Richard Haass's Proposal to Trump: Negotiate with the Islamic Republic Backed by Credible Force

The former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Haass, recently addressed the options for Donald Trump's administration in dealing with Iran in an article. He warned that a direct military attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would only delay the Islamic Republic's nuclear weapons program by a few years. In the article published on Monday, January 7, in Foreign Affairs, Haass also explains that pursuing a 'regime change' policy in Iran may not serve U.S. interests. Haass describes the developments since October 7, 2023, as the 'beginning of the end of Iran's regional dominance,' arguing that the Islamic Republic's regional influence has been unprecedentedly weakened, domestic dissatisfaction with the Iranian government has peaked, and economic problems and sanctions have left the government unable to meet the most basic needs of society, such as electricity, gas, and water. He notes that concerns regarding Iran remain in three areas: its nuclear program, Iran's support for its proxy groups in the Middle East, and the government's treatment of its people. He argues that simultaneous efforts to succeed in all three areas are almost certain to fail and explains that foreign policy must achieve what is possible as well as desirable, and pursuing idealistic and unrealistic approaches can lead to the failure of all efforts. Regarding the nuclear program, Haass emphasizes that it should be the highest priority for the U.S. as a nuclear Iran could threaten U.S. allies in the region and lead to an arms race involving Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which he believes would threaten regional stability. Therefore, he reiterates that stopping Iran's nuclear program should be an 'immediate priority' for the U.S. He suggests diplomacy for this purpose but argues that to ensure the success of diplomacy, it must be combined with a credible threat of force. He emphasizes that diplomacy should explore the 'capacity for a grand bargain' whereby Iran agrees to transparency and verifiability of its nuclear program, limits the amount of enriched materials and the level of enrichment, and guarantees that any nuclear weapons-related activities will be prohibited. Haass also adds that this agreement should address Iran's regional activities in the Middle East, end Tehran's military support for non-state actors like Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah, and impose restrictions on Iran's missile program. He believes these are the most significant differences that a new agreement would have compared to the 2015 JCPOA, as it would not be limited to Iran's nuclear program alone. In another part of his detailed article, Haass addresses the arguments of those who believe 'regime change' in Iran should be prioritized. He points out that the logic of these individuals is that a democratic, pro-Western Iran would not pursue nuclear weapons and would refrain from supporting its proxy forces. However, Haass explains that there is little evidence to suggest that Washington can facilitate regime change in Iran. He describes the Iranian government as an authoritarian regime but adds that while all such regimes share common characteristics, such as being led by an individual rather than collective leadership and a significant lack of institutions, not all of these regimes are equally fragile. He notes the significant problems and discontent among Iranians, stating that in this energy-rich country, people suffer from energy shortages. At the same time, he emphasizes that the Islamic Republic still has real bases of internal support, with forces willing to use violence to protect the regime. In his article for Foreign Affairs, Haass also adds that while tools such as covert support, sanctions, non-recognition of the regime, and recognition of the opposition exist, history has shown that there is no guarantee that such tools will achieve the desired effect, and these changes may not necessarily align with U.S. interests. In another section of the article, Haass refers to the necessity of utilizing 'credible force' to support diplomatic efforts, invoking the famous quote from George Kennan, the author of the containment doctrine. Kennan, a U.S. diplomat during the Cold War, stated that a minimal military presence behind negotiations would greatly assist diplomacy. Accordingly, while Haass supports the existence of a military threat against Iran, he generally opposes its application as the primary idea against the Iranian government. He discusses the necessity of a direct military attack by the U.S. on Iran's nuclear facilities and argues against it, explaining that even if such an attack seriously damages Iran's nuclear facilities, it would not provide a permanent solution, as the Iranian government has acquired nuclear knowledge that cannot be destroyed by an attack. Haass argues that such an attack would lead the Iranian government to decide to rebuild its nuclear program in stronger positions that American and Israeli munitions cannot destroy and would use such an attack as further justification for the need to develop nuclear weapons. He also adds that such an attack could lead the Islamic Republic to retaliate against Israel with its ballistic missiles or target the oil and gas facilities of its neighbors, many of whom are vital regional partners of the U.S. Haass, who served as an advisor to Colin Powell during George W. Bush's administration, continues by stating that for such an agreement, the U.S. would offer to lift a significant portion of sanctions on Tehran and recognize the Iranian government while promising to cease efforts for regime change. He argues that Tehran would be inclined to agree to such an agreement due to the numerous economic problems it faces, likening it to the 'drinking of poison' by Ruhollah Khomeini at the end of the Iran-Iraq War. In conclusion, Haass explains that strategic opportunities are not permanent, and Washington must seize the opportunity to control Iran's nuclear program and change the behavior of the Islamic Republic, as he states that the Islamic Republic may soon conclude that only possessing nuclear weapons can protect Iran against the U.S. and Israel.