Rohani Against Khamenei?

In a recent statement that contrasts with the views of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Hassan Rouhani has commented on the teaching of English in Iranian schools, saying: "The choice of which language and how many foreign languages we learn depends on our resources, the number of teachers familiar with foreign languages, and of course, the will of the people. The people themselves must want it, and the students must also want it and be able to choose how many languages they want to learn." Rouhani's remarks came just two days after the Supreme Leader's comments during a meeting with teachers, where Ayatollah Khamenei criticized the "insistence on promoting the exclusive use of English," describing it as "an unhealthy practice" and adding: "A foreign language is not just English; the language of science is not just English. Why are other languages not designated as language subjects in schools? What is the insistence? This is a legacy of the Pahlavi era." The Supreme Leader criticized the teaching of English as part of nurturing a generation favorable to the "global hegemonic system." Now, Rouhani, in a statement that diverges from the leadership's position, says: "If 98 percent of students choose one foreign language in school, we cannot teach another language for the remaining two percent with the resources we have." He also recalls some realities of the world, adding: "Today in the Indian subcontinent, where more than one and a half to two billion people live, because this vast population is proficient in English, see what they are doing in IT and what great jobs they have secured." In explaining his differing stance from the leadership, he adds: "We must teach a language that facilitates the acquisition of knowledge and creates more jobs for the future young generation and eases our economic relations with the world; of course, today our level of relations with the world is extensive." This is not the first time in the three years of Rouhani's government that he has expressed views that differ from the Supreme Leader's opinions. For example, his remark that "if I say I am revolutionary, well, you are revolutionary, but what does revolutionary mean?" was a noticeable expression of a different stance compared to the opposition media and the Supreme Leader's media arms; especially considering that Ayatollah Khamenei has emphasized that "I am revolutionary" and has repeatedly encouraged his audiences in various institutions to "think and act revolutionarily." In another instance, in Esfand 1392, the Supreme Leader expressed empathy with the cultural concerns of members of the Assembly of Experts, saying: "In cultural matters, the respected government must pay attention... I hope that cultural officials will be mindful of what they are doing. Cultural issues cannot be joked about; carelessness cannot be tolerated; if a cultural breach occurs, it cannot be fixed as easily as economic breaches can be fixed with money or food baskets or cash subsidies; it is not that easy, it will not be easily repairable, it has many problems." Two days after these remarks, Rouhani expressed a distinct view at a press festival: "Undoubtedly, if in a society mouths are closed and pens are broken, public trust will disappear, and eyes and ears will turn towards foreign communication means. Let the field of pen and expression be open so that truths can be clarified for the people and society... If cultural issues were to be resolved through pressure and police methods, we should not still be worried about our society's culture after all these years..." In another instance, in Farvardin 1393, the Supreme Leader emphasized on Women's Day that we must "completely empty our minds of the things that Westerners say about women (regarding employment, management, gender equality). One of the greatest errors of Western thought regarding women is this notion of gender equality." The day after these remarks, Rouhani clarified that "women should have equal opportunities, equal protections, and equal social rights." Another example occurred in the spring of 1393; Ayatollah Khamenei stated: "Some people, when it comes to guidance and expressing religious truths, say, 'Sir, are we obliged to take people to heaven?' Yes, indeed; the difference between an Islamic ruler and other rulers is exactly this: an Islamic ruler wants to do something that leads people to heaven; to true happiness and the hereafter; thus, the paths must be paved." A few days later, the moderate president announced: "Do not interfere so much in people's lives, even out of concern; let people choose their own path to heaven; you cannot force people to heaven with force and whips. The Prophet did not have a whip in his hand; the Prophet was a bearer of good news and a warner, and we must also be bearers of good news and warners." There are numerous examples, regardless of the occasional reactions of Ayatollah Khamenei to Rouhani's views on various issues (such as negotiations with the West, engagement with the U.S., the JCPOA, post-JCPOA, the economy, and supervisory oversight). The disagreement between Rouhani and the leadership of the system is not a new phenomenon in the Islamic Republic. The design that the constitution outlines for a system based on the guardianship of the jurist, and the realities of the political power