Return of Ahmadinejad's Associates: With Extremism and Limited Influence

Former associates of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have begun their activities in a group called "Yekta." This group includes at least six former ministers and two former vice presidents. From studying and evaluating the statements and position of "Yekta" (Efficient and Transformative Companions of Islamic Iran) within the broader political framework of the country, several points can be inferred, including: One - the strategic impact of "Yekta" on the political scene is limited. Two - the mobilization power of "Yekta" among "gray" voters is restricted. Three - "Yekta" will create opportunities for its peers in the conservative front. Four - "Yekta" may exacerbate the leadership crisis among conservatives. Five - the return of populism in rhetoric and extremism in behavior could pose challenges for reformists. Opportunities and threats for conservatives: The formation of "Yekta" (although it has not yet received official approval from the Ministry of Interior) will create several opportunities for conservatives that can be examined at the organizational level, in the realm of discourse, and in political methods. Ahmadinejad's associates have influence in state and semi-state institutions, including the Ministry of Interior, and will utilize these networks. Their influence, particularly in districts, governorships, and provincial administrations, has been noted, which can be exploited in either formal or informal ways. In terms of discourse, the return of populism and the issue of class identity and social justice by "Yekta" allows the mobilization of low-income classes for the conservative camp. This populist discourse brought conservatives to power during Ahmadinejad's presidency, and its revival will be a strong temptation for conservatives. In terms of method and tactics, "attack as the best defense" will be the guiding principle of "Yekta," increasing the operational maneuvering space for conservatives. However, the rise of "Yekta" and other extremist groups can also present problems and threats for conservatives, most importantly intensifying their internal struggle to determine leadership within the front. "Yekta" and other extremist conservatives will collaborate with traditional groups but are likely to take an opposing stance against moderate conservatives (such as Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, Mohsen Rezaei, and Ali Larijani) and claim leadership over them. The strengthening of the extremist element within the conservative front will exacerbate their internal tensions. The 2013 elections showed that the general public is more inclined towards moderate conservatives, preferring Qalibaf over Saeed Jalili. Therefore, if extremists gain the upper hand at the expense of moderates, they could jeopardize the position of this front in public opinion and deal a significant blow to it. Political methods: The formation of "Yekta" within the conservative front will bring along extreme methods and encourage assaults, especially in cultural and foreign policy areas (including the nuclear issue). The easiest and most accessible method for extremists will be to exert pressure in public spaces and create street tensions to foster public distrust in Rouhani's government. "Yekta" will likely pursue the previously tested strategy, including creating a bipolar condition to isolate the middle layers of society and portray the government as powerless against pressure groups. Their tactic will involve continuous criticism and pressure on government programs, particularly in cultural areas (e.g., canceling music concerts and preventing women's presence in public places). A determining element: regulating internal relations among conservatives. A key point in determining the position of "Yekta" is how internal relations among conservatives (i.e., between the three tendencies of extremists, traditionalists, and moderates) are managed. The relationship between extremists and traditionalists is pragmatic in nature, but their relationship with moderates is tense and unpredictable. The bitter history of Ahmadinejad's confrontation with Ali Larijani and his associates is well-known. The expectation of organizational or political unity among these tendencies in the current conditions is unrealistic and at best may lead to some form of convergence among them. In the previous parliamentary elections, the formation of a committee known as "7+8" represented all conservative tendencies and was a breakthrough for them. If a similar agreement is reached this time, conservatives will be relatively united. Otherwise, we should expect deeper divisions among them or one tendency to dominate the others, which is less likely. Opportunities and threats for reformists: It seems that reformists will welcome the return of Ahmadinejad's associates. Apparently, the common analysis among reformists is that the return of extremists keeps Ahmadinejad's memory alive and will be detrimental to conservatives. Reminding the public of Ahmadinejad's shortcomings in nuclear policy (sanctions) and in economic areas (unemployment, inflation, and corruption) could frighten some segments of society and alert them to the risks of conservative programs. Reformists also hope that the activities of Ahmadinejad's associates will, if not paralyze, at least disorganize the internal relations of conservatives and diminish their electoral capabilities. However, this optimism and welcome could have dire consequences for reformists. One cannot ignore the possibility that "Yekta" could revive the wave of populism again, especially if Rouhani faces challenges in