private and cooperative sectors. Methods such as tax discounts and credit facilities were considered to expedite this transfer. In the absence of competition due to the weakness of the private sector, what actually happened was the transfer of government assets to the IRGC and affiliated institutions. Thus, the public sector shrank, but at the same time, the IRGC, as a paramilitary sector, filled the position of the public sector. The IRGC, through and by utilizing credits and facilities from institutions such as the IRGC Cooperative Foundation and the Ansar Financial and Credit Institution, and the Mehr Economy Investment Company, holds ownership and management of economic enterprises registered on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Although the inefficiency of supervisory institutions and ambiguity in laws create the groundwork for the IRGC's monopoly in the Iranian economy, it is the relationship of the IRGC with the leadership and its dominance over other institutions that enables the IRGC's control over the Iranian economy. Although a comprehensive report on the economic activities of the IRGC has not yet been published, the activities of this military organization and its affiliated institutions are directly involved in the fields of oil and gas, road construction, dam construction and tunneling, agriculture, telecommunications (as a major shareholder of the Telecommunications Company of Iran), and construction, and it exercises its ownership over enterprises registered on the Tehran Stock Exchange through holding companies.
Resistance Economy and the Aspirations of the IRGC Leaders
The article discusses the concept of 'Resistance Economy' in Iran, highlighting the IRGC leaders' ambitions to dominate the economy, particularly through political rhetoric that blames economic issues on liberal and Western influences. It emphasizes the IRGC's increasing control over economic sectors following privatization efforts, which have led to a significant transfer of state assets to the IRGC and its affiliates.
👥 Key Players
📰 What Happened
The article discusses the IRGC's ambitions to dominate Iran's economy through the concept of 'Resistance Economy', criticizing liberal influences and emphasizing domestic economic control.
- The IRGC seeks to control the economy by promoting 'Resistance Economy' and sidelining liberal policies.
- Privatization efforts have led to significant state asset transfers to the IRGC.
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
The IRGC has historically played a significant role in Iran's politics and economy, often clashing with reformist elements.
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Translation confidence: 85%