structure and the powers and authorities of the two senior officials of the government, have made such a narrative inevitable — regardless of who the leader is and who the president is. From the disagreements between Ayatollah Khomeini and Abolhassan Banisadr to the tensions of Seyyed Ali Khamenei with the president of the Islamic Republic, and from the problems of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami with the second leader of the Islamic Republic to Ahmadinejad's challenges with him — which led to the famous 11-day absence of the president following the controversial and ambiguous elections of 1388 — there are numerous pieces of evidence. Although depending on the temperaments and spirits and projects of the two leaders and presidents, the dimensions of the challenges and the depth of disagreements have varied. A noteworthy point regarding the disagreement between Rouhani and the leadership of the system is their long-standing history of cooperation and familiarity. The moderate president, elected and appointed by the first person of the system in the Expediency Discernment Council and the Supreme National Security Council, has been a long-time companion in the political power structure. However, this has not prevented the head of the political system from criticizing him directly and indirectly since the very next day of Rouhani's presidency. Regardless of the reasons and causes of this event (which may be traced back to the sensitivity of the period following Rouhani's rise to power and the nuclear negotiations, as well as the increase in the leadership's authoritarianism after the 1388 electoral coup), the moderate president has been targeted by the criticisms of the Supreme Leader much sooner and more than previous presidents. Independent of Ahmadinejad's case, and aside from the special case of Hashemi Rafsanjani, even in Khatami's case, Ayatollah Khamenei did not clarify his boundaries or criticize him so quickly. However, it is noteworthy that Rouhani has not backed down, and his independence and self-confidence in the face of a leadership that has been in power for more than a quarter of a century is evident. What is the root of Rouhani's audacity? Why does Rouhani appear so confidently against the first person of the system? Does he consider himself backed by social support and public opinion? Do the differing demands of the majority of society and the social base supporting him, as well as the social force behind him, increase his audacity in his differing positions with Ayatollah Khamenei, and even in his critical confrontation with the head of the political system? In the author's opinion, although one cannot disregard all of this, it seems that Rouhani's courage is rooted in more significant factors. In addition to Rouhani's personal temperament and spirit (he has a self-confidence worthy of the presidency based on his long-standing experience in senior security and political management in the system), he is sufficiently aware of two situations: first, the core power's need for his continued presence in the presidency to extricate the system from various crises — especially the economic crisis; and second, his awareness of the Supreme Leader's illness and the psychological and physical consequences that come with it. Both of these, from Rouhani's perspective, likely prevent acute and severe confrontations with him in the short term and, on the other hand, create a kind of tolerance out of necessity in the central power. This does not mean that Rouhani is the preferred option for the authoritarian and principlist factions for another four years; rather, it simply means that Rouhani intelligently knows that there is no escape from tolerating him for the time being. In addition to all this, the moderate president is politically trying to clarify his position and avoid the usual courtesies in the government, thereby making his social base of support and the civil society revitalized by the 1392 and 1394 elections more hopeful, motivated, and empowered. This approach could strengthen Rouhani's position in the political power structure and make it more costly for authoritarian forces to obstruct and limit him. It seems that Rouhani, in a realistic assessment of power relations and equipped with the necessary data, has realized that the "benefit" of his candid and distinct remarks outweighs their "costs." He likely believes that in lobbying with the first person of the system, relying on that long-standing and old relationship, and based on his political maneuvering skills, temperament, intelligence, and even his "smile," he can sufficiently mitigate the side effects and upheavals. It remains that he has always left himself an "escape route"; as in this case regarding the English language, he has called for the issue to be examined by the Ministry of Education and a report to be submitted to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council. It should be added that with the increase of his authority and effective playing field, Rouhani not only increases the chances of success for his programs and goals — with increased empathy and support from society — but at the same time — considering the illness of the Supreme Leader — he appears as a significant option for the "critical moment" of selecting the next leader, in the eyes of public opinion and political actors.