advancing nuclear or economic programs. In that case, "Yekta" and extremist groups will portray Rouhani's government as incapable and find an opportunity to fuel populism and present themselves as an alternative force. The fact that the conservative front has only managed to gain executive power under the leadership of extremists indicates that the temptation to align this front under the leadership of the extremist element is a strong allure that keeps conservatives addicted to reviving it to attack Rouhani's government. Limited impact on public opinion: "Yekta" may be able to mobilize the loyal base of conservatives and bring them into the arena, but it will likely frighten the social base of reformists even more and mobilize them as well. What is uncertain is the extent of "Yekta" and other extremists' influence on the "gray and floating" voter segment, which has no specific group loyalty and can lean towards any political pole. It could be argued that if Rouhani suffers a heavy defeat in part of his agenda, "Yekta" could benefit from the protest votes of the gray segment. However, it should also be noted that currently, the "caution and conservatism" stemming from Middle Eastern wars is a determining element in public opinion in Iran, and the gray voting segment will be concerned by the extreme methods of groups like "Yekta." Additionally, the gray segment does not have a specific inclination towards traditional social thought and culture, and "Yekta" cannot attract them with the ticket of their religious traditionalism. In other words, "Yekta"'s dealings with traditional conservatives and moving under their traditional banner, namely "pure Muhammad's Islam," will backfire against extremists in public opinion. Thus, even in the best conditions for "Yekta," such as the nuclear negotiations stalling, its influence will remain limited. Slightly adjusted discourse: An examination of the statements and limited remarks of "Yekta" members shows that the group's discourse is the same as Ahmadinejad's with slight but noteworthy changes. In foreign affairs, "Yekta" apparently maintains the previous radicalism of "resistance" and "aggression" and prefers the "jihadist" approach in economic matters to achieve social justice and class identity. However, slight changes and renewals are observed in the cultural and domestic political spheres. In cultural matters, where the "Iranian school" (combining Shiism and Iranian nationalism) was one of the reasons for Ahmadinejad and Rahim Mashaei's failures, there is now an emphasis on "pure Muhammad's Islam" and a tendency towards traditional culture. In domestic politics, references to "the constitution and freedoms" have emerged, which seems to be a new emphasis. Additionally, the promotion of allegiance to the clergy and alignment with religious authority is more pronounced. Despite this fluctuation in discourse, it is unclear how foundational and sustainable these changes will be. Ahmadinejad: A double-edged sword for Yekta. Ahmadinejad has two completely contradictory aspects for "Yekta" and serves as a double-edged sword. On one hand, Ahmadinejad is a burden for conservatives. They have not forgotten his 11-day standoff with the leader, his unilateralism, and disregard for his peers. Some members of "Yekta" are those who disagreed with him during his second term and separated from him, and it does not seem that they are willing to forgive his "sins" and accept him back among their ranks. On the other hand, Ahmadinejad enjoys popularity among significant segments of society and provides a favorable position for propaganda. Ahmadinejad's personal popularity is an asset that cannot be easily overlooked. None of the conservative political figures have been able to attain his status so far. In such circumstances, "Yekta"'s approach should logically aim to distance itself from his presidency in a way that utilizes his aura of popularity while also sitting far enough away to avoid the consequences of his mischief. Limited impact on the political scene: Attention to three elements of the political scene - namely public opinion position; internal relations among conservatives; and the balance of power between conservatives and reformists - provides a realistic assessment of "Yekta"'s position. Accordingly, one can imagine that the 2013 election model could be used as a basis and repeated, with "Yekta" and its peers obtaining about ten percent of the votes and winning in some areas, such as Mashhad. In this case, the hardliners' seats in parliament would be halved. With such an assumption and considering the points raised, even if "Yekta" strengthens the position of conservatives in some respects, it will not create a strategic change in the larger equations and will not alter the main game. "Yekta": A step towards political development. In a longer historical view, the organized activities of Ahmadinejad's former associates could be positively assessed. They can still represent a part of Iranian society, even though their political and financial capabilities currently exceed their social base. Collective work is gradually becoming serious in the current conditions of Iran, and factions are moving away from being fluid, variable, and personal to adopting a more formal, impersonal, and stable form. In such a process, the forces associated with "Yekta" may lose their unknown and hidden nature and come closer to the stage of forming a party. In Iran, reaching a point where, for example, two powerful parties can represent most of society still requires time - about four presidential terms or 16 years - and the more organized formation and activity of "Yekta" could be a small step in this process.